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I.I) CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW 
Cognitive impairment is a fundamental aspect of schizophrenia [1]. The last twenty 
years or so have witnessed a large, and increasing, body of research literature reporting 
substantial decrements in cognition in those with the disorder [2]. These problems 
have serious implications for individuals’ functioning [3] and quality of life – and 
therefore recovery. However, neither the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition [DSM-V; 4], nor the International Statistical Classification of 
Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Edition [ICD-10; 5], specify the presence 
of cognitive impairments as being necessary in their respective criteria for a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia. Also, although cognitive remediation therapy (CRT) has been 
convincingly shown to be effective in addressing cognitive impairment [6], the latest 
NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) guidelines for psychosis [7] 
do not advocate its provision for these issues in schizophrenia. For these reasons, 
despite their being a core feature of the disorder, the extent to which cognitive 
impairments are currently recognised and addressed by mental health services for 
those with schizophrenia is at present unclear. This study therefore set out to explore, 
within an NHS community mental health team for psychosis in the UK, multi-
disciplinary staff members’ knowledge and awareness of cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia. 
I.II) LITERATURE REVIEW 
The term ‘schizophrenia’ refers to a heterogeneous range of symptoms, including 
implausible and peculiar beliefs and sensory experiences, social withdrawal, restricted 
or inappropriate emotional expression and disorganised behaviour [4]. ‘Cognition’ 
incorporates a range of abilities, including: (i) attention/concentration (the ability to 
focus upon a particular stimulus and to maintain that stimulus in mind, sometimes 
over an extended period); (ii) short- and long-term forms of memory; (iii) working 
memory (the ability to briefly hold and manipulate information, e.g., when performing 
mental arithmetic); (iv) processing speed (the ability to perform simple mental tasks 
quickly and efficiently); (v) speech and language abilities (e.g., vocabulary, verbal 
comprehension and verbal expression, etc.); (vi) visuo-spatial skills (the ability to 
recognise, organise and interpret visual information, e.g., map-reading), and; (vii) 
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motor skills. An individual’s general intelligence (or Intelligence Quotient; IQ) refers 
to their average ability across these various domains. In addition, executive functions 
are another crucial aspect of cognition, and refer to a range of processes involved in the 
initiation and maintenance of goal-directed behaviour [8], including 
planning/organisation, decision-making, problem-solving, impulse-control, self-
monitoring and set-shifting (the ability to ‘flit back and forth’ between different tasks). 
Finally, social cognition refers to ‘the ability to perceive, process and utilise social 
information’ [9, p. 126] and incorporates theory-of-mind skills (the ability to infer the 
intentions and mental states of others). Cognitive impairment, therefore, refers to 
dysfunction in one or more of these abilities. 
Historically, the pioneering German psychiatrists Emil Kraepelin [10, 11] and Eugen 
Bleuler [12, 13] held that cognitive impairments were ‘fundamental’ in schizophrenia 
and that positive symptoms were merely ‘accessory’. Indeed, the very name that 
Kraepelin gave to the disorder, ‘Dementia Praecox’, broadly translates as ‘premature 
cognitive decline’. Yet the decades after witnessed a decline in the conceptual 
importance placed on cognitive impairments, manifested perhaps most clearly in the 
DSM-V [4] and ICD-10 [5] criteria for schizophrenia, which focus almost exclusively on 
positive and negative symptoms, without any explicit reference to cognitive deficits 
[14]. This relative neglect of cognitive impairments may be due, firstly, to positive 
symptoms being arguably more salient than cognitive deficits, which, by comparison, 
may be relatively subtle. It may also be attributable to the absence, until around the 
mid-1950s, of standardised measures for assessing cognition [2]. However, the 
development of standardised, norm-referenced neuropsychological measures to 
systematically assess the various domains of cognition [such as the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale - Fourth Edition, or WAIS-IV; 15] proved to be hugely important. The 
subsequent application of such measures to explore functioning in those with 
schizophrenia, relative to healthy controls, initiated by Shakow [16, 17], has resulted in 
a large body of research literature reporting substantial cognitive deficits in 
schizophrenia. 
Over the last twenty years or so, a series of meta-analyses comparing those with 
schizophrenia against healthy controls has provided overwhelming evidence for the 
existence of substantial cognitive impairments in patients [18-23]. The very largest 
cognitive impairments (i.e. of around 1.5 pooled standard deviations) appear to be in 
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processing speed and aspects of sensory, verbal and working memory [2]. However, 
impairments are global and broad-based, also being reported across tests of attention, 
executive function, language, motor and spatial abilities, social cognition and general 
intelligence (i.e. around 1.0 pooled standard deviation) – indeed, on virtually any test 
of cognition administered. Such is the magnitude of these impairments, they equal or 
exceed those seen in composite cognition following moderate to severe traumatic brain 
injury [24], non-verbal memory following right-hemisphere stroke [25], executive 
impairments in attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder [26] and, perhaps most 
shockingly, memory impairments seen in preclinical and subsequent Alzheimer’s 
disease [27]. On the basis of meta-analytic findings, 70-75 per cent of individuals with 
schizophrenia perform significantly below the general population across a wide range 
of cognitive tests [2]. In fact, Keefe et al. [28] have even reported that 98.1 per cent of 
individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia fail to reach their expected level of 
general cognitive ability (i.e. based on maternal education level). The cognitive deficits 
observed in schizophrenia seem to become apparent from around age 7 [29], with Gur 
et al. [30] reporting that, through the ages of 8 to 21 years, those who later go on to 
develop the disorder are between 6 to 18 months behind typically-developing children 
in terms of cognitive development. Consequently, Kahn and Keefe [1] have called for 
the re-conceptualisation of schizophrenia as a primarily cognitive disorder, with 
positive symptoms relegated to a secondary position. 
Perhaps contrary to common perception, it seems that cognitive deficits cannot be 
attributed to the side-effects of anti-psychotic medication. In fact, longitudinal studies 
and meta-analyses suggest that anti-psychotics may have a beneficial, instead of 
detrimental, effect on cognition in general [31-34]. This notwithstanding, meta-analytic 
evidence does suggest that slow processing speed might be brought about, or at least 
augmented by, medication – possibly due to adverse effects on basal ganglia motor 
systems [35]. Impairments in spatial working memory have been reported in first-
episode patients administered Risperidone [36], whilst different aspects of implicit 
memory have been found to be selectively impaired depending on whether first- or 
second-generation medications are administered [37]. Overall, though, it seems 
implausible that the range and magnitude of cognitive deficits in schizophrenia are a 
function of medication side-effects. Similarly, it seems unlikely that cognitive 
impairment results from the psycho-social stresses associated with a schizophrenia 
diagnosis. Firstly, moderate to severe impairments across most cognitive domains are 
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(already) present in first-episode patients [38, 39], as well as in an attenuated form in 
those identified as exhibiting prodromal symptoms [40]. Secondly, the deficit profile 
observed in such individuals is consistent with that seen in more chronic samples. 
Thirdly, the cognitive impairments observed in first-episode patients and prodromal 
individuals have been found to remain stable for up to 10 years [albeit with some 
deterioration in verbal memory; 41]. 
A growing literature indicates that cognitive impairments are an important predictor 
of functional outcome in schizophrenia [3]. Crucially, impairments in cognition appear 
to predict functional outcome to a greater degree than either positive or negative 
symptoms [42] – ‘functional outcome’ referring here not only to symptom-reduction 
and time spent in hospital, but also to factors such as degree of independence in 
community living, social relationships, occupational development and quality of life. 
Green [43] and Green et al. [3] reported medium-sized mean effect-sizes (i.e. ES = 0.30) 
for the relationship between individual cognitive abilities and functional outcome, 
whilst larger effect-sizes have been found between composite measures of cognition 
and functional outcome [44]. Specifically, Green et al. [3] reported that: (i) verbal 
fluency, executive functioning and secondary verbal memory (i.e. the ability to acquire 
and store verbal information from several minutes to much longer) reliably predicted 
community functioning; (ii) vigilance (i.e. sustained attention) and secondary verbal 
memory reliably predicted social problem-solving skills; and (iii) immediate and 
secondary verbal memory both reliably predicted psychosocial skill acquisition. A 
range of studies report robust associations between various cognitive domains and 
specific aspects of work functioning [e.g., 45, 46, 47]. Even when they have secured a 
job, those with the disorder often find it difficult to maintain employment, due to, for 
example, poor work performance [i.e. fewer than 15-20% of those with schizophrenia 
are employed; 48, 49, 50]. A meta-analysis by Fett et al. [51] reported that the amount 
of variance in functional outcome accounted for by cognitive measures ranged from 4 
per cent, in terms of attention measures predicting social outcomes, to up to 23 per 
cent, for measures of social cognition predicting community functioning. Although this 
may seem modest, consider that stress electrocardiograms account for around 5 per 
cent of the variance in coronary artery disease and mammogram results account for 
around 9 per cent of cancer morbidity at one-year follow-up [52]. Due to the early onset 
of the disorder and its long-term impairing effects on the ability to look after oneself, 
complete activities of daily living and work, schizophrenia has been identified as one 
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of the ten most globally burdensome illnesses to individuals and societies throughout 
the world [53]. 
The above notwithstanding, it is possible to ameliorate cognitive impairments and 
their functional consequences. A substantial research (and financial) effort has 
examined the possible benefits of pharmacological interventions for cognitive 
impairments. Such interventions have included the administration of first- and second-
generation anti-psychotics alone, as well as pharmacological augmentation – that is, 
multiple medications with different targets – thus, anti-psychotics for positive 
symptoms, anti-depressants for negative symptoms, as well as medications aimed 
specifically at the cognitive deficits. However, overall, medications have been shown to 
be of little benefit [54, 55]. Cognitive Remediation Therapy (CRT) – an umbrella term 
that refers to a range of different, though related, interventions, with the shared aim of 
improving impaired cognition – on the other hand, has been shown to be effective. In 
practice, CRT engages the participant in a wide variety of tasks, often delivered by a 
therapist, that are repeated over and again until the specific ability in question has 
improved. In a randomised controlled trial (RCT) including 85 participants, Wykes et 
al. [56] reported that 40 weeks of CRT led to durable improvements in working memory 
ability which, in turn, led to improvements in social functioning. Furthermore, several 
meta-analyses have reported CRT to bring about medium-to-large effect-size 
improvements across various domains of cognitive functioning [6, 57, 58], with only a 
limited amount of cognitive remediation (e.g., 5-15 hours) being sufficient to bring 
about improvements. In combination with psychiatric rehabilitation, CRT can promote 
improvements in functioning [54, 57, 59]. Also, patients report CRT-based 
interventions to be engaging and enjoyable, and they are associated with increases in 
self-esteem [60]. It was arguably surprising, therefore, that the most recent NICE 
guidelines, published in 2014, did not recommend the provision of CRT to address 
cognitive deficits. NICE concluded that there is ‘no consistent evidence that cognitive 
remediation alone is effective in improving the critical outcomes’ (p. 249). However, 
NICE incorporated relapse rates, rehospitalisation and mental state as part of their 
‘critical outcomes’. Even the most enthusiastic proponents of CRT may be cautious 
about its potential for having an impact upon such outcomes, the primary aim of CRT 
being to improve functioning in a specific cognitive domain(s), as well as improving 




I.III) THE PRESENT STUDY 
Given the above, it is surely important that Psychosis services are not only aware of, 
but also dedicate an appropriate level of resource to, the understanding and 
management of cognitive impairments in patients. The present study therefore set out 
to explore this in an NHS CMHT for Psychosis in the UK. 
II. METHODS 
II.I) DESIGN 
The design utilised a mixed-methods approach. At baseline, quantitative (via closed 
questions) and qualitative (via open-ended questions) data were derived from 
individual structured interviews with multi-disciplinary staff members in a Community 
Mental Health Team (CMHT) for psychosis, with the aim of exploring their knowledge 
and awareness of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. At the end of each of these 
interviews, staff members were asked to: i) identify (the number of) patients on their 
caseload whom they believed to exhibit cognitive impairment/s, and; ii) rate their 
confidence (from 0-10, with ‘10’ being ‘the greatest confidence possible’) in being able 
to notice cognitive impairments in patients with schizophrenia. 
The interviews took place prior to participants attending a teaching session (i.e. the 
intervention) on cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. Following the teaching 
session intervention, staff members were asked to again: i) identify (the number of) 
patients on their caseload they believed to exhibit cognitive impairment/s, and; ii) rate 
their confidence in being able to notice cognitive impairments, from 0-10; these 
quantitative aspects of the design were thus repeated-measures in nature. 
II.II) PARTICIPANTS 
All staff members within a Multi-Disciplinary Community Mental Health Team 
(CMHT) for psychosis participated in the study. There were 15 participants, aged 34 to 
65, of which 11 were female. There were no inclusion/exclusion criteria, other than 
being a staff member within the team. 
The study was given ethical approval by the relevant body in the NHS Trust within 
which the study took place (not named here in order to preserve confidentiality). 
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Participants gave verbal consent after being provided with both a verbal and a written 
outline of the study during a Business Meeting within the CMHT. Participants were 
assured of confidentiality and were informed that they could end their participation at 
any stage and have their data removed. 
II. III) MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE 
II.III.I) BASELINE: STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE TO EXPLORE KNOWLEDGE 
AND AWARENESS OF COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 
A structured interview schedule, developed by the authors, was used to explore staff 
members’ knowledge and awareness of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. The 
interview schedule consisted of the 3 broad sections detailed below and, in general, 
tended to take around 30-35 minutes to administer. With the exception of one 
participant (who withheld consent), all interviews were recorded via Dictaphone and 
subsequently transcribed verbatim. 
Both quantitative (closed questions) and qualitative (open questions) data were 
collected via the interviews. The type of data collected via each question is given in 
brackets below. 
II.III.I.I) SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (ALL DATA QUANTITATIVE) 
Section A was used to collect the following information: i) age; ii) gender; iii) ethnicity; 
iv) position; v) the length of time (in years) employed in current position, and; vi) the 
length of time employed within the Trust. 
II.III.I.II) SECTION B: KNOWLEDGE OF COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA 
AND RELATED QUESTIONS 
In this section, the participant was asked the following questions: 
1. Can you name and briefly describe for me any cognitive impairments that you 
are aware of in psychosis and schizophrenia? (Quantitative data; details of the 
method via which this question was quantified are given below.) 
i. Do you know roughly what proportion of people with psychosis and 




ii. Do you know what sorts of things can be done to help manage these 
cognitive impairments? (Quantitative data; details of the method via 
which this question was quantified are given below.) 
2. Have you had any teaching or workshops in cognitive impairments in psychosis 
and schizophrenia? (‘Yes’/’No’ – quantitative data.) 
3. How much discussion would you say there is in your team around cognitive 
impairments in psychosis and schizophrenia? (Qualitative data.) 
4. If and when you notice that a patient on your caseload seems to be exhibiting 
cognitive deficits, do you know what the options are, in terms of referral? 
(Quantitative data; details of the method via which this question was quantified 
are given below.) 
i. Around how many patients would you say you have referred in the last 
year? (Quantitative data.) 
5. Overall, how confident do you feel, from 0 to 10 (with ‘0’ being ‘not at all 
confident’ and ‘10’ being ‘the greatest confidence possible’) in terms of 
noticing/recognising cognitive impairments in patients? (Quantitative data.) 
II.III.I.III) SECTION C: IDENTIFICATION OF COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN PATIENTS 
CURRENTLY ON THE PARTICIPANT’S CASELOAD (ALL DATA QUANTITATIVE) 
As part of this section, the participant was presented with a copy of their current 
caseload and was asked to identify patients they believed to exhibit cognitive 
impairments. The following data were collected: i) the number of patients on the 
participant’s caseload; ii) the number of patients identified by the participant as 
exhibiting/potentially exhibiting cognitive impairments, and; iii) for each patient 
identified by the participant, a brief description of the nature of the cognitive 
impairment/s the participant believed the patient to exhibit. Only those patients on 
participants’ caseloads across both baseline and teaching session intervention were 
included as part of the data. 
Where participants identified a patient as experiencing cognitive deficits, but then 
invalidated their response by going on to discuss difficulties which were clearly not 
cognitive in nature (specifically, difficulties related to positive or negative symptoms), 
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these patients were not included as part of the number of patients that participant had 
identified. In cases where patients were identified but their difficulties were not 
elaborated upon, participants were given the benefit of the doubt and they received a 
score for these participants. In cases in which participants discussed difficulties that 
were ambiguous, in terms of whether or not they referred specifically to cognitive 
impairments, participants were given the benefit of the doubt and scored positively. 
Thus, overall, participants were generally given the benefit of the doubt in cases of 
ambiguity. 
Quantifying responses to Question 1 in Section B: Although this question was open-
ended, participants’ responses were quantified via systematic scoring criteria 
developed by the authors (See Appendix 1). Firstly, on the basis of meta-analytic 
literature reporting on the magnitude and range of forms of cognitive impairment in 
schizophrenia [cf. 18, 19-23], the following list of 9 broad cognitive domains, on which 
those with schizophrenia are shown to reliably perform worse than healthy controls, 
was drawn-up: 
i. Attention/concentration 
ii. Executive functions 
iii. General intelligence/IQ 
iv. Language abilities 
v. Memory 
vi. Motor skills 
vii. Processing speed 
viii. Social cognition 
ix. Visuospatial skills 
Participants received a score of ‘1’ for each form of cognitive impairment that they 
referred to (regardless of how many times they referred to this domain) throughout the 
entirety of the interview (i.e. not just in response to Section B, Question 1) – in order 
that they were given the best-possible chance to score. In response to Question 1, 
therefore, each participant received a score from 0 to 9. Participants’ responses were 
scored independently by two researchers (MM and AC), with Kohen’s kappa [61] used 
to examine inter-rater reliability. Kohen’s kappa [61] can range between -1 to 1. Landis 
and Koch [62] characterise a kappa value of <0 as indicating no agreement, with values 
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between 0-0.20 indicating ‘slight agreement’, 0.21-40 as ‘fair’, 0.41-0.60 as ‘moderate’, 
0.61-80 as ‘substantial’ and 0.81-1 as indicating ‘almost perfect agreement’. 
Quantifying responses to Questions 1. ii and 4 in Section B: These questions were open-
ended but quantified categorically. Two researchers (MM and AC) independently 
produced initial codes to categorise participants’ responses to each of these questions. 
The researchers then discussed their initial codes, before finalising the response 
categories. 
II.IV) INTERVENTION: TEACHING SESSION ON COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT/S IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
The teaching session intervention consisted of an approximately one-hour-long 
PowerPoint presentation to all MDT staff during a Business Meeting at the CMHT (see 
Appendix 2 for the PowerPoint slides). All staff members were provided with a copy of 
the slides in the form of paper hand-outs during the teaching session (and were 
subsequently sent the electronic version via email). 
The presentation contained much of the information included in the Literature Review, 
above, and was divided into 3 sections. Broadly, the first, didactic section (slides 3-13) 
was concerned with: 
i. Defining the various domains of cognition known to be impaired in 
schizophrenia (slides 3-6) 
ii. A brief history of the concept of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia (slide 
7) 
iii. Describing the magnitude and range of cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia, as well as the proportion of those with schizophrenia estimated 
to exhibit cognitive impairments (slide 8) 
iv. Evidence that cognitive impairment/s in schizophrenia do not seem to be a 
function of either anti-psychotic medication or the stress associated with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia (slides 9-10) 
v. The idea that, and mechanisms via which, cognitive impairment/s may affect 
functional outcome in schizophrenia (slides 11-12) 
vi. Evidence-based interventions to help manage cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia, with a particular focus on Cognitive-Remediation Therapy 
(CRT) (slide 13) 
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In the second, more interactive section of the teaching session intervention, a series of 
slides presented some of the common ways in which certain aspects of cognitive 
impairment might manifest in everyday life (slides 14 to 20). After these slides had been 
presented, participants were each provided with a copy of their caseload and were given 
around five minutes to indicate (by marking against their names) any patients they 
believed to be exhibiting or possibly exhibiting cognitive impairment/s. 
The third section of the teaching intervention (slides 21-26) consisted of a series of 
slides presenting simple, everyday strategies that could be used, by both patients (and 
their carers) and MDT members, in order to mitigate against cognitive impairments. 
At the end of the session, all participants again rated, on a scale from 0-10 (‘0’ = ‘not at 
all confident’; ‘10’ = ‘the greatest confidence possible’), their confidence in being able 
to recognise cognitive impairments in patients with schizophrenia. Participants were 
also asked to provide any feedback that they had following the presentation. Following 
the presentation, photocopies were taken of all participants’ marked-on caseloads, with 
the originals being left with participants. This was done so that staff members: 1) could 
each see, quickly and easily, which of their patients may be exhibiting cognitive 
impairment/s, and; 2) could implement the mitigation strategies, discussed during the 
teaching session and printed on the hand-outs, corresponding to each patient’s 
suspected cognitive impairment/s. 
Due to other commitments, four staff members that had been interviewed at baseline 
were unable to attend the teaching intervention session. These people were therefore 
followed-up individually, presented with slides 14 to 20, provided with a copy of their 
caseload and taken through the same procedure as occurred during Section 2 of the 





II.V.I) QUANTITATIVE DATA 
Simple descriptive statistics were used to explore the quantitative data generated via 
the baseline structured interviews. 
Repeated-measures t-tests were used to explore whether: 1) participants’ self-reported 
confidence in being able to notice cognitive impairments in their patients (rated 0-10) 
changed between baseline and post-intervention, and; 2) the numbers of patients 
identified by participants as exhibiting or possibly exhibiting cognitive impairments 
changed between baseline and post-intervention. 
The number of participants that provided data for each of the quantitative analyses 
varied (e.g., due to some participants not having caseloads, participants not being 
contactable across both baseline and post-teaching time-points, etc.). The number of 
participants included as part of each of the quantitative analyses is stated in the 
description/outcome for each analysis presented in the Findings section. 
II.V.II) QUALITATIVE DATA 
Inductive thematic analyses, based on the 6-stage method described by Braun and 
Clarke [63], were used to analyse participants’ responses to each of the two qualitative 
questions in the baseline interview. First, the data were transcribed (by MM). Following 
this, in order to allow familiarisation with the data and to facilitate initial analytic 
thoughts regarding meanings and patterns, the data were repeatedly read 
independently by two researchers (MM and AC). Second, the two researchers 
independently produced lists of initial codes manually from the raw data. The two 
researchers then compared and discussed their respective codes, before, thirdly, 
sorting them into a set of potential themes (with all the relevant coded extracts collated 
within the identified themes). Following this, themes were subjected to systematic 
initial refinement (e.g., both researchers discussed whether identified themes were 
indeed such, collapsing themes into each other, etc.) and further refinement, before 





Fifteen participants (i.e. all members of the CMHT) took part in the study. Participants’ 
demographic characteristics are shown in Table 1. Unless otherwise stated, all 15 
participants provided data in response to each question. 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the complete sample of participants 
Variable N (Total = 15) % 
Age (years)*   
18-24 0 0.00 
25-34 1 7.14 
35-44 2 14.29 
45-54 3 21.43 
55-64 7 50.00 
65+ 1 7.14 
Gender   
Female 11 73.30 
Male 4 26.70 
Ethnicity   
White: English / Welsh / Scottish / 
Northern Irish / British 
8 53.33 
White: Any other White 
background 
1 6.67 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups: 
White and Black Caribbean 
1 6.67 
Asian / Asian British: Any other 
Asian background 
1 6.67 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black 
British: African 
3 20.00 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black 
British: Caribbean 
1 6.67 
Table 1 continues over the page 
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Table 1 continued 
Variable N (Total = 15) % 
Position   
Support Worker 1 6.67 
Social Worker 4 26.67 
Community Psychiatric Nurse 6 40.00 
Occupational Therapist 2 13.33 
Specialist Registrar 1 6.67 
Consultant Psychiatrist 1 6.67 
Length of time employed in current 
position 
  
1-5 years 3 20.00 
6-10 years 6 40.00 
11-15 years 3 20.00 
16-20 years 1 6.67 
21-25 years 1 6.67 
26+ years 1 6.67 
Length of time employed within Trust 
sites† 
  
1-5 years 0 0.00 
6-10 years 5 33.33 
11-15 years 4 26.67 
16-20 years 1 6.67 
21-25 years 2 13.33 
26+ years 3 20.00 
* One participant declined to give their age and was therefore not included in the percentage 
calculations for age. 
† The term ‘Trust sites’ is used here, rather than ‘the Trust’ as 4 participants were Social Workers 
and were therefore employed by the local authority, rather than by the NHS Trust. 
The mean average age of participants was 52.50 (SD = 8.50) years. Participants had 
worked within the team for a mean average of 11.53 (SD = 8.63) years, and within Trust 
sites for 16.20 (SD = 8.27) years.
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III.II) SECTION 1: DATA FROM PRE-INTERVENTION INTERVIEWS 
The data presented and described in this section all relate to questions contained 
within Section B of the interview schedule. 
QUESTION 1) ‘CAN YOU NAME AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBE ANY COGNITIVE 
IMPAIRMENTS THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF IN PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA?’ 
INTER-RATER RELIABILITY FOR SCORING CRITERIA 
Table 2 presents the percentage agreement between the two raters and Kohen’s kappa 
for each of the nine cognitive domains. 
Table 2: Per cent agreement between the two raters and Kohen’s kappa value for each 
cognitive domain, as well as overall mean 
Cognitive domain Agreement (%) Kohen’s kappa 
Attention/concentration 92.9 0.86 
Executive functions 92.9 0.76 
General intelligence 78.6 0.51 
Language 71.4 0.44 
Memory 92.9 0.76 
Motor skills 92.9 0* 
Processing-speed 92.9 0.76 
Social cognition 85.7 0.44 
Visuospatial skills 100 1 
Overall mean 88.91 0.69† 
* Kohen’s kappa could not be computed due to rater 1 not scoring any participant positively for 
this domain, meaning that this variable was a constant. 
† Value calculated without Kohen’s kappa for motor skills. 
As can be seen in the Table, percentage agreements were all relatively high. The 
majority of kappa values (5/8) fell into either the ‘substantial’ or ‘almost perfect 
agreement’ ranges, with the remaining three falling into the ‘moderate’ range [62]. The 
mean kappa value fell into the ‘substantial agreement’ range. Good levels of inter-rate 
reliability were therefore achieved for the scoring criteria.
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NUMBER OF COGNITIVE DOMAINS IDENTIFIED BY PARTICIPANTS 
Given the high levels of inter-rater reliability achieved, the two raters’ scores were 
mean-averaged. The mean numbers of participants that identified the various cognitive 
domains often impaired in schizophrenia, as scored by the two raters, are presented in 
Table 3.  
Table 3: Mean numbers and percentages of participants that identified the various 
cognitive domains impaired in schizophrenia (N = 15) 
Cognitive domain Number of participants 




Attention/concentration 7.5 50.00 
Executive functions 12.5 83.33 
General intelligence 4.5 30.00 
Language 7 46.67 
Memory 12.5 83.33 
Motor skills 0.5 3.33 
Processing speed 2.5 16.67 
Social cognition 2 13.33 
Visuospatial skills 1.5 10.00 
The mean number of domains identified by each individual participant was 3.36 (SD = 
1.20), out of a possible 9. The table shows that memory and executive functions were 
clearly the domains identified most often by participants. Indeed, these domains were 
identified around twice as often as the next-most-identified domains of 
attention/concentration and language. Notably, very few participants identified 
impairments in motor or visuospatial skills. 
Almost half the participants (7) conflated the positive symptoms of schizophrenia with 
cognitive impairments at some point in their naming/describing the various cognitive 
domains, as illustrated by the following: 
They [patients] cannot understand… something, something real, 
whether they, maybe they’re hearing voices or they’re seeing things that 
are not there, and they can’t put it together to say, ‘Is this real or not 
real?’ So I would say that they haven’t got the knowledge of what’s 
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going-on around them – so that’s my understanding of cognitive 
impairment in schizophrenia (Participant 13). 
One participant equated the negative symptoms with cognitive impairments. 
QUESTION 1. I) ‘DO YOU KNOW ROUGHLY WHAT PROPORTION OF PEOPLE WITH 
PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA ARE ESTIMATED TO EXHIBIT COGNITIVE 
IMPAIRMENTS?’ 
Where participants gave an upper and a lower estimate in response (e.g., ‘30-40 per 
cent’), their response was scored as the mid-point between these two values (e.g., 
‘35%’). The mean percentage of patients with schizophrenia estimated by participants 
to show cognitive impairment/s was 53.45 (SD = 25.47); the range of estimates here was 
substantial, however, from 10 to 100 per cent. Nevertheless, it is true that a number of 
participants’ estimates clustered around the 50 per cent mark, with 7 participants 
estimating within or below 15 per cent of the 50 per cent mark. This mean estimate is 
substantially lower than the approximately 70-75 per cent of patients thought to 
demonstrate cognitive impairment [2]. 
QUESTION 1. II): ‘DO YOU KNOW WHAT SORTS OF THINGS CAN BE DONE TO HELP 
MANAGE COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA?’ 
Table A1 in Appendix 3 presents the forms of intervention strategy for cognitive 
impairments in schizophrenia mentioned by participants, together with illustrative 
quotations and the numbers of participants that mentioned each strategy. Participants 
were free to mention any number of strategies.  Thus, participants mentioned a number 
of possible interventions, although only two described Cognitive Remediation Therapy 
(CRT) – the approach with the best evidence-base [6, 56-59]. Each participant 
mentioned a mean of 2.73 (SD = 1.62; range = 0-6) possible interventions. 
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QUESTION 2: ‘HAVE YOU HAD ANY TEACHING OR WORKSHOPS IN COGNITIVE 
IMPAIRMENTS IN PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA?’ 
Perhaps surprisingly, not a single participant had had any specific teaching/training 
concerning cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. 
As a follow-up to the question of whether participants had had any specific training on 
cognitive impairments in schizophrenia, 11 participants were asked whether they would 
like to learn more about this area; four participants were not asked this question (due, 
for example, to their having spontaneously stated their lack of teaching/training at a 
point in the interview before they were due to be asked by the researcher, and the 
researcher’s subsequently failing to return to this issue at what would have been the 
appropriate part of the interview). Of the eleven participants asked, 100 per cent said 
that they would like to learn more about cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. 
Indeed, the enthusiasm for teaching/training in this area shown by participants is 
illustrated by Participant 1, who, in response to being asked whether they would like to 
receive such training, said: ‘Yes! Definitely, definitely… I think, definitely, we need more 
training around that.’ 
QUESTION 3: ‘HOW MUCH DISCUSSION WOULD YOU SAY THERE IS IN YOUR TEAM 
AROUND COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS (IN PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA)?’ 
As part of their responses to this question, 11/15 (73%) participants spontaneously 
stated, in various ways (e.g., ‘I’m not aware that there’s that much’ [Participant 4], ‘I 
think we touch on it… It’s not really something that we talk about’ [Participant 11]), that 
discussion of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia in the team was limited. 
Thematic analysis of participants’ responses revealed 2 key themes: i) Attenuated 
awareness and discussion due to resources and ii) Discussion occurs as and when a 
serious/obvious impairment presents itself. 
Attenuated awareness and discussion due to lack of resources 
Around half of participants (7/15) expressed the view that awareness and discussion of 
cognitive impairments were attenuated due to various resources being limited or 
unavailable within the service: ‘I think a lot is dep-, er, depending on the resources you 
have, as well, to address [this thing]’ (Participant 2). Participants talked about the day-
to-day demands of their job making it difficult to find the time to first consider 
22 
 
cognitive impairments: ‘We need to have more time to reflect about some of the 
challenges, rather than trying to respond all the time…’ (Participant 1). Related to this, 
there was also a feeling that the often-stressful nature of the job – specifically, and 
ironically, interactions with patients possibly affected by cognitive impairments – can 
in itself reduce the chances that clinicians may recognise these possible cognitive 
impairments in patients: ‘You know, often we can be frustrated ourselves, as clinicians, 
you know, “Why can’t people see the logic in this matter?”, when maybe we should be 
thinking, “Well, what is [sic] the barriers for people being able to do [that]?” You know, 
“Is it their choice that they’re not able to do [that]…?”’ (Participant 1). One participant 
vividly described how the assessment tools utilised by the service (and, of course, by 
services in general) do not allow for the consideration of cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia: ‘Where we might get new referrals, in fact, I’m, there’s probably nothing 
in the integrated assessments around [that]’ (Participant 12). Interestingly, and owing 
to participants’ perceived lack of resources in their service to address cognitive 
impairments, there was an indication that the lack of consideration and discussion may 
be wilful: ‘But I don’t think we, well, I, I… maybe that we don’t have enough skills or 
materials to help [them] overcome [that], so therefore, we, we don’t pay enough 
attention to [it] – because if we can’t repair something, what’s the use of, erm, peering 
over it for so long?’ (Participant 8). It also seemed that some participants believed that 
the consideration of cognitive deficits fell under the purview of specific roles within the 
team, and was therefore not a general concern: ‘I don’t know, maybe, maybe we expect 
doctors to, to be assessing [that]…’ (Participant 12). Relatedly, a lack of 
knowledge/expertise in being able to recognise cognitive impairments was also 
highlighted: ‘I wouldn’t, I don’t really feel very confident, I just, sort of, might make an 
observation, erm, you know, having worked with somebody, but yeah, I wouldn’t, I 
wouldn’t feel that comfortable maybe pinning it down in an assessment’ (Participant 
12). 
Discussion occurs as and when a serious/obvious impairment presents itself 
Seven participants said that, though they are not a part of routine discussion, cognitive 
impairments are talked about when patients’ difficulties are clearly noticeable: ‘I’m not 
sure we specify that there is cognitive impairment… unless the person is presenting 
with very severe deficits’ (Participant 3). Some participants elaborated further, 
suggesting that such discussions tend to be restricted to non-schizophrenia-related 
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cognitive issues. For example, Participant 15 said: ‘… A few team meetings with, erm, 
about certain concerns about certain clients, but again, that was more around, “Are we 
concerned that someone’s gaining / has developed a dementia? And what [sic] 
services?”, rather than … related to psychosis’. Similarly, Participant 12 said the 
following: ‘I think we talk, we think about it sometimes, when we, you know, there’s 
substance misuse and things.’ However, although discussion may indeed occur, 
participants indicated that such talk tends to occur in a rather informal, implicit 
manner, as opposed to an explicit and distinct aspect of team discussions: 
Most of the discussion, I guess, I would hear around cognitive 
impairments would just be people commenting, perhaps, o-, on, on, or 
maybe giving a scenario of something they’ve experienced, one of their 
own clients and, and just having a conversation about, say, how maybe 
difficult a particular encounter is, or whatever, so, erm, so it-, it-, that’s 
kind of, making-up a part of a conversation, rather than any kind of 
formal discussion, yeah, if you see what I mean, yeah (Participant 4). 
QUESTION 4) ‘IF AND WHEN YOU NOTICE THAT A PATIENT ON YOUR CASELOAD 
SEEMS TO BE EXHIBITING COGNITIVE DEFICITS, DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE OPTIONS 
ARE, IN TERMS OF REFERRAL?’ 
Table 6 presents the categories into which responses fell, together with the numbers of 
participants whose responses fell into each category. Participants were free to mention 
any number of referral options.
24 
 
Table 6: Participants’ referral routes / discussion fora for patients with cognitive 
impairment and the numbers of participants whose responses fell into each category 
(N = 15) 
Response category Number of participants 
that gave response 
Internal:  
Discuss with Care Coordinator 2 
Discuss with other MDT members 2 
Discuss with Occupational Therapist (OT) / 
Refer for OT assessment 
2 
Discussion with / referral to Psychiatrist 3 
Discussion with / referral to Psychology 
(unspecified) 
3 
Psychometric assessment 3 
Mindfulness Group 2 
Discussion with Supervisor 3 
Unspecified within-team referral 3 
External:  
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) Service 1 
Signpost to General Practitioner (GP) 1 
Memory service (for dementia assessment) 1 
Neurology (if learning disability; LD) 1 
Neuropsychiatry 1 
Neuropsychology 1 
Support agencies (unspecified) 1 
Don’t know 5 
 
The mean number of referral routes mentioned by each participant was 1.73 (SD = 1.22; 
range = 0-4). As part of their responses to the question, most participants (12/15) 
mentioned intra-team referrals / discussions. Six participants mentioned external 
referrals, with 3 routes being related to cognitive impairments in the context of other 
disorders (ASD, dementias and LD), with signposting to GP and referral to unspecified 
support agencies also being mentioned. External referrals to either Neuropsychiatry or 
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Neuropsychology were each mentioned by one participant. As part of their responses 
to this question, 5 participants said that they ‘don’t know’. 
QUESTION 4. I): ‘AROUND HOW MANY PATIENTS WOULD YOU SAY YOU HAVE 
REFERRED, ON THE BASIS OF COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS, IN THE LAST YEAR?’ 
Thirteen participants contributed data here (i.e. all but two who did not have a 
caseload). The mean percentage of patients that each participant reported (as a 
proportion of their caseload) having referred in the last year, on the basis of their 
presenting with cognitive impairments, was 14.15 (SD = 15.31). The range of scores was 
considerable, with 4 people reporting not having referred any of the patients on their 
caseload within the last year, whilst the highest self-report was 50 percent. Relatedly, 
it appeared that the relatively small mean quoted above was nevertheless inflated by 
four participants self-reporting percentages of 27 and above; the remaining 9 
participants reported percentages of 4 or lower. 
Notably, one participant, who reported having referred 27 percent of their caseload, 
spontaneously volunteered that all of these referrals had been to the Mindfulness 
Group.  Additionally, after having given their response to this question, Participant 14 
(who had reported referring 30% of their patients) spontaneously said: ‘… On 
reflection-, I think that, erm, I mean there is a-, what is cognition? What do we mean 
by it? I don’t really know what we mean by it, so that’s why it’s difficult to actually 
answer the questions.’ 
III.III) SECTION 2: COMPARING DATA ACROSS PRE-INTERVENTION INTERVIEWS 
AND POST-TEACHING INTERVENTION 
CONFIDENCE IN NOTICING/RECOGNISING COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT/S IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA IN PATIENTS PRE- AND POST-INTERVENTION 
Participants’ mean self-report ratings for their confidence in being able to 
notice/recognise cognitive impairment/s in Schizophrenia, at both pre- and post-
intervention, are given in Table 7. There were 14 participants with complete data here 
(one participant could not be contacted for their rating post-intervention).
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Table 7: Participants’ (N = 14) mean (SD) self-reported confidence in 
noticing/recognising cognitive impairment/s in schizophrenia at pre-intervention 
interview and post-intervention 
Mean self-reported confidence in 
noticing/recognising cognitive 
impairment/s at pre-intervention 
interview* 
Mean self-reported confidence in 
noticing/recognising cognitive 
impairment/s post-intervention* 
5.96 (2.06) 7.18 (1.49) 
* Participants were asked to rate their confidence on a scale from 0 to 10, anchored by the 
statements ‘Not at all confident’ (0) and ‘The greatest possible confidence’ (10). 
A repeated-measures t-test found that the greater confidence in noticing cognitive 
impairments in schizophrenia reported by participants at post-intervention was 
statistically significant [t (13) = -2.49; p = 0.03, 2-tailed]. 
IDENTIFICATION OF PATIENTS ON PARTICIPANTS’ CASELOADS PRE- AND POST-
INTERVENTION 
The mean percentages of patients that each participant identified on their caseload as 
demonstrating cognitive impairment/s during the pre-intervention interviews and 
post-intervention are presented in Table 8. Percentages are given here, rather than the 
absolute numbers of patients identified by participants, due to each participant having 
a different number of patients on their caseload. Four participants did not provide 
complete data at both pre-intervention interview and post-intervention: two 
participants did not have caseloads and another 2 participants provided data at pre-
intervention interview but not at post-intervention. Thus, 11 participants had complete 
data for these analyses. 
Three participants described problems unrelated to cognitive impairment (e.g., 
positive symptoms, negative symptoms, other difficulties, etc.) when identifying 




Table 8: Mean percentages (SD; range) of patients that each participant identified on 
their caseload as showing cognitive impairment/s at pre- and post-intervention (N = 
11) 
Mean percentage of patients 
identified at pre-intervention 
interview 
Mean percentage of patients 
identified at post-intervention 
33.24 (19.84; 0-70.59) 80.64 (22.49; 27.27-100.00) 
 
A repeated-measures t-test found that the greater percentage of patients identified by 
participants at post-intervention was highly statistically significant [t (10) = -9.04; p < 
0.01, 2-tailed]. 
IV. DISCUSSION/IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Overall, the results from the present study are consistent in indicating that, within the 
CMHT, staff members do not generally actively look-out for cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia, nor are they systematically addressed. The main findings were that: i) 
participants identified a mean number of 3, from a possible list of 9, cognitive 
impairments often exhibited by those with schizophrenia; ii) on average, participants 
(under)estimated that around 53 per cent of individuals with schizophrenia exhibit 
some form of cognitive impairment; iii) only 2/15 participants were aware of Cognitive 
Remediation Therapy (CRT) as an empirically-supported intervention for cognitive 
impairment; iv) not a single participant had received any specific teaching/training 
concerning cognitive impairments in schizophrenia; v) 73 per cent of participants 
indicated that there was an inadequate amount of discussion of cognitive impairments 
in schizophrenia, with lack of resources highlighted as a key factor, and;  vi) within the 
previous year, participants had referred only around 14 per cent of the patients on their 
caseloads, on the basis of their exhibiting cognitive impairments. Additionally, 
participants rated their baseline confidence in being able to notice/recognise cognitive 
impairments in patients at a mean of 6 (out of 10), which (statistically-significantly) 
increased to 7 (out of 10) post-teaching-session. Finally, at baseline interview, 
participants identified an average of 33 per cent of the patients on their caseloads as 
exhibiting cognitive impairments, which subsequently (statistically-significantly) 
increased to 81 per cent of patients post-intervention.
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IV.I) LIMITED KNOWLEDGE AND AWARENESS OF COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
That participants described a mean average of only a third of the cognitive impairments 
often observed in schizophrenia suggests that, in daily practice, MDT staff members 
are not familiar with most of the impairments presumably being displayed by patients. 
Furthermore, at some point during their interviews, almost half of participants 
conflated the positive symptoms of schizophrenia with cognitive impairments. This 
demonstrates a lack of understanding regarding the nature of cognitive impairments – 
specifically, their status as an independent category of difficulty exhibited in 
schizophrenia, fundamentally separate from hallucinations and delusions. The two 
domains of cognitive impairment most mentioned (by some distance) by participants 
were memory problems and executive functioning difficulties. Although these are 
important cognitive difficulties commonly observed in the disorder, the impairment 
with the largest effect-size [on the basis of meta-analytic studies; 2] – (slow) processing 
speed – was referred to by just 3 (of 15) staff members. Similarly, impairments in social 
cognition – for which large effect-sizes have also been reported [23] – were also 
mentioned by only 3 staff members. 
A potential limitation of the study was that the baseline interviews were generally 
‘squeezed in’ as and when members of staff had ‘gaps’ in their diary, between sessions 
with patients. It could be argued that, under these circumstances, participants were 
not able to focus and bring to mind and articulate the extent of their knowledge around 
cognitive impairments, and that the present results are therefore an under-
representation of their knowledge in this area. In response to this, it is argued that, in 
the context of a busy CMHT, staff members’ time is a precious commodity and it is thus 
incredibly difficult to conceive of an alternative means via which these data could have 
been collected. In fact, that the present study managed to recruit all members of the 
MDT, giving them all the opportunity to demonstrate their awareness of cognitive 
impairments, despite these substantial time-pressures, was a significant strength. Also, 
and as stated in the Methods section, participants’ referencing of each of the listed 
domains of cognitive impairment was scored across the whole interview, not just in 
response to the first question (which asked explicitly about this). This, together with 
the fact that, generally, baseline interviews lasted around 30-35 minutes, meant that 
participants were given time to gather themselves, ease into the interview and 
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gradually call to mind their knowledge of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia, 
giving them the best chance of demonstrating their knowledge as was feasible. 
Furthermore, and as can be seen in Appendix 1, the scoring system was relatively liberal, 
such that participants scored positively for a domain if they gave, ‘any clear reference 
to, or unambiguous examples of, difficulties in [that area]’, rather than having to 
explicitly name the domain to which they were referring. Finally, the total number of 
potential domains to which participants could refer was reduced as far as possible, such 
that, for example, short-term and long-term forms of memory were incorporated 
within a single domain. Overall, therefore, a substantial effort was made to ‘tap into’ 
and represent the ‘true’ extent of participants’ knowledge. 
During the baseline interviews, participants estimated that 53 per cent of those with 
schizophrenia exhibit cognitive impairments. This is substantially lower than the 
70/75-98 per cent of patients thought to demonstrate cognitive impairment [2, 28] and 
thus constitutes an underappreciation of the extent to which cognitive impairments 
affect those with schizophrenia. Similarly, participants identified an average of just 33 
per cent of the patients on their caseloads as exhibiting cognitive impairments – some 
way short of the 70-75 per cent of individuals with schizophrenia estimated, on the 
basis of meta-analytic findings, to show such difficulties [18-23]. However, a limitation 
of the present study was that it was not feasible to determine the ‘true’ number of 
patients showing cognitive impairments on the caseload of the CMHT (by, for example, 
assessing patients). Then again, the fact that such a figure would have had to have been 
generated by the present researchers as part of the study, rather than being accessed 
via records held as a routine part of the service, might in itself be noteworthy. 
Regardless, this means that it is not possible to conclude that any patients with 
cognitive impairments had been ‘missed’ by participants at the baseline interviews. 
This notwithstanding, post-teaching-intervention, participants identified a 
significantly greater 81 per cent of their patients as exhibiting cognitive impairments – 
the proximity of this figure to estimates derived from meta-analytic studies being 
notable. Accordingly, participants also rated their self-confidence in being able to 
detect/recognise cognitive impairments as being significantly higher following the 
intervention. 
Taken together, the above suggests that staff members in the current MDT are to a 
large extent unaware of the forms and extent of cognitive impairments in 
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schizophrenia. The extent to which these findings are representative of other MDTs in 
the country is unclear, and so similar studies in other teams would be useful. 
Nevertheless, given the potentially widespread impact that such problems can have on 
an individual’s functioning [3, 43-44], a lack of awareness of this aspect of patients’ 
presentations could lead to difficulties. Suppose, for example, that slow processing 
speed meant that, in a meeting with a clinician, it takes a patient a significantly longer 
amount of time, firstly, to interpret and understand that which their clinician says to 
them/asks them, and secondly, to formulate an appropriate verbal response. This 
would tend to have the consequence that, overall, the patient might not end-up saying 
very much in the session(s). If the clinician is unaware of this, then it might be 
reasonable for them to conclude – albeit incorrectly – that the patient did not wish to 
answer the question, was not listening to what they had said or had nothing to say on 
that particular subject. The clinician might abandon the topic and move-on to 
something else, when, in reality, the patient had simply not had enough time to 
articulate their response. It is important to state that a given score indicating 
impairment in a given cognitive construct, in a neuropsychological assessment, does 
not purely and simply translate to a given list of observable manifestations related to 
that impairment. Nevertheless, if clinicians are unaware that such difficulties are often 
present in schizophrenia, clinicians will understandably tend not to adapt their 
practice with patients on the basis of such impairments (e.g., allowing the patient more 
time to formulate responses to questions/statements). This would be expected not only 
to impact on the relative ‘success’ of clinicians’ sessions with patients, but also more 
broadly: if the underlying cognitive impairments are not themselves recognised and 
addressed, this may compromise the extent to which patients are able to pursue and 
maintain recovery goals [3, 43-44]. 
Given that cognitive impairments are considered fundamental in Schizophrenia [1], it 
is perhaps surprising that not a single participant had had any specific 
teaching/training concerning these issues. This almost certainly explains participants’ 
relative lack of awareness of cognitive impairments in patients: people cannot be 
blamed for being broadly unaware of issues in which they have had no formal training 
and to which the wider system directs such little attention.
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IV.II) LIMITED DISCUSSION OF AND REFERRAL FOR COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Eleven out of fifteen percent of participants felt that discussion of cognitive 
impairments in the team was limited, which they related to a lack of resources – 
namely, a lack of knowledge/awareness of what to look-out for, combined with the 
ongoing demands (and stress) of staff members’ jobs, a lack of time and an absence of 
materials to screen for and address potential cognitive impairments. Participants 
described discussing cognitive impairments as and when they were so severe as to be a 
salient aspect of a patient’s presentation – and often in a non-schizophrenia context, 
such as in cases of a suspected dementia or when related to substance abuse. 
Participants said that, when these discussions do occur, they tend to be ‘informal’ and 
‘by-the-by’ in nature, rather than being formally and systematically explored and 
problem-solved by the team. Overall, participants’ comments suggest an endemic lack 
of awareness and consideration of cognitive impairments within Psychosis Services. 
When asked about possible interventions for cognitive impairments, a wide range of 
potential approaches were described by participants, although many of these would 
not traditionally be expected to directly address any underlying deficits (e.g., attending 
social groups, encouraging independence, engagement in meaningful activity, 
improving sleep hygiene, mindfulness, having a Support Worker, increasing insight 
around positive symptoms), thereby suggesting a lack of understanding concerning the 
nature of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. Four participants mentioned 
possible interventions that would appear reasonable from a lay perspective but which 
are questionable according to the available evidence – such as, firstly, medication to 
act directly on impairments and, secondly, managing the side-effects of anti-psychotic 
medication. Medications to directly act upon cognitive impairments appear ineffective 
[54, 55] and anti-psychotic medication has a mildly beneficial, rather than harmful, 
effect on cognition [31-34]. This notwithstanding, staff members’ responses suggested 
considerable effort in trying to address/ameliorate (the impact of) cognitive 
impairments using the limited means at their disposal. Specifically, two-thirds of 
participants (and over 20% of total responses) mentioned practical, Occupational 
Therapy-type adaptations (e.g., phone alarms, diaries) as a way of managing cognitive 
impairments. Similarly, 27% of participants also spoke about the need to be person-
centred, looking at the (cognitive) strengths and weaknesses of any given patient. Only 
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two participants mentioned Cognitive Remediation Therapy (CRT) – the approach with 
the strongest evidence-base [6, 56-58]. This appears understandable, given that the 
only referral route for cognitive impairments in schizophrenia in the CMHT was to the 
Clinical Psychologist for a cognitive assessment – with no further routes onward for 
CRT if/when cognitive impairments are detected. Then again, the latest NICE 
guidelines for Psychosis (2014) do not recommend the provision of CRT, meaning that 
the CMHT was merely adhering to national guidelines. 
Given the lack of an external referral route when cognitive impairments are suspected 
and/or detected, it is unsurprising that two-thirds of responses to the question of 
referral routes used by MDT members described within-team referrals / discussions 
with other team members. Only 3/15 participants said that they would refer to the 
Clinical Psychologist for a cognitive assessment (in accordance with the designated 
referral route for cognitive impairments in the service). Overall, given participants’ 
comments on the lack of resource to address cognitive impairments in the service, the 
potential effectiveness of these inter-team referrals and their associated interventions 
is surely questionable. It is also notable that 4/15 participants (and around 11% of total 
responses) mentioned external referral pathways that had no clear relevance to 
cognitive impairments in schizophrenia; that is, referrals to: external Autism Spectrum 
Disorders services, memory services (for dementia assessment) and neurology services 
(if presence of a learning disability); signposting to GP, and; referral to external ‘support 
agencies’. Five (out of fifteen) participants (around 15% of total responses) said that 
they did not know where they could refer. It makes sense, given all of the above, that, 
within the year prior to baseline interview, participants had only referred 14% of their 
patients, on the basis of cognitive impairments: if staff members do not recognise 
cognitive impairments, and indeed underestimate their prevalence, as well as not 
having a clear referral route to adequately address such problems, this clearly reduces 
the chances of their making referrals. Regardless of the underlying reasons, that only 
14% of patients on the caseload of the CMHT were referred strongly suggests that the 
cognitive impairment that would be expected to be exhibited by a sizeable number of 
patients is not being adequately and systematically addressed, with potential 
implications for patients’ functioning and wellbeing. 
Overall, the data appear to suggest a team trying to identify and manage cognitive 
impairments in their patients as best they can under (highly) challenging 
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circumstances – that is, given their lack of teaching/training, the lack of specialist 
services to which patients can be referred for assessment/intervention and the lack of 
resource in Psychosis Services in general to meet the need for cognitive impairments 
in schizophrenia to be properly addressed. 
An immediate and obvious argument against the training of MDT staff and provision 
of CRT would be the current economic climate. Specifically, according to recent 
estimates, the UK NHS is around £2.5 billion in debt (the Health Foundation, 2016), 
with real-term reductions in spending amounting to 1% for working-age adults and 
3.1% for older adults (NHS Confederation, 2016) – with the funding shortfall projected 
to increase to at least £16 billion by 2030/2031 (the Health Foundation, 2016). Seen 
against this backdrop, the current lack of resource dedicated to cognitive impairments 
in schizophrenia might appear justified. Also, in fairness to those responsible for 
commissioning and mandating such training and services, the research evidence 
around cognitive impairments in schizophrenia, and the beneficial effects of CRT, has 
only relatively recently become established. Also, CRT is a relatively time- and 
resource-intensive process and may require dedicated staff working specifically on 
remediation. This notwithstanding, it is now clear that cognitive impairments exert a 
significant and substantial influence over patients’ work, community functioning and 
broader recovery [3, 43-47, 51] – indeed, a significantly greater influence than either the 
positive or negative symptoms [42]. Schizophrenia is one of the ten most globally 
burdensome disorders in the world, for both individuals and societies [53] and it has 
been estimated that schizophrenia costs the UK economy £11.8 billion a year [64]. With 
only around 15-20% of those with a diagnosis employed [48], and measures of cognitive 
functioning having been shown to account for up to 23% of individuals’ functional 
outcome [51], it can be reasonably assumed that a substantial proportion of the 
financial costs associated with schizophrenia are related to impairments in cognition. 
Participants in the present study identified a seemingly more valid proportion of the 
patients on their caseloads as exhibiting cognitive impairments, as well as self-
reporting a greater level of confidence in being able to detect cognitive impairments, 
after just one teaching session. This suggests that the financial and time costs of 
providing training to identify these difficulties may not be particularly substantial – yet 
could lead to a significantly heightened awareness of cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia within MDTs. Similarly, it is surely worth considering the potential 
financial and wider social benefits of setting-up and running specialised services for 
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delivering CRT (together with corresponding NICE guidelines), in order to address the 
many and varied financial and social costs associated with cognitive impairment in 
schizophrenia. Indeed, a continued lack of resource to address this huge issue appears 
difficult to justify. 
IV.III) CONCLUSION 
Overall, the present study found that, in a CMHT for psychosis, staff members had 
limited knowledge and awareness of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. These 
findings are hardly surprising, given the current lack of resource (e.g., training, 
specialised services, etc.) allocated to cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. This 
should surely be re-evaluated in the light of growing evidence of the breadth and 
magnitude of cognitive impairments in schizophrenia, together with their important 
implications for functioning and general wellbeing. 
V. DISSEMINATION 
The findings of the project are to be presented to the team in the form of a PowerPoint 
presentation at one of their monthly Business Meetings. I also hope that it can be 
prepared, in whole or in part, as part of an application to commissioners for resource 
to address cognitive impairments in schizophrenia in Psychosis Services. This report 
will also be submitted as an article to peer-review journals, as well as being submitted 
for (poster or oral) presentation at conferences. 
VI. LEADERSHIP 
This project was carried-out at my first placement. I demonstrated leadership in the 
first instance by developing the rationale and protocol for the project and taking this 
to my placement supervisors, who agreed that it was worthwhile and that they would 
supervise it. As stated above, all staff members participated in the project, which 
involved their agreeing to a 30-35-minute structured interview at baseline, followed by 
their completing the post-intervention identification of patients with possible 
cognitive impairments on each of their caseloads. Clearly, this was relatively ‘involved’ 
for staff members in a busy CMHT and I believe that the good working relationships 
that I had developed and maintained with them whilst on placement helped facilitate 
their engagement in the project. In addition, staff members had often commented that 
they wanted to learn (more) about cognitive impairments in schizophrenia; that I was 
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offering a teaching session on this area probably also aided their participation. Staff 
members were often busy and had to reschedule interviews at the last moment (e.g., 
due to patient emergencies); I believe that my skills in being gently but firmly 
persistent in following-up staff members through such occasions was an important 
factor in my nevertheless managing to collect data from all of them. I led on all stages 
of the data-analysis and report write-up. I strongly believe and hope that the findings 
from this report can be used to bring about the provision of greater resource-allocation 
for cognitive impairments in schizophrenia. 
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APPENDIX 1: SCORING CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
QUESTION 1 (NAMING AND BRIEFLY DESCRIBING COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS IN 
PSYCHOSIS AND SCHIZOPHRENIA) 
Scoring Criteria for Naming/Briefly Describing Question 
Participants are scored 0-9, based on how many of the following cognitive domains 
they identify throughout the entirety of the baseline interview, that is, not only in 
response to this (first) question, but also as part of responses to any other question 
throughout the interview. Participants only score once for each domain, regardless of 
how many times they may refer to that domain during the interview. 
Participants receive a score, unless they go on to give a response that clearly invalidates 
this, e.g., if someone mentions difficulties in ‘responding appropriately’, which could 
potentially be scored due to being related to language problems, but then immediately 
goes on to discuss delusional thinking – which would then suggest that their response 
was in fact concerned with positive symptoms, rather than with cognitive impairment. 
Cognitive impairments must be contextualized within the Schizophrenia diagnosis – 
and not explicitly linked by the participant to another diagnosis/es (e.g., Asperger’s 
syndrome, alcohol and/or other drug addictions, brain injury, etc.); cognitive 
impairments are assumed to be related to Schizophrenia in particular, unless the 
participant explicitly refers to another disorder (i.e. participants generally receive the 
benefit of the doubt). 
Also, the participant must clearly and obviously identify the cognitive impairments that 
they may be describing as such – it is not enough for participants to merely mention 
cognitive impairments in passing without it being clear that they believe themselves to 
be referring to cognitive impairments. That said, participants do not have to actually 
name the domain that they are referencing (i.e. processing speed) in order to score, but 
they must, firstly, clearly describe such things as being a problem/difficulty, and 
secondly, describe the problem in such it a way that clearly relates to that domain’s 
being the issue. 





x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, difficulties in (paying) 
attention/concentration/focusing [on something] (e.g., difficulty concentrating 
when watching television, in conversation, being easily distracted, etc.) 
2. Executive functions: 
x Any clear reference, or unambiguous examples of, to one or more of the 
following abilities: 
o Planning/prioritizing (budgeting/finances) 
o Self-monitoring (spec. with reference to monitoring outcomes of 
behaviour, etc.) 
o Task initiation 
o Organisation 
o Working memory (‘being unable to carry-out/process complex tasks, 
like making a cup of tea’) 
o Sequencing 
o Problem-solving (‘considering courses of action to take’) 
o Inhibition/impulsivity 
o Decision-making 
o Cognitive flexibility 
3. General intelligence: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, a lower general 
intelligence/IQ or ‘general cognitive functioning’ 
The reference must be clearly related to a reduced IQ within the normal range, and not 
to learning disabilities (i.e. IQ < 70). 
4. Language abilities: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, difficulties in language 
abilities (in verbal or written form) 
x The reference must be clearly and specifically related to the 
understanding/comprehension or production of language in the context of 
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Schizophrenia, and not to either illiteracy or to English not being the person’s 
native language 
5. Memory: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, memory 
problems/difficulties remembering [information/something/things; i.e. 
semantic or episodic memory] or how to do something (procedural memory) 
(e.g., medication, appointments, conversations, things watched on television, 
use a mobile phone, etc.) 
6. Motor abilities: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, difficulties in the 
production/execution/coordination of gross or fine muscle-movements 
7. Processing-Speed: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, a longer period of time 
than normal being needed to process (any forms of) information (e.g., in 
conversation, when reading, etc.) 
8. Social cognition: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, difficulties in the 
processing of social information and situations, as per the following: 
o Theory of Mind abilities 
o Social perception (understanding social roles, societal rules and social 
context) 
o Social knowledge (awareness of the rules and goals that govern and 
characterize social situations and interactions) 
o Emotional processing (the ability to use and perceive emotions) 
o The reference must not be as part of any comorbid neurodevelopmental 
disorders (e.g., autistic spectrum disorders) in which difficulties in 
social processing are key features
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9. Visuospatial abilities: 
x Any clear reference to, or unambiguous examples of, difficulties in the 
processing of visuospatial information (e.g., awareness of oneself in space, 
difficulties in map-reading, finding locations, etc.)
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APPENDIX 2: SLIDES FROM TEACHING SESSION INTERVENTION DELIVERED TO 














APPENDIX 3: TYPES OF INTERVENTION STRATEGIES FOR COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT IN SCHIZOPHRENIA MENTIONED BY PARTICIPANTS 
Table A1 presents the types of intervention strategies for cognitive impairment in schizophrenia mentioned by participants, together with 
illustrative quotations and the numbers of participants that mentioned each strategy. 
Table A1: Types of intervention strategies for cognitive impairment in schizophrenia mentioned by participants, as well as illustrative quotations 
and the numbers of participants that mentioned each strategy (N = 15) 




‘I think it’s important that, erm, that they have some form of 
employment – I don’t mean paid employment, but some sort of 
activity that they involve themselves… that empowers them and 




‘… I try not to get into prompting somebody every time I’m 
seeing them, so that they can sort of get used to remembering 
appointments and checking their diary and, you know, taking 
responsibility for it, so…’ (Participant 12) 
1 
Groups/socialising with others ‘… We have a lot of groups that have been run here, to support 
people that are like… We have, erm, you know, the Walking 
1 
Table A1 continues over the page
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Table A1 continued 
Type of intervention (alphabetised) Example of participant response Number of participants that 
mentioned strategy 
 Group, we have the Women [sic] Group, we have, erm, Bipolar 
Group, to support people at that level to do that… A lot of things 
are done to support them’ (Participant 13) 
 
Improving sleep hygiene ‘… There’s probably medication, as well, that could help, erm, if 
someone’s sleep’s impaired… that could help promote better 
concentration during the day, erm, and any sleep hygiene 
interventions that are not medication-related’ (Participant 7) 
1 
Managing anxiety (and thereby 
improving impairments indirectly) 
‘… I would see that much more as, not managing cognitive 
impairments, but managing anxiety or managing, you know, 
helping someone to-, I don’t see it in terms of cognitive 
impairment...’ (Participant 14) 
1 
Medication:   
To act directly on 
impairments 
‘… Maybe medication also would be… an intervention that might 
help…’ (Participant 4) 
3 
Managing the side-effects of 
medication 
‘… The side-effects of medication is [sic] talked about a lot… 
Maybe looking at the side-effects of medication, as that [sic] 
2 
Table A1 continues over the page
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Table A1 continued 
Type of intervention (alphabetised) Example of participant response Number of participants that 
mentioned strategy 
 could be something that’s creating the problem…’ (Participant 
11) 
 
Not knowing whether/which 
interventions might help 
Interviewer: Okay, and do you know anything about what can 
be done to manage cognitive impairments in psychosis and 
schizophrenia? 
 
Participant 9: Not really… No, if I’m honest, no. 
3 
Occupational therapy-related / 
practical interventions and 
adaptations (e.g., diaries, phone 
reminders) 
‘… It’s about breaking-down, erm, information, breaking-down 
everyday barriers for people… helping people to keep things, 
like diaries, that works for them or, erm, alarms…’ (Participant 
1) 
10 
Otherwise unspecified form of 
therapy 
‘Therapy might help…’ (Participant 3) 1 
Psychology-related approaches:   
‘Behavioural’ approaches ‘… I would’ve thought that… something, maybe, along the sort  1 
Table A1 continues over the page 
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Table A1 continued 
Type of intervention (alphabetised) Example of participant response Number of participants that 
mentioned strategy 
 of behavioural therapy lines might work, with a specific, erm, 
impairment, so maybe, er, actually, retraining somebody, for 
instance, take an example of how, how, how do you, you know, 
if somebody’s coming the other way on a towpath, or 
whatever, erm, how to recognise that and maybe take avoiding 
action, I guess you could do a behavioural thing around that, 
you know, actually get people to perform that in a sort of, erm, 




‘… Well, I think the work we do… CBT-kind of approaches that 










‘… Well, it depends on the cognitive impairment, so it’s 
looking at how one balances the person’s strengths with the 
person’s weaknesses… and saying, “… Let’s look at how we can 
4 
Table A1 continues over the page
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Table A1 continued 
Type of intervention (alphabetised) Example of participant response Number of participants that 
mentioned strategy 
 support you and you can support yourself in the areas that, er, 
that there are these deficits.”’ (Participant 5) 
 
Mindfulness ‘… Mindfulness-type things might help to focus the mind, erm, 
keep them… grounded (Participant 7) 
2 
Psychoeducation ‘… You know, with cognitive deficits, it’s, it’s often where, 
where a person feels there’s something not going well for 
them, you know, so it’s not us telling them, “You’ve got a 
cognitive deficit” and they’re completely unaware of it; it’s 
more someone that’s, feels that they’re not getting on with 
something, something’s stopping them moving-on in life in 
one direction, and helping them better understand it – that it’s 
a cognitive deficit, it’s not because they’re, you know, stupid or 
lazy or some of those other ways that people will take these on 
themselves…’ (Participant 5) 
2 
Support worker ‘… Having a support person, erm… support people with their 
difficulties’ (Participant 7) 
2 
Table A1 continues over the page
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Table A1 continued  
Type of intervention (alphabetised) Example of participant response Number of participants that 
mentioned strategy 
Treating the (positive) symptoms of 
schizophrenia (and thereby 
improving impairments indirectly): 
  
Via medication ‘Number one, I think, managing the illness, so that there aren’t 
episodes of, erm, acute illness, which cause ongoing damage to 
your white matter and neurones… medication would be one 
part of it…’ (Participant 8) 
1 
Via increasing insight ‘… We can speak to them and try to explain to them that what 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.I) DEMENTIA 
‘Dementia’ is an umbrella term referring to a range of degenerating brain conditions, 
all of which involve the progressive deterioration of cognitive functions – their 
common feature being a decline in memory functioning [1]. The two most common 
forms of dementia are Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and vascular dementia (VD) [2]. AD is 
characterised by the development of neurofibrillary tangles (groupings of protein 
within neurons), senile plaques (accumulations of protein between neurons) and 
cortical atrophy in a number of brain regions [3]. Initially, these neural abnormalities 
tend to be concentrated within regions of the medial temporal lobe associated with 
episodic memory (EM) – a form of long-term memory concerned with personal 
experience [4]; consequently, EM tends to be the first aspect of cognition to deteriorate 
[5]. As the underlying neuropathology progressively expands to other brain regions, so 
the EM impairment becomes progressively worse, along with deteriorations in 
executive functioning [functions comprising volitional activities, such as planning, 
organising, self-awareness, self-regulation and the initiation of action; 6], semantic 
memory [a form of long-term memory concerning general knowledge about the world, 
language, etc.; 4] and attention and visuo-spatial abilities [7, 8]. Initially, these 
difficulties may only be apparent to the individual but, with time, they become 
increasingly apparent to others. In the advanced stages of the disease, the sufferer is 
unable to live independently and may even be ignorant of their cognitive 
impairment(s). In contrast to the gradual onset of AD, VD occurs abruptly, in the wake 
of infarction(s). Severer forms of VD tend to result from pronounced infarcts, which 
leave a region of dead (or dying) brain tissue, whereas milder forms result from partial 
infarction within capillaries [9]. Although there is considerable overlap in the cognitive 
signs of AD and VD, VD patients typically exhibit greater executive impairments but 
fewer and less severe impairments in memory [10]. AD and VD can coexist in the form 
of ‘mixed dementia’, although the prevalence rates of this disorder are controversial 
[11]. 
Early-onset dementia (EOD) refers to Dementia occurring prior to 65 years of age; late-
onset dementia occurs after 65 [12]. In terms of prevalence, EOD is experienced by 
around 0.1 per cent of people between the ages of 40 and 65. It is estimated that around 
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18,500 people in the UK suffer from EOD [13]. Beyond 65 years of age, incidence rates 
double approximately every five years, such that, by 85 years, approximately 50 per cent 
of people are estimated to have AD and other dementias [14]. 
I.II) PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA 
The term ‘schizophrenia’ refers to a heterogeneous range of symptoms, including 
implausible and peculiar beliefs and sensory experiences, social withdrawal, restricted 
or inappropriate emotional expression and disorganised behaviour [1]. Hallucinations 
and delusions have traditionally been considered as the core features of the disorder 
[15]. Prognoses are variable, with approximately one third of individuals experiencing 
just one episode in their lifetime, one third experiencing intermittent episodes 
interspersed with periods of remission and another third experiencing a chronic, 
deteriorating course [16]. The lifetime individual risk for developing schizophrenia is 
approximately 1 per cent and, on average, around 20 new cases per 100,000 are 
diagnosed each year [17]. 
I.III) COGNITIVE/NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL DEFICITS IN 
PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA 
A number of meta-analytic studies report approximately 70-75% of individuals with 
schizophrenia to perform below general population norms for many standard cognitive 
tasks [15]. The magnitude of such differences is in the order of 1.5 pooled standard 
deviations for processing speed and aspects of sensory, verbal and working memory; 
differences of 1.0 standard deviation have been reported across tests of attention, 
executive functioning, language, motor and spatial abilities, as well as general 
intelligence [18-22]. To put this into perspective, the magnitude of these differences in 
cognition equal or exceed effect-sizes for moderate to severe traumatic brain injury and 
composite measures of cognition [23], the effects of right cerebral hemisphere stroke 
and non-verbal memory [24] and preclinical and subsequent Alzheimer’s disease and 
memory performance [25]. The functional consequences of cognitive impairments 
appear to be significant, with degree of independence in community living, skill-
acquisition, work performance and occupational development, social skills and 
relationships, as well as quality of life, all being negatively associated with 
neuropsychological deficits [26, 27]. 
 61 
Though it seems that the breadth and magnitude of cognitive impairments in 
schizophrenia cannot be attributed to anti-psychotic medication [28-30], highly-
medicated patients demonstrate specific impairments in processing-speed, relative to 
less medicated patients [31]. There is also evidence that risperidone may disrupt spatial 
working memory [32]. 
I.IV) SCHIZOPHRENIA AND DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY DISORDERS: PREVALENCE 
AND EFFECTS ON COGNITION 
Depression and anxiety disorders are commonly observed throughout the course of 
psychosis, including the prodromal phase and following symptomatic recovery [33-35]. 
Rates of comorbid depression have been estimated at between 30 and 50% [36, 37] and 
rates of anxiety disorders are thought to be around 45% [34]. The nature and course of 
these co-morbidities in schizophrenia are not well understood [38, 39]. Regardless, the 
presence of depression and anxiety disorders are both related to memory problems and 
other difficulties in cognition that can resemble those observed in dementia. 
Depression is associated with difficulties in EM, as well as broad impairments in 
executive functioning [40, 41], and anxiety disorders are associated with impairments 
in attention, executive functioning, long- and short-term verbal and visual memory 
and poorer processing speed [42]. In addition, depression is also highly co-morbid in 
dementia [43]. Depression and anxiety disorders are therefore important differential 
diagnoses when testing for dementia. 
II. PRESENTING PROBLEM 
The patient was a 58-year-old white British male outpatient with a primary diagnosis 
of psychosis/schizophrenia. His clinical psychologist had referred him for a formal 
memory assessment, following the patient’s self-reporting long-standing memory 
problems, which seemed to be interfering with his daily functioning. In particular, the 
patient described forgetting appointments and everyday tasks, such as taking his 
medication. Since he had been prescribed the anti-psychotic Risperidone (6 mg daily), 
as well as insulin for diabetes, there were potentially serious consequences of his 
forgetting to take his medication. In addition, the patient reported difficulty following 
the conversation of his partner when at home and an inability to recall conversations 
that had occurred just half an hour previously. He also described often forgetting the 
purpose for which he has entered a room. The patient reported no difficulties, however, 
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in recalling events from his childhood and young adulthood (the accuracy of which 
were verified by his long-term partner). Thus, there were concerns that he may be 
exhibiting signs of early-onset dementia. 
III. BACKGROUND 
The patient had an approximately 20-year psychiatric history. Although he had begun 
to hear voices in the mid-1990s, the patient remained unknown to mental health 
services until December 2000, when he experienced an acute psychotic episode and 
was admitted to hospital as an inpatient. 
He has experienced chronic low mood, marked by lack of pleasure and poor 
motivation. In 2004, he scored 43 on the Beck Depression Inventory, placing him in the 
severely depressed range. There was also a history of chronic anxiety, with a substantial 
social element. In social occasions, for example, he reports finding it hard to speak and 
is subsequently critical of himself. A previous therapist, working with the patient 
around low mood, poor motivation and self-critical thoughts, reported that he was, 
‘Too anxious to do the necessary exploratory work’. Such was his anxiety that she was 
unable to derive a formulation from the limited account of his difficulties that the 
patient was able to give. Similarly, another therapist reported that, ‘… He could respond 
to direct questioning but his answers were brief and unelaborate… He reported 
experiencing discomfort when questioned.’ 
In April 2000, the patient was involved in a road traffic accident, in which he was hit 
by a van and knocked from his bike. During a previous neuropsychological assessment, 
he reported losing consciousness for around 30 seconds, but remembered lying in the 
road and being helped-up after the accident. He sustained a cut on the back of his head 
and was taken to hospital via ambulance, where the wound was stitched, before he was 
discharged. Although the patient required a couple of weeks off work, he did not note 
any changes in his memory or concentration following the accident. A subsequent 
discharge summary reported no evidence of neurological deficits. He had been 
unemployed since this accident, but reports his giving-up work to be related to his 
psychiatric state, rather than any possible changes that may have occurred subsequent 
to the accident. 
The patient is highly supported by his partner, who performs most activities of daily 
living (ADLs; daily self-care activities, e.g., bathing, dressing, grooming, etc.) for him. 
 63 
This notwithstanding, and according to patient and partner report, when his partner is 
not present, the patient is capable of completing ADLs independently. 
IV. PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT 
Due to the patient having had concerns about his memory as far back as 2000, he 
previously underwent an in-depth assessment in 2005 (i.e. following his bicycle 
accident). The assessment comprised an interview with the patient, as well as 
completion of: (i) the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-UK Third Edition [WAIS-
IIIUK; 44], to assess his cognitive functioning; (ii) the National Adult Reading Test 
[NART; 45] and the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading [WTARUK; 46], to estimate his 
premorbid level of intellectual functioning; (iii) to assess his memory functioning, four 
subtests from the Adult Memory and Information-Processing Battery [AMIPB; 47] and 
the Short Recognition Memory for Words and Faces, from the Camden Test Battery 
[48]; and (iv) to assess his executive functioning, the Trail-Making Test [49], the 
Hayling Sentence-Completion Test [50], the Stroop task [51] and the Brixton Spatial 
Anticipation Test [50]. 
The following is a summary of the patient’s results (see Appendix 1 for a detailed 
overview of his performance). In terms of his general intellectual ability, as assessed by 
the WAIS-IIIUK, the patient’s functioning was in the Low Average to Borderline ranges 
– which represented a significant level of under-functioning, relative to his premorbid, 
reading-based estimates derived from the WTAR and NART. His Performance IQ was 
particularly poor, which was attributed to slow processing speed. Regarding his 
memory, the patient performed either in the Below Average or Well Below Average 
ranges across tests, with his delayed recall seeming to be particularly impaired. 
Notably, however, the patient’s forced-choice recognition of faces was at ceiling level 
and he made no errors on this task. In terms of the patient’s executive functioning, 
there were marked difficulties with response-inhibition, sequence-detection and rule-
following. Overall, based on the interview with the patient and his performance across 
the tests, it was concluded that it was, ‘… Difficult to attribute the current executive 
function difficulties, along with his slowed processing speed and memory difficulties, 
to [his bicycle accident in 2000] and it may be more likely that his psychiatric history 
and its treatment account for his current cognitive profile.’
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V. AIMS OF THE PRESENT ASSESSMENT 
The aim of the present assessment was to formally examine the patient’s memory 
functioning, in order to i) establish whether any impairment/s were evident and ii) if 
so, to examine the extent to which the problem/s were organic, functional or both and 
iii) to inform his ongoing care plan with the community mental health team. Also, the 
results of the present assessment could be used as a baseline against which to compare 
the results of potential future assessments, in order to investigate the presence and 
progression of potential dementing conditions. The patient was keen to understand, 
‘What is going on?’ 
It was not possible, due to a lack of access, to administer the same tests as those given 
in the patient’s previous neuropsychological assessment. The results of the previous 
assessment were nevertheless informative: the overall impression they gave of the 
patient’s functioning in 2005 were compared to the present results, in order to explore 
whether his memory problems might have markedly worsened since then; if so, this 
would indicate a possible dementia. 
VI. ASSESSMENT MEASURES 
The following measures were administered (see Appendix 2 for detailed descriptions 
of each of these indices): (i) The Spielberger State and Trait Anxiety Inventory [STAI; 
52]; (ii) The Test of Premorbid Functioning – UK Edition [TOPFUK; 53]; (iii) The 
Wechsler Memory Scale – UK 4th Edition IV [WMS-IVUK; 54]; (iv) The 2-Subtest 
Version of the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale – UK 2nd Edition [WASI-IIUK; 
55], and; (v) The Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test [WCST; 56]. 
VII. ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
The assessment took place over two sessions; the first lasted around 1 hour and 20 
minutes, whilst the second lasted around 2 hours and 15 minutes (see Table A7 in 
Appendix 3 for schematic over of measures administered and their 
sequencing/timings). The first session began with a brief interview concerning the 
patient’s perspective of his memory difficulties. This was also used as a means of easing 
the patient into the assessment, with the aim that he did not begin the first test of the 
battery at peak anxiety. (I also tried, via my manner and tone of voice, to ease the 
patient’s anxiety throughout the two sessions.) Following this, the STAI, TOPFUK and 
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the first half of the WMS-IVUK (i.e. subtests 1-5) were completed. The second half of the 
WMS-IVUK (i.e. subtests 6-10), the WASI-IIUK and the WCST were completed in the 
second session. 
VIII. ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
VIII.I) BEHAVIOUR DURING THE ASSESSMENT 
The examinee engaged well with the assessment and informed me that he was keen to 
participate. He seemed to understand the instructions of the tasks and what was 
required of him in each. However, he spent little time planning for tasks and did not 
appear to be implementing strategies in order to successfully complete the tasks. 
Similarly, in those tasks providing corrective feedback, he did not appear to learn from 
feedback indicating that he had given an incorrect answer, instead perseverating with 
an incorrect approach to the task. At the beginning of tasks, the patient would often 
state, ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I can’t remember’ and, despite encouragement, would not spend 
much time trying to problem-solve, instead giving up. With support from the 
examiner, however, he was able to complete tasks to a slightly higher level than 
recorded in this assessment. This may have been because he was being reminded of the 
instructions of the task, his focus was being kept on the task and/or he was encouraged 
to persevere. 
VIII.II) RESULTS ON MEASURES 
The patient’s results for the various measures, described only briefly below, are related 
in more detail in Appendix 4. 
VIII.II.I) THE STAI 
The patient’s state anxiety (s-anxiety) was 67 and his trait anxiety (t-anxiety) was 75, 
indicating considerable anxiety.
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VIII.II.II) THE WMS-IVUK 
The patient’s performance on the WMS-IVUK indicated substantial and global memory 
impairment. The examinee’s performance across 4 indices (auditory memory, visual 
memory, immediate memory and delayed memory) of the WMS-IVUK fell into the 
extremely low range; his visual working memory performance fell into the borderline 
range. 
VIII.II.III) THE TOPFUK 
The patient’s TOPFUK raw score was 56, placing his premorbid estimates in the average 
to high average range. His estimated premorbid scores for WMS-IVUK indices were 
uniformly substantially greater than his obtained scores. 
VIII.II.IV) THE WASI-IIUK 
The examinee’s performance on the WASI-IIUK placed him within the borderline range 
for FSIQ. 
VIII.II.V) THE WCST 
The patient’s performance on the WCST demonstrated that his executive functioning 
was significantly impaired. 
IX. DISCUSSION 
The patient’s performance across the WMS-IVUK, TOPFUK, WASI-IIUK and WCST was 
suggestive of significant memory, cognitive and executive impairments across all 
domains. Based on the examinee’s face-value performance across all tasks in the 
current assessment, therefore, he would appear to be severely compromised, both in 
terms of his memory and his broader cognitive functioning. 
There can be little doubt, based on the patient’s self-report on his everyday experience 
and his significantly compromised WMS-IVUK performance, that he is exhibiting 
memory dysfunction. This is consistent with literature suggesting difficulties with 
aspects of memory in those with psychosis/schizophrenia [15]. However, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to pinpoint the extent to which this is the case. It is possible that the 
patient’s impaired memory performance may have partly resulted from possible 
executive functioning difficulties, as suggested by his WCST performance – such 
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problems being common amongst those with schizophrenia/psychosis [20, 21]. 
Individuals with executive dysfunction are likely to perform poorly on a wide range of 
tasks/activities, memory or otherwise, due to so many relying, to some extent, on 
executive abilities [57]. This would be consistent with the examinee’s impaired 
performance across all the measures administered. Nevertheless, it is not possible, on 
this assessment alone, to disentangle the patient’s poor memory performance from his 
poor executive performance. 
It is also possible that a third factor – the patient’s apparently high level of state anxiety 
– may have significantly contributed to his impaired performance, raising a significant 
question-mark against the validity of the present assessment. (Questions concerning 
the validity of the assessment were also raised by the statistically-improbable TOPFUK 
findings and the questionable WASI-IIUK results.) When asked during the sessions how 
he felt, the examinee verbally reported that he did not feel particularly anxious or 
worried – with which his body language and presentation during these sessions 
appeared consistent. However, there are several reasons for hypothesising that the 
examinee was in fact likely to have been experiencing significant anxiety. Firstly, it was 
well-documented in his notes that he experiences clinically-significant anxiety, and 
particularly in social situations. Since social anxiety is known to be related to a fear of 
negative evaluation by others [58], it is reasonable to conclude that a somewhat formal 
neuropsychological testing scenario, administered by someone the patient had not 
previously met, would have evoked a strong anxious response. Secondly, he self-
reported a considerable level of state anxiety via the STAI. Thirdly, the patient did not 
present on the initial date set for the first assessment session due to fears that he had 
developed concerning the nature of the sessions: specifically, he had come to believe 
that he was to undergo brain surgery. This had understandably distressed him and 
appears to have led to his experiencing a protective, fugue-like state; thus, after having 
left his house to present for the first assessment session, the patient appeared to have 
forgotten the appointment and had instead spent hours walking around his local area. 
A similar incident occurred on what had initially been set as the second session. 
Following both of these occasions, he did, however, attend a rescheduled appointment 
for the following week. (Following his non-attendance of both of these appointments, 
the examiner checked whether the patient still wished to proceed with the assessment, 
to which he responded affirmatively on both occasions.) Incidentally, reports in his 
notes document that this fugue-like state occurs in other potentially anxiety-provoking 
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(social) situations, such as when meeting for the first time with a member of his care 
team. 
Consequently, the patient’s performance in the current assessment may significantly 
underestimate his ‘true’ memory and cognitive abilities. Indeed, were his performance 
in the present assessment to be truly representative of his ability, it would be virtually 
impossible for him to maintain the independent life as an outpatient that he does. 
Rather, if he was indeed experiencing the high level of anxiety hypothesised, it is 
reasonable to suggest that he was unable to focus his attention upon the requirements 
of the various tasks and to utilise his cognitive resources to his fullest ability level. His 
uniformly impaired performance across all tasks is consistent with this [59]. 
Furthermore, the patient’s high trait anxiety score indicates that his high state anxiety 
was likely to be consistent across situations, and not specific to the assessment; it 
therefore follows that any memory problems related to such anxiety may also be 
consistent across situations in his everyday life. 
It is also possible that the patient’s chronic low mood (as documented in his care 
record) may also have impacted on his performance, depression being associated with 
impairments in memory and executive functioning, in particular [60]. Unfortunately, 
a measure of depression was not administered as part of the current assessment (a 
limitation), meaning that this remains unclear. 
In the patient’s previous assessment (in 2005), his memory performance, across all 
tests, fell into either the below average or well below average ranges, with his delayed 
recall particularly poor. The patient made no errors on a forced-choice recognition 
task. As detailed above, there was no such differentiation in the patient’s scores in the 
present assessment, his performance across all indices falling into the extremely low 
range. It is therefore possible that the patient’s memory functioning has indeed 
deteriorated since his previous assessment. Correspondingly, his general cognitive 
functioning in the previous assessment was in the low average to borderline range, 
whereas his performance here placed him in the borderline range. However, whereas 
the previous assessment used the full WAIS-IIIUK, the present assessment administered 
the 2-subtest version subtest of the WASI-IIUK – a less reliable indicator of functioning. 
It is similarly difficult to compare the patient’s memory and executive performances 
across the two assessments, given the different measures used to index these constructs 
in each assessment. Overall, then, it is not possible to directly compare performance 
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across the two assessments, meaning that a possible decline (i.e. owing to a dementing 
condition) in the patient’s cognitive functioning, though possible, cannot be 
determined. 
In conclusion, the true extent of the patient’s memory dysfunction is unclear. It is 
possible that he has experienced memory, executive and more general cognitive 
deterioration as a result of his long-standing experiences of psychosis/schizophrenia 
[40, 41]. It may be that his taking risperidone may attenuate these difficulties [18-22]. It 
also seems likely that his (chronic) anxiety (and low mood) significantly exacerbates 
these difficulties by reducing his ability to concentrate and to fully devote his available 
cognitive resources to ongoing tasks and activities. It is, of course, also possible that 
the patient’s performance is indicative of an underlying, organic memory dysfunction 
(i.e. dementia); yet it is not possible to discern this at the present stage. 
IX.I) RECOMMENDATIONS 
In terms of recommendations, ideally, I would suggest that the patient continue to 
receive psychological input for his anxiety, with a view to his repeating the WMS-IVUK 
in the near future. A possibly reduced level of performance anxiety in a subsequent 
assessment may provide a clearer picture of the extent of his memory impairment. 
Unfortunately, he is soon to be discharged by his service; and besides, his performance 
anxiety in the current assessment followed significant anxiety work as part of his 
(substantial) course of psychological therapy. It is therefore unclear to what extent his 
performance anxiety may be improved in preparation for another assessment. Indeed, 
the potential benefits of his undergoing a further assessment, against the anxiety that 
this is likely to again engender, are debatable. Instead, it is recommended that the 
patient be referred for a course of cognitive remediation therapy, in order that he can 
learn and consolidate strategies to better manage his memory difficulties in everyday 
life.
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IX.II) WIDER IMPLICATIONS 
The questions concerning the validity of the present assessment raise questions more 
widely, concerning the validity of cognitive/neuropsychological findings in 
psychosis/schizophrenia. A large, and growing, literature documents significant 
cognitive impairment in those with schizophrenia, relative to non-psychiatric 
individuals [32]. Rates of anxiety disorders amongst those with psychosis are estimated 
to be around 45% [61]. However, the majority of studies examining cognitive 
impairments in schizophrenia do not seem to screen for the presence of anxiety 
disorders in their participants. It is therefore intriguing to speculate on whether the 
impaired performance of schizophrenic participants may be influenced, at least in part, 
by a proportion of individuals in these studies experiencing substantial levels of 
(performance) anxiety; that is, these studies may be underestimating the ‘true’, 
‘underlying’ cognitive abilities of those with psychosis. It may therefore be advisable 
for future studies to measure, and statistically control for, comorbid anxiety, so as to 
examine whether/the extent to which anxiety might impair performance on 
cognitive/neuropsychological assessments. A potential future benefit of such 
procedures may be the generation of an algorithm to estimate the extent to which 
performance on a given individual neuropsychological assessment might have been 
adversely affected by performance anxiety. Alternatively, studies investigating 
cognitive deficits in psychosis may seek to exclude those who breach cut-off for 
clinically significant levels of anxiety, in the pursuit of a ‘purer’ estimate of cognitive 
impairment. However, such studies may be open to the accusation of being somewhat 
unrepresentative, given the relatively high proportions of anxiety disorders in those 
with schizophrenia. 
X. REFLECTIONS 
Throughout the assessment sessions, I noticed that I felt somewhat uneasy – guilty, 
even. I believe this could be traced to at least four inter-related thoughts: firstly, the 
examinee’s performance being quite obviously impaired across all tasks; secondly, his 
being very likeable and endearing, leading to feelings of warmth and sympathy towards 
him; thirdly, my being the facilitator of what appeared to me to be a rather unpleasant 
experience for the examinee; and finally, the manualised nature of neuropsychological 
assessment dictating that I was unable to provide any help or hints to the examinee, 
despite his obviously struggling to complete the tasks successfully. Related to the last 
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point, I was also aware of my experiencing feelings of frustration and tension 
throughout: observing somebody struggling to correctly perform a task, whilst 
resolutely failing to provide them with any tangible help is a deeply unpleasant, 
unusual, and arguably ‘inhuman’, experience: consequently, I felt somewhat relieved 
on those occasions when the examinee violated a discontinue criterion, meaning that 
that particular task could be ended, offering a brief respite until the next was started. 
These feelings notwithstanding, I have a strong interest in neuropsychology and would 
like to pursue a career in this area. I believe, therefore, that the present assessment will 
prove to be beneficial, in terms of my learning to notice and accept such difficult 
feelings. Although it may feel unpleasant watching someone struggle to perform in a 
cognitive/neuropsychological assessment, the primary purpose of such assessments is 
precisely this: to detect potential difficulties, in order that they can, hopefully, 
subsequently be ameliorated or remediated and the individual’s functioning and 
quality of life improved. 
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APPENDIX 1: VERBATIM REPRODUCTION OF THE PATIENT’S PREVIOUS 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT IN 2005 
A note on the text: 
The patient’s neuropsychological assessment from 2005 is presented below verbatim, 
together with typos/incorrect spellings, which are indicated by ‘[sic]’. The patient’s 
name, together with any other potentially identifiable information, has been 
anonymised. 
REASON FOR REFERRAL: 
Neuropsychological assessment of a 48-year-old right-handed gentleman, who has an 
approximately 10-year history of auditory hallucinations (currently in remission), 
persecutory delusions and deterioration of his personality. There is also a history of a 
road traffic accident in 2000 and [the patient] demonstrated executive and memory 
deficits when seen in the neuropsychiatry outpatient clinic in March 2005. 
BACKGROUND: 
[The patient] has an approximately 10-year psychiatric history. He apparently began 
hearing voices in the mid-1990s, but this remained untreated until his first psychiatric 
presentation in December 2000, when he was admitted to the [name of ward] at [name 
of hospital]. At that time, he was thought to be experiencing primarily a paranoid state, 
with secondary depressive features; he was treated with amisulpride. His mental state 
improved and he was discharged on 5th January 2001. [The patient] indicated during 
the current assessment that he no longer hears voices but had experienced a previous 
relapse when he stopped taking his medication. 
In 2000, [the patient] was also involved in a road traffic accident. He was working at 
the time as a cycle messenger in London and was hit by a van whilst working. [The 
patient] reports having lost consciousness for about 30seconds but remembers lying in 
the road and being helped up after the accident. He said that he had sustained a cut on 
the back of his head and was taken to hospital by ambulance, where the wound was 
stitched and he was discharged. He said that he required a couple of weeks off work 
that [sic] did not note any changes in his memory or concentration following the 
accident. In addition, he said that he had not experienced any anxiety about resuming 
riding his bike. He no longer works but had given up working as a result of his 
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psychiatric state, rather than due to any changes that he [sic] might have occurred 
following the accident. He described the voices that he had been hearing as developing 
slowly over time and after the accident they continued getting worse. 
[The patient] does report a deterioration in his memory but feels that this has become 
poor since his hospital admission in late 2000, rather than occurring after the accident. 
He says that he will remember some events but generally not what has just happened. 
If he reads a paper or book then after about five minutes he will need to keep going 
back to re-read the same passages. He said that he is ‘terrible’ at remembering 
telephone messages and cannot remember the story line of television serials from one 
episode to another. He said that he gets confused when undertaking additions or 
subtractions and that this has also developed since his psychiatric admission. His 
partner, Robert Brent, helps him out with his finances although he will occasionally go 
to the shops on his own. [The patient] said that he no longer rides his cycle, having 
‘lost his nerve’ since his psychiatric hospital admission. 
[The patient]’s partner, [partner’s name], commented that [the patient] now needs 
considerable encouragement to undertake everyday activities. [The patient’s partner] 
has known [the patient] for 30 years. Currently, [the patient’s partner] said that [the 
patient] undertakes less in terms of self-care activities such as keeping his fingernails 
clean or showering, but [the patient’s partner] said that [the patient] does have good 
and bad days. [The patient’s partner] said however that when [the patient’s partner] is 
not around, he is not sure how well [the patient] copes with everyday activities, 
although he is reliable about taking his medication. [The patient’s partner] said that 
[the patient] is very nervous about relating to people and this extends to for example, 
going to the post office or travelling by bus. When he is anxious he will stand making 
rocking movements or pace around. However, [the patient’s partner] felt that [the 
patient] had improved over the last couple of years. 
By way of education, [the patient] said that he had left school at the age of 16 and 
reports having taken three CSEs (in English Language, History and Religious 
Education). He then worked in the music business as a messenger for 15 years and then 
became a cycle messenger for [name of company], and worked for this group for many 
years. 
[The patient’s] current medication is risperidone 4mg daily, citalopram 40mg daily and 
procyclidine 5mg bd. In addition, [the patient] has non-insulin dependent diabetes for 
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which he takes metformin tablets. [The patient] said that his diabetes was first 
diagnosed in either 1999 or 2000. He says that he has greater difficulty controlling his 
diabetes when he is depressed. This is because he cannot be bothered to eat the right 
food or monitor his blood sugar levels. He says that he sees a specialist and a dietician 
at [name of hospital] for this. 
BEHAVIOUR DURING ASSESSMENT: 
[The patient] was seen on two separate assessment sessions. During both of these he 
appeared very anxious about the testing process and demonstrated at times quite 
marked akathisia, in terms of leg movements, which did appear to worsen then [sic] he 
was finding tasks particularly difficult. He would also sit and rock backwards and 
forwards when finding tasks difficult. However, he appeared adequately motivated to 
complete testing and was prepared to return for the second assessment session. 
ASSESSMENT RESULTS: 
(a) General Intellectual Ability: 
[The patient] was assessed on 11 subtests of the WAIS-III. On the basis of these he 
obtained a prorated verbal IQ of 87 (low average range) and a prorated performance 
IQ of 75 (borderline range). Although the difference between his verbal and 
performance IQ was suggestive of a statistically significant difference, a discrepancy of 
this size is not thought to be clinically abnormal. 
[The patient] obtained a verbal comprehension index of 93 (average range) and a 
perceptual organisation index of 82 (low average range). Again although the difference 
between these two scores was statistically significantly different, it is not of a clinically 
abnormal magnitude. [The patient’s] working memory index was 75 (borderline range) 
and his processing speed index was 68 (extremely low range). Whilst both [the 
patient’s] perceptual organisation index and his verbal comprehension index were 
significantly higher than his processing speed index from a statistical point of view, it 
was the discrepancy between his verbal comprehension index and processing speed 
index that tended to suggest a clinically significant relative weakness in his processing 
speed index. 
In terms of obtaining estimates of [the patient]’s premorbid level of functioning, he 
was assessed on both the National Adult Reading Test and the Wechsler Test of Adult 
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Reading. Both of these measures yielded premorbid estimates of general intellectual 
ability in the average range. When comparing WTAR-predicted WAIS-III scores with 
his current verbal and performance IQs, although both of his current IQs were 
significantly lower than the predicted levels, it was the discrepancy between his 
predicted and current performance IQ that appeared to represent a clinically 
significant current level of underfunctioning. It is likely that this discrepancy between 
predicted and current performance IQ scores reflects his particularly slow processing 
speed. This is to some extent substantiated by the observation that his performance on 
the untimed matrix reasoning subtest was in the average range (scaled score 9; IQ 
equivalent 95). 
(b) Memory: 
[The patient] was assessed on the four memory subtests from the Adult Memory and 
Information Processing Battery (AMIPB) and also the Short Recognition Memory Tests 
for Words and Faces from the Camden Test Battery. 
[The patient]’s performance on tests of memory functioning were [sic], to some extent, 
rather patchy. In terms of his ability to recall a short story, his immediate recall was 
below average (10-25th %ile) but his delayed recall was well below average (10th %ile). 
His percentage retained score fell below the 10th %ile. In terms of his ability to learn a 
list of words, presented over five trials, he achieved a total learning score that fell in 
the below average range (10-25th %ile) and he showed a rapid plateau in terms of the 
number of words retained across successive trials. His delayed recall of the initial list 
was impaired and his one trial learning of the distraction list was at the lower end of 
the average range. His forced choice recognition of words was impaired (below the 5th 
%ile) but he had initially misunderstood some of the task instructions. 
[The patient] produced a broadly accurate copy of the AMIPB complex figure but 
produced this copy large [sic] without a systemic [sic] plan. His immediate recall was 
at the 50th %ile but he showed marked forgetting of the figure over the 30 minute delay 
such that his absolute level of delayed recall was well below average (below the 10th 
%ile) but his percentage retention score was impaired (below the 2nd %ile). His ability 
to learn an abstract design, presented over five trials was below average (10-25th %ile) 
although he showed a perfect retention of the figure after an intervening distraction 
trial. However, his one trial learning of the distraction trial itself was impaired (below 
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the 2nd %ile). However, his forced choice recognition of faces was at ceiling level and 
he made no errors on the test. 
(c) Language: 
[The patient]’s reading ability, as noted earlier, is consistent with an average level of 
general intellectual ability. He obtained a score of 21/30 on the Graded Naming Test, 
which is in line with his current reading ability and does not suggest any acquired 
dysnomic difficulties. In addition, his verbal fluency, as assessed on the FAS test, 
yielded a number of words that was consistent with his reading ability and did not 
therefore suggest any difficulties in word generation. 
(d) Executive Functions: 
As noted above, [the patient]’s performance on the verbal fluency test was in line with 
the level predicted on the basis of his current reading ability and did not suggest any 
acquired impairments of verbal fluency. On the WAIS-III similarities subtest, [the 
patient] obtained an age scaled score that had an IQ equivalent in the low average 
range (i.e. 80). This suggests some degree of relative weakness in terms of abstract 
thinking compared to his ability to retrieve semantic information as assessed by the 
Information subtest where his IQ equivalent was 105. Although [the patient] made on 
error on Part B of the trail making test, his completion time on Part B was not 
disproportionately slower to that seen on Part A, and whilst suggesting very mild 
difficulties in self-monitoring, did not suggest any particular difficulty with divided 
attention that could be attributed to a dysexecutive syndrome. 
However, [the patient] did have more pronounced difficulties on the Stroop colour-
word interference test, where his completion time and score placed him below the 2nd 
%ile. In addition on the Hayling sentence completion test, while his completion times 
for both the sensible and unconnected sentences were classified as moderate average, 
he made a number of both connected and somewhat connected error responses, his 
score on the error measure being classified as Poor. Thus he appeared to have some 
difficulty in response inhibition on this measure. On the Brixton spatial anticipation 
test, he made a total of 29 errors with his score overall being classified as abnormal. 
Thus, there is mild evidence for difficulties with abstract reasoning but more marked 
difficulties on tests of response inhibition, sequence detection and rule following. 
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CONCLUSIONS: 
In terms of general intellectual ability, [the patient] is currently functioning in the low 
average to borderline range, although a purer measure of his verbal intellectual skills, 
which does not rely on working memory measures, places him more clearly in the 
average range. His current IQ scores represent a significant degree of underfunctioning 
compared to his premorbid, reading-based estimates, although the discrepancy is more 
marked for his performance than his verbal IQ, and this is probably attributable to his 
slowed processing speed as recorded during the current assessment. [The patient]’s 
memory functioning would appear to be somewhat inconsistent across tests, and on a 
number of measures he performed in the below average to well below average range. 
No difficulties were detected in terms of naming or verbal fluency, but assessment of 
executive functions revealed mild relative difficulty on a test of abstract reasoning and 
more pronounced deficits on measures of response inhibition, rule detection and 
sequence following. 
[The patient] is currently awaiting an MRI scan. It will of course be important to 
interpret the results of the current assessment in light of any findings from that scan, 
but it is of note that neither he nor his partner attribute any of his current cognitive or 
psychological difficulties to the apparently mild head injury which he sustained in 
2000. It would therefore be difficult to attribute the current executive function 
difficulties, along with his slowed processing speed, to that accident and it may be more 
likely that his psychiatric history and its treatment account for his current cognitive 
profile. In addition it is possible that poor control of his diabetes may place him risk 
[sic] for poor cognitive functioning, especially in terms of memory. However, the 
current assessment will serve as a good baseline against which to evaluate any 
suspected future change in [the patient]’s cognitive profile.
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1) WAIS-III    
     
 Verbal Age Scaled Performance Age Scaled 
 Vocabulary 9 Picture 
Completion 
5 
 Similarities 6 Matrix 
Reasoning 
9 
 Arithmetic 6 Block Design 7 
 Digit Span 7 Digit Symbol 
Coding 
3 
 Information 11 (Symbol 
Search) 
(4) 
 (Letter Number 
Sequencing) 
(5)   
     
2) Pro-Rated VIQ = 87 Pro-Rated PIQ = 75  
  VCI = 93  POI = 82 
  WMI = 75  PSI = 68 
     
3) NART-R    
     
 Error Score = 18   
 Predicts WAIS-R FSIQ = 108   
  VIQ = 107   
  PIQ = 108   
     
4) AMIPB    
     
 a) Story Recall Raw Score Percentile  
     
 Immediate 25 10-25  
 Delayed 17 10  
 % Retained 68 <10  
     
 b) List Learning    
     
 Total A1-A5 39 10-25  
 A6 5 2nd  
 B 4 25  
     
 Intrusions 0 75+  
 c) Figure Recall    
     
 Copy 97.5% 25-50  
 Immediate 76.92% 50  
 Delayed 38.46% <10  
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 % Retained 50% <2nd  
     
 d) Design Learning    
     
 Total A1-A5 25 10-25  
 A6 9 90  
 B 0 <2nd  
 Intrusions 3 90  
     
5) Camden Short Recognition Memory Test  
     
 Words Raw Score = 20/25  
  %ile <5th%ile  
     
 Faces Raw Score = 25/25  
  %ile 90+  
     
6) Trail Making Test    
     
 Part A 52 sec. 10-25th%ile  
 Part B 132 sec. 10-25th%ile 1 error 
     
7) Stroop Test    
     
 Colour Words Score = 112/112  
  Time = 69 sec.  
 Colour Words 
Interference 
Score = 45/112  
  %ile = < 2nd  
  Time = 260 sec.  
     
8) Graded Naming Test    
     
 Score = 21/30 50-75th%ile  
     
9) Word Fluency    
     
 F 19   
 A 9   
 S 11   
 Total 39   
 Predicted by NART = 44   
     
10) Hayling Sentence Completion Test   
     
 Sensible Completion    
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 Time Scaled Score = 5 = “Moderate Average”  
     
 Unconnected Sentences   
 Time Scaled Score = 5 = “Moderate Average”  
 Hayling 2 errors 
Scaled Score = 
3 = “Poor”   
     
 Overall Scale Score = 4 “Low Average”  
     
11) W.T.A.R.    
     
 Raw Score = 38   
 Standard Score = 99   
 Predicted WAIS-III VIQ 100 (95% c.i. 82-120) 
  PIQ 102 (95% c.i. 77-127) 
     
12) Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test   
     
 Errors = 29    
 Scaled Score = 2 = 
“Abnormal”) 
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APPENDIX 2: FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES USED IN THE PRESENT 
ASSESSMENT 
THE SPIELBERGER STATE AND TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY [52] 
The STAI was administered due to the patient’s well-documented history of chronic 
anxiety – and in particular, his chronic history of social anxiety; his level of anxiety at 
the time of testing was therefore of interest. The STAI comprises two self-report 
questionnaires. One measures state anxiety (s-anxiety; form Y-1) – that is, the anxiety 
experienced at the time the scale is completed, whilst the trait anxiety (t-anxiety; form 
Y-2) questionnaire indexes one’s general tendency towards anxiety. Each scale consists 
of 20 items, with responses scored from 1 (‘almost never’) to 4 (‘almost always’) via a 
Likert scale; thus, the total score for each can range from 20 to 80, with higher scores 
indicating greater anxiety. A cut-off point of 39-40 has been suggested for inferring 
clinical significance in each scale [STAI; 52], though others have suggested a higher 
cut-off of 54-55 [62]. Internal reliability coefficients for the scale range from 0.86 to 
0.95, whilst test-retest correlations, across a two-month interval, range from 0.65 to 
0.75 [63].  
THE TEST OF PREMORBID FUNCTIONING – UK EDITION [TOPFUK; 53] 
The TOPFUK consists of a list of 70 words that have atypical grapheme to phoneme 
translations. The examinee must read each word from the list aloud in turn, with the 
words becoming increasingly phonetically irregular as one progresses down the list. As 
implied by its name, this measure is used to estimate premorbid intellectual and 
memory abilities, as the ability to identify and articulate words is thought to be 
relatively resistant to the effects of brain-injury and/or dementia. The test’s scoring 
manual provides age-corrected standard scores with a mean of 100 and standard 
deviation (SD) of 15; this standard score was used here to compare the examinee’s 
predicted and observed memory abilities. 
THE WECHSLER MEMORY SCALE – UK 4TH EDITION [WMS-IVUK; 54] 
The WMS-IVUK was used to comprehensively assess the patient’s memory functioning. 
It is a widely-used memory test battery and comprises 10 subtests and assesses a range 
of memory processes, generating five domain-related indices in line with theories 
fractionating memory function: the auditory memory index (AMI), the visual memory 
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index (VMI), the visual working memory index (VWMI), the immediate memory index 
(IMI) and the delayed memory index (DMI). Tables A1-A5 present descriptions of the 
WMS-IVUK indices and their incorporated subtests. 
Table A1: Descriptions of the auditory memory index and its incorporated subtests 
Index/Subtest Description 
Auditory Memory Index This index indicates the examinee’s ability to 
remember orally-presented information. 
Logical Memory I This subtest assesses narrative memory under a free-
recall condition. Two short stories are orally presented. 
The examinee is asked to retell each story from 
memory immediately after hearing it. 
Logical Memory II The delayed condition assesses long-term narrative 
memory with free-recall and recognition tasks. The 
examinee is asked to retell both stories from the 
immediate condition. Then, the examinee is asked 
yes/no questions about both stories. 
Verbal Paired Associates 
I 
This subtest assesses verbal memory for associated 
word-pairs. After 14 word-pairs are read to the 
examinee, the first word of each pair is read, and the 
examinee is asked to provide the corresponding word. 
There are four trials of the same list in different orders. 
Verbal Paired Associates 
II 
The delayed condition assesses long-term recall for 
verbally-paired information with cued-recall and 
recognition tasks. The examinee is orally presented 
with the first word of each pair learned in the 
immediate condition and asked to provide the 
corresponding word. The examinee is then read a list 
of word-pairs and asked to identify each as either one 
of the word-pairs he or she was asked to remember, or 
a new word-pair. 
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Table A2: Descriptions of the Visual Memory Index and its incorporated subtests 
Index/Subtest Description 
Visual Memory Index This index indicates the examinee’s ability to 
remember visually-presented information. 
Designs I This subtest assesses spatial memory for unfamiliar 
visual material. The examinee is shown a grid with 4-8 
designs on a page for 10 seconds, which is then 
removed from view. The examinee then selects the 
designs from a set of cards and places the cards in a 
grid in the same place as previously shown. 
Designs II The delayed condition assesses long-term spatial and 
visual memory with free-recall and recognition tasks. 
First, the examinee is asked to recreate the pages 
shown in the immediate condition with the cards and 
grid. Then, he or she is shown a series of grids and 
asked to select the two designs that are correct and in 
the same place as on the pages shown in the immediate 
condition. 
Visual Reproduction I This subtest assesses memory for non-verbal visual 
stimuli. A series of five designs is shown, one at a time, 
for 10 seconds each. After each design is presented, the 
examinee is asked to draw the design from memory. 
Visual Reproduction II The delayed condition assesses long-term visual-
spatial memory with free-recall and recognition tasks. 
First, the examinee is asked to draw the designs shown 
during the immediate condition, from memory in any 
order. Second, the examinee is asked to choose which 
of six designs on a page matches the original design 
shown during the immediate condition. 
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Table A3: Descriptions of the Visual Working Memory Index and its incorporated 
subtests 
Index/Subtest Description 
Visual Working Memory 
Index 
This index indicates the examinee’s capacity to 
remember and manipulate visually-presented 
information in short-term memory storage. 
Spatial Addition This subtest assesses visual-spatial working memory, 
using a visual addition task. The examinee is shown, 
sequentially, two grids with blue and red circles. The 
examinee is then asked to add or subtract the location 
of the circles, based on a set of rules. 
Symbol Span This subtest assesses visual working memory using 
novel visual stimuli. The examinee is briefly shown a 
series of abstract symbols on a page and then asked 
to select the symbols from an array of symbols, in the 
same order they were presented on the previous page. 
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This index indicates the examinee’s ability to 
remember both visually- and orally-presented 
information immediately after it is presented. 
Logical Memory I This subtest assesses narrative memory under a 
free-recall condition. Two short stories are orally 
presented. The examinee is asked to retell each 
story from memory immediately after hearing it. 
Verbal Paired Associates 
I 
This subtest assesses verbal memory for associated 
word-pairs. After 14 word-pairs are read to the 
examinee, the first word of each pair is read, and the 
examinee is asked to provide the corresponding 
word. There are four trials of the same list in 
different orders. 
Designs I This subtest assesses spatial memory for unfamiliar 
visual material. The examinee is shown a grid with 
4-8 designs on a page for 10 seconds, which is then 
removed from view. The examinee then selects the 
designs from a set of cards and places the cards in a 
grid in the same place as previously shown. 
Visual Reproduction I This subtest assesses memory for non-verbal visual 
stimuli. A series of five designs is shown, one at a 
time, for 10 seconds each. After each design is 
presented, the examinee is asked to draw the design 
from memory. 
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Table A5: Descriptions of the Delayed Memory Index and its incorporated subtests 
Index/Subtest Description 
Delayed Memory Index This index indicates the examinee’s ability to 
remember both visually- and orally-presented 
information after a 20-30 minute delay. 
Logical Memory II The delayed condition assesses long-term narrative 
memory with free-recall and recognition tasks. The 
examinee is asked to retell both stories from the 
immediate condition. Then, the examinee is asked 
yes/no questions about both stories. 
Verbal Paired Associates 
II 
The delayed condition assesses long-term recall for 
verbally-paired information with cued-recall and 
recognition tasks. The examinee is orally presented 
with the first word of each pair learned in the 
immediate condition and asked to provide the 
corresponding word. The examinee is then read a list 
of word-pairs and asked to identify each as either one 
of the word-pairs he or she was asked to remember, or 
a new word-pair. 
Designs II The delayed condition assesses long-term spatial and 
visual memory with free-recall and recognition tasks. 
First, the examinee is asked to recreate the pages 
shown in the immediate condition with the cards and 
grid. Then, he or she is shown a series of grids and 
asked to select the two designs that are correct and in 
the same place as on the pages shown in the immediate 
condition. 
Visual Reproduction II The delayed condition assesses long-term visual-
spatial memory with free-recall and recognition tasks. 
First, the examinee is asked to draw the designs shown 
during the immediate condition, from memory in any 
order. Second, the examinee is asked to choose which 
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of six designs on a page matches the original design 
shown during the immediate condition. 
 
THE 2-SUBTEST VERSION OF THE WECHSLER ABBREVIATED SCALE OF 
INTELLIGENCE –2ND EDITION [WASI-IIUK; 55] 
The WASI-IIUK was used to give an indication of the examinee’s general cognitive 
abilities. This measure offers the option of a 4- or a 2-subtest version; although the 
former is considered to provide a more reliable indication of current cognitive ability 
[52], it takes 30 minutes to complete and, as time was at a premium, the 2-subtest 
version was used here. The 2-subtest version yields a single score, that of Full-Scale IQ 
(FSIQ), based on performance within the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests. 
Table A6 presents descriptions of the vocabulary and matrix reasoning subtests of the 
WASI-IIUK.
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Table A6: Descriptions of the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the 
WASI-IIUK 
Subtest Description 
Vocabulary The Vocabulary subtest has 31 items, including 3 
picture items and 28 verbal items. For picture items, 
the examinee names the object presented visually. For 
verbal items, the examinee defines words that are 
presented visually and orally. Vocabulary is designed to 
measure an examinee’s word knowledge and verbal 
concept formulation. It also measures an examinee’s 
crystallised intelligence, fund of knowledge, learning 
ability, long-term memory and degree of language 
development. Other abilities that may be used by the 
examinee during this task include auditory 
comprehension and verbal expression. 
Matrix Reasoning The Matrix Reasoning subtest has 30 items. The 
examinee views a series of incomplete matrices and 
completes each one by selecting the correct response 
option. The subtest taps fluid intelligence, broad visual 
intelligence, classification and spatial ability, 
knowledge of part-whole relationships, simultaneous 
processing and perceptual organisation. 
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THE WISCONSIN CARD-SORTING TEST [WCST; 56] 
The WCST is one of the most commonly-used instruments for the assessment of 
executive function and is considered a significant measure of cognitive flexibility, 
attention and impulsivity. The test assesses abstract reasoning, the subject’s ability to 
generate problem-solving strategies in response to changing conditions and may be 
regarded, therefore, as a measure of flexibility of thought. Briefly, the WCST test 
consists of 128 paper cards containing geometric designs that vary in colour, form and 
number. The subject is given four cards and then asked to sort the remaining deck of 
cards by colour, form or number, but is not instructed as to how to do so. Thus, the 
subject is required to infer the correct sorting principles from limited feedback from 
the examiner, who only tells the participant, following each individual card-sort, 
whether the sorting is correct or incorrect. 
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APPENDIX 3: SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW OF MEASURES ADMINISTERED AND THEIR 
SEQUENCING/TIMINGS 
Table A7 presents a schematic overview of the measures administered as part of the 
assessment, together with the sequence in which they were administered and the time 
taken to complete each. 
Table A7: Schematic overview of measures administered and their 
sequencing/timings 
Session Order of tests (and timings) 
1 Informal interview (15 minutes) 
State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (15 minutes) 
Test of Premorbid Functioning (TOPFUK) (3 minutes) 
Wechsler Memory Scale – UK 4th Edition (WMS-IVUK) 
(Subtests 1-5) (40 minutes) 
2 WMS-IVUK (subtests 6-10) (35 minutes) 
Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale – 2nd Edition (WASI-
IIUK) (30 minutes) 
Wisconsin Card-Sorting Test (WCST) (45 minutes) 
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APPENDIX 4: RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENT 
THE STAI 
The patient’s state (s-anxiety) was 67 and his trait anxiety (t-anxiety) was 75, indicating 
considerable anxiety. Of most interest for the present purposes was his s-anxiety – that 
is, the degree to which he was experiencing anxiety in the moment, during the testing 
sessions. His score of 67 breached both the more liberal (39-40) and the more 
conservative (54-55) cut-offs for inferring the presence of clinically-significant 
symptoms. Furthermore, his s-anxiety score was substantially higher than for adult 
males of the same age within the general population (M = 34.51; SD = 10.34), placing 
him within the top 1% [64]. Even relative to other male neuropsychiatric patients (i.e. 
those with major depression, an anxiety disorder, schizophrenia, brain damage), his 
scores were high, with mean s-anxiety across other neuropsychiatric groups equaling 
47.74 (SD = 13.24); the patient’s s-anxiety score therefore places him within the top 10% 
of neuropsychiatric patients. His (very) high s-anxiety is consistent with his apparent 
apprehension and anxiety around his presenting for and attendance at the sessions. 
This is of considerable importance, given the potentially deleterious impact of high 
levels of anxiety on one’s ability to concentrate and allocate attentional resources to 
ongoing tasks, such as those completed in the current assessment. His trait anxiety 
score was even greater than his state anxiety score, consistent with the chronic anxiety 
documented in his care record. It is therefore likely that the patient’s chronically 
elevated anxiety also interferes with his cognitive and memory functioning in everyday 
life, impairing his ability to follow conversations and remember why he has entered the 
kitchen, for example. 
THE WMS-IVUK 
The patient’s performance on the WMS-IVUK indicated substantial and global memory 
impairment. The examinee’s performance across all indices of the WMS-IVUK fell into 
the extremely low range. Table A8 presents the results of the WMS-IVUK. 
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Table A8: Results of the WMS-IVUK 










Auditory Memory Index 67 62-75 1 Extremely Low 
Logical Memory I 2    
Logical Memory II 3    
Verbal Paired Associates 
I 
5    
Verbal Paired Associates 
II 
8    
Visual Memory Index 57 53-64 0.2 Extremely Low 
Designs I 8    
Designs II 2    
Visual Reproduction I 2    
Visual Reproduction II 1    
Visual Working Memory 
Index 
70 65-79 2 Borderline 
Spatial Addition 5    
Symbol Span 5    
Immediate Memory 
Index 
61 57-69 0.5 Extremely Low 
Logical Memory I 2    
Verbal Paired Associates 
I 
5    
Designs I 8    
Visual Reproduction I 2    
Delayed Memory Index 56 52-65 0.2 Extremely Low 
Logical Memory II 3    
Verbal Paired Associates 
II 
8    
Designs II 2    
Visual Reproduction II 1    
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The AMI: This measures the ability to remember orally-presented information. The 
examinee’s AMI score was extremely low, compared to others his age. There was 
significant inconsistency in performance on specific measures within this domain, 
warranting a closer look. Thus, his performance on the verbal paired associates II 
subtest was a statistically-significant strength, indicating that he has an improved 
ability to remember word-pairs 20-30 minutes after presentation. On the other hand, 
a relative weakness was the score he obtained on logical memory I – that is, the ability 
to recall verbal information that is conceptually-organised and semantically-related 
immediately after hearing it. 
The VMI: The VMI measures the ability to process, analyse and recall visually-
presented information. The examinee’s score placed him within the extremely low 
ability range. However, there was significant inconsistency in his performance on 
specific measures within this domain, warranting a closer look at his scores. The 
examinee’s performance in designs I was significantly better than his average 
performance on the other subtests within this index; the scale of the discrepancy 
between his improved score on the former relative to his mean VMI performance is 
shared by only 1% of the population. Thus, a relative strength of his is his immediate 
recall of unfamiliar visual material. In contrast, the examinee’s performance on designs 
II was worse, suggesting that his long-term recall is poor. Interestingly, his ability to 
recognise unfamiliar visual material from long-term memory (designs II recognition) 
was significantly better and was equivalent to the performance of 26-50% of the general 
population. These data are consistent with the examinee’s being able to encode 
information into long-term memory but experiencing difficulty with its subsequent 
retrieval; indeed, when asked during the testing sessions whether he had any methods 
via which he was trying to remember material, the examinee responded in the negative. 
The VWMI: The VWMI evaluates the temporary storage and manipulation of visual 
information within a virtual mental notepad. The examinee performed in the 
borderline ability range; his performance here is shared by only 2% of the general 
population. 
The IMI: The IMI is a measure of the ability to recall verbal and visual information 
immediately after the stimuli have been presented. Compared to other individuals his 
age, the examinee performed in the extremely low range, his performance being shared 
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with just 0.5% of the general population. Within this index, the examinee exhibited a 
strength on the designs I subtest; thus, his ability to retrieve unfamiliar visual 
information from short-term memory was superior to his performance on the other 
IMI subtests. 
The DMI: The DMI indexes the ability to recall verbal and visual information after a 20- 
to 30-minute delay. As per his performance on the other indices, the examinee was 
again placed within the extremely low ability category, his score being shared with only 
0.2% of the general population. There was inconsistency amongst the examinee’s 
subtest scores within this index, which merits further discussion. His performance on 
the verbal paired associates II subtest was a strength, meaning that, relatively speaking, 
he was more able in terms of the long-term recall of pairs of words. 
THE TOPFUK 
The patient’s TOPFUK raw score was 56, placing his premorbid estimates in the average 
to high average range. His estimated premorbid scores for WMS-IVUK indices were 
uniformly substantially greater than his obtained scores. The discrepancies between 
his estimated and observed WMS-IVUK scores were so great, in fact, as to be statistically 
implausible – indeed, fewer than 0.09% of the general population exhibit such 
discrepancies between their expected and observed scores. This calls into question the 
validity of his WMS-IVUK performance. Table A9 presents the results of the TOPFUK.
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Table A9: Discrepancies between estimated premorbid and current obtained scores 


































67 110 -43 < 0.06 
THE WASI-IIUK 
The examinee’s performance on the WASI-IIUK placed him within the borderline range 
for FSIQ. According to his performance, there is a 95% chance that his ‘true’ IQ score 
lies somewhere between 71 and 84. Considering that one criterion for intellectual 
disability is an IQ below 70, this may suggest that he is on the borderline for such a 
diagnosis. However, even the most cursory of meetings with the patient reveals that he 
is clearly not intellectually challenged, and neither has the possibility ever been 
queried; indeed, his very low IQ score represents a further challenge to the validity of 
his overall performance in the present assessment. Table A10 presents the results of the 
WASI-IIUK.
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Full Scale-2 72 76 5 71-84 Borderline 
Matrix 
Reasoning 
39     
Vocabulary 33     
THE WCST 
The patient’s performance on the WCST demonstrated that his executive functioning 
was significantly impaired. The large number of errors he made meant his performance 
was shared with the lowest 5% of the general population. Similarly, the very high 
numbers of perseverative responses and errors he made were shared with less than 1% 
of the population. He demonstrated significant difficulty in appreciating the need to 
learn using corrective feedback; indeed, his low Learning to Learn score was shared 
with less than 1% of the (worst) performers on this task in the general population. 
Overall, the patient’s WCST performance was similar to that expected for individuals 
with frontal lobe lesions. Table A11 presents the results of the WCST.
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T Score Percentile 
Score/Range 
Number of Trials 
Administered 
128  
Total Number Correct 55 
Total Number of Errors 73 71 31 3 
Percent Errors 57 72 31 3 
Perseverative 
Responses 
82 59 23 < 1 
Percent Perseverative 
Responses 
64 56 21 < 1 
Perseverative Errors 65 60 23 < 1 
Percent Perseverative 
Errors 
51 57 21 < 1 
Non-Perseverative 
Responses 










29 74 33 4 
Number of Categories 
Completed 
2  6-10 
Trials to Complete First 
Category 
19 6-10 
Failure to Maintain Set 1 > 16 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.I) PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Schizophrenia is a chronic and severe mental disorder that affects an individual’s 
thoughts, emotions and behaviour [1]. The symptoms typically emerge between the 
ages of 16 and 30 and fall into three main domains: (i) positive symptoms; (ii) negative 
symptoms and; (iii) cognitive symptoms. ‘Positive symptoms’ refer to thoughts and 
behaviours not typically observed in healthy people, such as hallucinations, delusions 
and disordered thinking. ‘Negative symptoms’ refer to disruptions of normal thoughts 
and behaviours, including ‘flat affect’ (e.g., reduced expression of emotions via facial 
expression or voice tone), attenuated feelings of pleasure, social withdrawal and 
reduced speech. Cognitive symptoms refer to a range of neuropsychological deficits 
often observed in schizophrenia, such as poor attention and memory, slow processing 
speed and impairments in executive functions (e.g., planning, inhibitory control, 
cognitive flexibility) [2]. 
It has been estimated that over half a million people in the UK, and around 25 million 
people worldwide, exhibit symptoms of psychosis [3, 4]. The potential for recovery is 
often reduced by the high levels of distress that can result from persisting psychotic 
symptoms, stigma and social exclusion [5, 6]. Indeed, surveys suggest that up to 60 
percent of those with schizophrenia may be moderately to severely socially disabled 
[e.g., 7] – the term ‘social disability’ including an inability to function at work, in 
relationships and in carrying-out normal activities of daily living. It has been estimated 
that 80 percent are unemployed [8]. The lifetime risk of committing suicide is five 
percent, with up to 13 percent showing moderate to severe suicidal behaviour [9]. 
I.II) ANXIETY IN PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Those with psychosis have an increased prevalence of anxiety, across all stages of the 
illness, relative to the general population [e.g., see reviews by 10, 11]. Indeed, anxiety is 
closely related to psychotic symptoms and may play a causal role in the onset and 
maintenance of psychosis, as well as arising in response to an episode and can be thus 
thought of as a central aspect of the disorder [12-14]. Although the reasons for severe 
social disability in the disorder appear complex and mutlifactorial [15], anxiety is at 
least partly attributable: thus, anxious avoidance can reduce the person’s efficacy with 
106 
 
regards to entering and remaining in social situations, having clear implications for 
their ability to find and maintain work, for example [16]. 
I.III) ADDRESSING THE SYMPTOMS OF PSYCHOSIS/SCHIZOPHRENIA 
The positive symptoms of psychosis have traditionally been thought of as untreatable 
via psychological approaches, although this position has changed markedly in recent 
decades [17]. Delusions and hallucinations have increasingly come to be viewed as 
occurring on a continuum with normality [18] and, consequently, as potentially 
susceptible to change via adaptations to cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for 
anxiety and depression. 
A number of modifications are recommended when applying CBT to psychosis (CBTp), 
with engagement and the establishment of a therapeutic alliance considered 
particularly important [16]. To achieve this, Kuipers et al. [17] emphasise keeping 
sessions non-aversive, which may include having shorter sessions than may be typical 
with other patient groups, as well as being more flexible / not pursuing session agendas 
too rigidly. It is generally held that therapists take up to six sessions to conduct a 
thorough assessment and develop a formulation collaboratively with the patient. This 
then allows for the development of a person-centred intervention, taking into account 
any cognitive deficits. 
Given the importance of anxiety in the development and maintenance of psychotic 
symptoms [19], its reduction (and associated distress) is often a primary goal in CBT 
for psychosis, with such interventions often found to be effective [e.g., 16, 20-22]. With 
phobic symptoms, this would typically involve the construction of a hierarchy of feared 
scenarios, followed by a graded exposure programme working up each aspect of this 
hierarchy – via the modifications described above. 
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) have supported the application of CBTp, much of 
this evidence coming from four research groups in the United Kingdom: (i) Garety, 
Fowler and Kuipers in London and East Anglia; (ii) Tarrier and Bentall in Manchester; 
(iii) Kingdon and Turkington in Southampton and Newcastle and; (iv) Birchwood and 
colleagues in Birmingham [19]. These RCTs, reporting beneficial effects of CBT for 
psychosis, have been included in a series of meta-analyses [e.g., 23, 24-26]. Although 
these studies have varied in their approach and findings, there is an overall effect-size 
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of around 0.37 (i.e. between the small-moderate ranges), the largest effects found for 
persistent positive symptoms1. 
Evidence such as the above has led to CBT being used as standard practice to address 
the symptoms of psychosis. Thus, the most recent National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines for psychosis [CG178; 27] recommends cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT) as a first-line intervention. 
II. THE PATIENT 
The patient, ‘Adesola’ (not his real name), was a 33-year-old Black-British male (of West 
African descent) who was a patient at a Community Mental Health Team (CMHT) for 
Psychosis. He had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, was unemployed and lived with a 
cousin Adesola spent a considerable amount of time working on a manuscript in which 
he outlined his thoughts and anxieties concerning the structure of the universe. He was 
on a regular dose of clozapine. 
III. THE PRESENTING PROBLEM 
Adesola was referred for psychological intervention due to a chronic anxiety about the 
safety of ‘tall towers’ (which he defined as those greater than 20 storeys), such as blocks 
of flats, the Shard, etc. His particular concern was that the foundations and general 
architecture of such structures were inadequate, such that they were vulnerable to 
potential collapse – and, more specifically, that, due to certain metaphysical ‘powers’ 
that he had, his proximity to tall buildings might act as a trigger for their collapsing. 
Adesola stated that, when near to such buildings, he hears voices telling him to ‘go 
back, go back!’ (i.e. to escape the situation), as the voices have a ‘premonition that 
something bad will happen’. Adesola described catastrophic mental images he had of 
such towers collapsing, which seemed reminiscent of the attack on the twin towers in 
New York on the 11th September, 2001. Understandably, this made Adesola anxious 
about walking near tall buildings, resulting in avoidant behaviour: ‘I have to be 
obedient in case something happens’. He was in fact so obedient that he rarely left his 
                                                                
1 It should be noted that all the aforementioned trials included participants who had been 
prescribed anti-psychotic medication. 
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home, stating that the voices only allow him to go somewhere if/when there is no 
alternative (e.g., attending a medical/psychology appointment). 
IV. BACKGROUND 
As stated above, Adesola believed that he had been endowed with various metaphysical 
‘gifts’, chief amongst these being an ability to hear the voices of ‘everyone in the world’. 
As a result of this ability, Adesola referred to himself as ‘the boy in the airwaves’. 
Adesola also stated that he was Jesus Christ and the President of the World, that he 
had ‘mutant abilities’ and that he could ‘invent anything’. He said he was grateful for 
these powers and that they ‘had given [him] a reason to live’. 
Adesola had developed a relatively complex belief system around the voices, saying that 
there were ‘good ones’ and ‘bad ones’. The former he labelled ‘spirits’, stating that 70 
percent of which are older ladies and 30 percent being teenagers who had become his 
‘pals’. Some of Adesola’s beliefs were rather grandiose. For example, he stated that the 
spirits were concerned with ridding the world of evil and that, as Jesus Christ, they were 
helping him in his destiny to save the world. Adesola said that he often speaks about 
moral and political issues with the spirits (e.g., ‘whether it is acceptable to be mean to 
others’). Adesola sought advice on such issues as he was deeply focused on ensuring 
that, after death, he goes to Heaven. He felt compelled to obey them when they 
instructed him to do/not do certain things and said that if he does not obey them, they 
accuse him of being disrespectful and rude. Adesola felt that he had no control over 
the voices and described being dependent on them to tell him what to do. Regarding 
the ‘bad’ voices, Adesola described them as ‘yobs’ and being ‘really horrible’: ‘all they 
talk about is evil things like murder… they always cause problems… they are bullies’. 
Adesola believed the spirits to be a positive influence in his life, trying to both keep 
him, as well as other people, safe. One of their principal concerns was the potential 
collapse of tall towers, due to Adesola’s superhuman powers; he thus believed that the 
voices were trying to protect anyone that may be in such buildings. He was also 
concerned that, due to his celebrity status, when out in public, he would be recognised 
by others as ‘the boy in the airwaves’, thinking that around 20 percent of people on the 
street could potentially recognise him. Of these people, he felt that whilst around half 
would be supportive, the other half would try to intimidate and/or attack him – for 
example, by stabbing him (he had not been attacked whilst out in public). Notably, he 
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said that his confidence ‘vanishes’ around strangers, leading him to be fearful in their 
presence. Overall, Adesola seemed to have a strong sense of the world and other people 
as being dangerous. He acknowledged his life as being restricted, but felt that this was 
preferable to either becoming harmed himself or his presence causing harm to others. 
He thus had a high sense of responsibility and morality. 
Adesola had challenging relationships with members of his family, in particular with 
his mother (with whom he occasionally lived, during times when she returned from 
West Africa). Specifically, Adesola reported that he experiences ‘mental abuse’ from his 
family and described his mother as ‘constantly shouting and complaining’. He said that 
his mother ‘put him under pressure’ to get a job, that his family in general did not agree 
that he had a mental health problem and that overall, he found interactions with them 
to be stressful. When asked why he had not chosen to find somewhere else to live, 
Adesola said that, ‘it is best not to complain’, as he did not want to ‘cause problems or 
irritate anyone’. At assessment, he said that he remembered being with his ‘real parents’ 
at the time of his birth and early years, and that those he now refers to as his parents 
are in fact imposters. Adesola had contacted the police several times about this and 
believed them to be investigating the issue. 
Adesola said that he had first begun hearing voices during the Christmas break of his 
first term at university, where he was studying for an IT-based degree. He said that he 
had been struggling with the demands of the degree and had been pressured by his 
parents to pursue this qualification. He had instead wanted to study Performing Arts, 
as he had a passion for music. Perhaps significantly, Adesola’s parents had recently 
returned from a West African country just before he had begun to hear voices. He said 
that, soon after he had begun to hear voices, his parents took him to this West African 
country for an extended period. Adesola remained concerned thereafter that he would 
be taken to West Africa again, reporting that his parents had told him they would do 
so ‘if his situation did not improve’. He was strongly against going to West Africa again, 
as he felt that the standard of living was worse, relative to the United Kingdom. 
Importantly, Adesola also reported having experienced ‘bad side-effects’ as a result of 





Adesola’s case was formulated as follows, based on the cognitive model of the positive 
symptoms of psychosis [6] (see Figure 1). 
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 Figure 1: A model of the positive symptoms of psychosis [based on the cognitive model developed by 6]
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According to Garety et al. [6], Adesola would have had an underlying biopsychosocial 
vulnerability/predisposition to develop the positive symptoms of psychosis. The model 
proposes that such symptoms most frequently result from a triggering event (e.g., life-
events, adverse environments, illicit drug use and/or periods of isolation) that brings 
about a disruption of cognitive processes [28], leading to anomalous conscious 
experiences (e.g., thoughts appearing to be broadcast, thoughts experienced as voices, 
unconnected events seeming to be linked). The triggering event(s) (i.e. the point at 
which he begun to hear voices) for Adesola seems to have been the stress of his 
university course, together, possibly, with his family’s returning from West Africa. 
These anomalous experiences often feel external and understandably threatening, 
triggering emotional arousal and a ‘search for explanation’ [29]. Biased conscious 
appraisal processes (e.g., jumping to conclusions, an externalising attributional bias 
and social cognition deficits) are said to be crucial at this point, facilitating a conclusion 
that the distressing experiences are in fact externally caused [30]. Although, given that 
I saw Adesola some years after these earlier experiences and it would thus not have 
been possible to specify the nature of any initially biased appraisal processes, it was 
clear that he had settled upon an external attribution for his anomalous experiences 
(e.g., ‘they are the voices of everyone in the world’, ‘spirits’ and ‘yobs trapped in 
purgatory’, etc.). The model posits that social isolation contributes to the acceptance 
of the psychotic appraisal by reducing access to alternative, more normalising 
explanations [31]. This certainly seemed relevant to Adesola, who seemed to have been 
a somewhat isolated figure throughout his life. 
Dysfunctional schemas and adverse environments are an important aspect of the 
cognitive model [e.g., 32, 33]. For example, Close and Garety [34] found that 
hallucinations and delusions that have negative content are associated with negative 
self-concepts. Garety et al. [6] cite research of low self-esteem developing in specific 
social contexts [35], such as living with unsupportive, high expressed-emotion families 
[e.g., 36]. The authors contend that psychotic beliefs may be more firmly held if 
consistent with firmly-held, distorted beliefs concerning the self (e.g., that one is bad), 
others (e.g., that others are hostile) and the world (e.g., that the world is dangerous). 
Adesola certainly seemed to have a low self-concept, as manifested, for example, in his 
stating that his confidence ‘vanishes’ in the presence of other people. It seems 
reasonable to speculate that the difficult relationships he reported with his family 
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might have been significant: Adesola’s reports of these interactions (which he 
described as ‘stressful’) seemed to be suggestive of significant levels of expressed 
emotion (e.g., refusing to accept his mental health difficulties and pressuring him to 
get a job). Furthermore, his mother’s apparent insistence that he get a job would likely 
have acted as an ongoing reminder of his difficulties (e.g., his daily experiences of 
chronic anxiety and feeling unable to leave his home), serving to maintain and 
reinforce his seemingly poor self-concept. It is not difficult to imagine that his 
traumatic-sounding experiences of being taken to Wes Africa, against his will (during 
which he experienced ‘bad side-effects’ of medication), following his first psychotic 
episode, might have led to a distrust of others and perception of the world as being 
unpredictable and dangerous. Strikingly, Mueser et al. [37] have reported a 98 per cent 
lifetime prevalence of traumatic events in those with psychosis. 
Garety et al. [6] also draw attention to the potential importance of the wider social 
environment, citing evidence of greater incidence of psychosis in inner-cities and in 
certain ethnic groups [38, 39]. These authors contend that the social marginalisation 
associated with such factors may also contribute to the development of negative 
schemas, often involving social humiliation and subordination [40]. Given this, it may 
be relevant that Adesola was a Black man who grew-up and lived in South-East London. 
It is notable, given the foregoing, that both Adesola’s experiences of command 
hallucinations (by the spirits) and his relationships with family members were, to a 
large extent, characterised by passivity. Thus, his appraisal that he needed to be 
compliant and obedient to the voices’ instructions seemed to echo the rules he had for 
interactions with his family (e.g., ‘it is best not to complain’). It seems reasonable to 
speculate that this passive approach towards social interactions may have been 
established during childhood and adolescence (e.g., as a result of unsuccessful attempts 
to challenge his parents). 
Adesola’s delusions of being Jesus Christ, with ‘magical powers’ on a mission to fulfil 
his destiny and ‘save souls in purgatory’, was conceptualised as a grandiose defence 
against his seemingly low self-concept [e.g., 41]. In perceiving himself (though not 
necessarily consciously) as the saviour of humankind, he was an all-powerful figure, 
able to achieve anything. This contrasted sharply with his real-world circumstances, in 
which he was socially isolated, financially dependent and struggled to tolerate the 
anxiety of being out in public. His ideas around being all-powerful may also have served 
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as a psychological escape from the powerlessness and associated emotions he seemed 
to experience in relation to his mother and other family members, whom he reported 
threatened to remove him to West Africa if ‘his situation did not improve’. 
The origins of Adesola’s fear of tall towers was challenging to formulate. It is possible 
that this represented a form of ‘reassuring’ inversion of his anxieties around being 
vulnerable whilst out in public in general. Thus, due to a combination of 
neuropsychological vulnerability, past experiences, his delusional belief system and 
symptoms of social anxiety, he was fearful of being attacked whilst outside his home, 
which was understandably a significant source of distress. If, however, his mere 
presence close to tall towers could bring about their collapse and destruction, then this 
would mean that he himself had significant power(s) – that he was potentially 
dangerous to others – and may, on some level, have served to act against his feelings of 
vulnerability. Regardless of its origins, his subsequent avoidance of and escape from 
being in close proximity to tall towers served to maintain these fears via his preventing 
the receipt of disconfirmatory evidence [42]. In addition, an information-processing 
bias in which he spent time gathering and focusing on information related to the 
dangers of tall towers (e.g., building-collapses in other parts of the world) was also 
significant in providing further ‘evidence’ for his fears [42]. The relationship between 
Adesola’s positive symptoms and his anxiety seemed to be bi-directional, such that his 
positive symptoms (e.g., the loudness and emotional tone of the voices, according to 
his verbal self-report) became more salient and intense when close to tall towers (and 
when in public, generally) and vice versa. 
VI. AIMS OF THE INTERVENTION  
Adesola’s specific aim was to reduce his anxiety around buildings collapsing in his 
proximity due to his powers, such that he would feel able to regularly travel to and 
from various day/community centres and support groups around South-East London 
– which his anxiety had been preventing him from doing. At the beginning of 
psychology sessions, Adesola was concerned that, by talking about his concerns, he 
would be ‘exposed’ – by which he meant that the voices on the airwaves would become 
aware that he was talking about them (and may take retaliatory action). However, he 
also displayed some ambivalence in his attitude towards the voices, stating that he 
wanted to have more freedom and to go out more, in particular to meet friends. He 
also said that he felt alienated from others and that he wanted to find employment and 
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live a more meaningful life. Fowler et al. [16] recommend working towards a specific, 
valued goal as a central part of CBTp. 
VII. INTERVENTION 
A modified form of CBT, tailored to Adesola’s presentation, was delivered. The 
intervention consisted of outpatient sessions, focusing principally on Adesola’s fear of 
tall towers. In accordance with the guidance provided by Fowler et al.’s treatment 
manual [16], the intervention was, in various ways, delivered more flexibly than in non-
psychosis populations. Thus, for example, the length of each session varied, depending 
on the extent to which Adesola felt able to continue, although, on average, sessions 
lasted around 45 minutes. The intervention was delivered by both myself and my 
supervisor. The first six sessions were focused on an extended assessment and the 
development of a shared formulation of Adesola’s difficulties, as well as building 
rapport and engagement with him. 
In order to achieve Adesola’s main goal of being able to travel around South-East 
London independently, the intervention primarily sought to challenge and restructure 
his fear of tall towers in a non-threatening, compassionate yet evidence-based manner. 
Thus, we did not seek to challenge his beliefs regarding his being Jesus Christ in 
communication with spirits who were trying to save souls from purgatory, etc. Instead, 
we focused on contextualising the spirits’ fears of harm coming to Adesola and/or 
others due to tall towers collapsing as their making predictions with the best intentions 
(i.e. to keep Adesola and others safe), but that, without testing-out these ideas/fears, it 
would not be possible to know whether they were accurate or not. This provided a 
rationale for empirically exploring them – that is, for Adesola to expose himself to tall 
towers (e.g., walking towards and standing in front of them) to both explore whether 
the fears were proportional and also to learn to tolerate the associated anxiety. We 
developed a hierarchy of feared tower-related scenarios and, across the sessions, 
worked ‘up’ these scenarios at a pace with which Adesola felt comfortable. 
Each of the ‘steps’ on this hierarchy involved our walking, each week, progressively 
closer to each of two tall towers close to the team base, which Adesola had respectively 
named ‘Bosling’ and ‘Champion’. Subjective units of distress (i.e. 0-10) were taken prior 
to, during and after Adesola’s having been gently encouraged to walk towards the 
towers. Following received wisdom on CBTp, the exposure sessions were conducted 
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more flexibly than would typically be the case in non-psychosis populations. Thus, on 
some occasions, Adesola’s anxiety during exposures seemed to be increasing/to have 
increased to a level that was leading him to experience more florid positive symptoms 
(e.g., the spirits becoming louder and/or more threatening) and, understandably, 
elevated his level of distress. We thus regularly ‘checked-in’ with Adesola regarding 
what the spirits were saying and sometimes left the situation so as to reduce the 
chances of Adesola finding the sessions too aversive. At such times, we came back to 
the CMHT in order to debrief and allow a period for his anxiety to reduce closer to 
baseline. 
In tandem with the exposure tasks, we also spent time thinking about the evidence 
for/against and likelihood of large buildings in London collapsing. For example, we 
wrote a letter to the office of the then-mayor of London, Boris Johnson, stating our 
concern about the safety of tall towers in the city and asking for information regarding 
measures used to ensure public safety (to which we received a reply, including 
directions to a number of webpages linked to the Mayor’s Office website outlining such 
safety procedures). We also searched the Internet and read webpages (some of which 
referred to in the Mayor’s reply) concerning the many and varied safety and 
architectural procedures involved in constructing a large building in London. Prior to 
and following such tasks, Adesola was asked to rate his concern (from 0 to 10) regarding 
the safety of tall towers. Adesola found some of this information compelling and we 
often referred back to it during subsequent exposure tasks. 
VIII. MEASURES 
Quantitative outcome(s): 
The Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation – 10-item version [CORE-10; 43] was 
administered at pre-, mid- and post-sessions as a quantitative outcome measure. The 
CORE-10 is a widely-administered, 10-item self-report scale comprising questions 
across a range of domains, including symptoms of depression, anxiety, general 
functioning, social relationships and close relationships, trauma, physical symptoms 
and risk. It is an abbreviated version of the Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation-
Outcome Measure [CORE-OM; 44], with each item being rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale, ranging from 0 (‘not at all’) through to 4 (‘most or all of the time’). Items can be 
summed to produce an overall score from 0-40, with greater scores indicating greater 
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levels of distress. Barkham et al. [43] suggest a cut-off point of 13 and above for 
indicating depression and a score of 11 and above for general psychological distress, and 
report an α-reliability of 0.90. At the beginning of the intervention, Adesola had a score 
of 18, above threshold for depression and psychological distress. 
In addition to the overall score, given that the CORE-10 includes items across a range 
of symptom- and functioning-domains, Adesola’s score for each of the ten items was 
also explored across the three administration-points. This was done in order to explore, 
more specifically, his particular strengths and challenges. His responses at baseline are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Adesola’s responses (and scores) to each item of the CORE-10 at the 
beginning of sessions 
Item Adesola’s response (and score) 
1. I have felt tense, anxious or 
nervous 
Most or all of the time (4) 
2. I have felt I have someone to turn 
to for support when needed* 
Often (1) 
3. I have felt able to cope when things 
go wrong* 
Most or all of the time (0) 
4. Talking to people has felt too much 
for me 
Only occasionally (1) 
5. I have felt panic or terror Often (3) 
6. I have made plans to end my life Not at all (0) 
7. I have had difficulty getting to or 
staying asleep 
Often (3) 
8. I have felt despairing or hopeless Often (3) 
9. I have felt unhappy Sometimes (2) 
10. Unwanted images or memories 
have been distressing me 
Only occasionally (1) 
Total score = 18 
Note: Items rated on the following 5-point Likert scale: 0 = ‘not at all’, 1 = ‘only occasionally’, 2 
= ‘sometimes’, 3 = ‘often’ and 4 = ‘most or all of the time’. 
* Item reverse-scored. 
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From the table, it can be seen that, in accordance with the difficulties for which he was 
seeking treatment, Adesola’s highest-scoring responses were mainly related to issues 
of anxiety. 
We were mindful not to ask Adesola not to complete more outcome measures, so as 
not to make the process too arduous for him. 
Qualitative outcome(s): 
We collaboratively developed a SMART (Specific, Measureable, Achievable, Relevant 
and Time-based) goal of Adesola’s being able to travel to and from day/community 
centres around South-East London independently by the end of the intervention. 
IX. DIFFICULTIES/CHALLENGES 
The complexities of Adesola’s presentation contributed to some challenges throughout 
the intervention. He often either cancelled sessions or did not attend (DNA’d) them, 
thereby reducing the amount of therapeutic time. After such occasions, Adesola tended 
to report that the spirits had been ‘speaking very loudly’, preventing him from going 
out. 
Unfortunately, there was a period around the mid-point of sessions when Adesola and 
I did not have a session for almost a month, due to his experiencing a crisis of severe 
anxiety. Conducting an emergency assessment, the Home Treatment Team (HTT) 
found him acutely unwell, telling them that he was unable to speak and that he was 
only able to communicate in writing. Adesola wanted verification that he was Jesus and 
the next world leader and, ‘for the relay that has voices and the birds’ singing to be less’. 
He said that he could not leave the house due to ‘everybody staring at him and being 
able to read his thoughts’. It emerged that Adesola had bought a box of weight-loss 
pills from the Internet, taking 14 of them in one day. These consisted almost entirely of 
caffeine and seem to have acted as a physiological trigger to his crisis. As well as 
increasing his anxiety, this had, for several days, made him feel dizzy, shaky and caused 
him to vomit a number of times. Believing these symptoms related to his anti-psychotic 
medication, Adesola had thrown his entire prescription out, his abrupt cessation of 
medication likely to have maintained his crisis during these weeks. 
Adesola found it difficult to report/discuss his anxiety, instead often projecting an 
apparently superficial positivity. For example, when asked how he was feeling during 
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exposure tasks, he tended to report ‘feeling perfectly fine’, despite seeming rather 
anxious. This was formulated as a manifestation of his ongoing desire ‘not to cause any 
trouble’ and seemed to stem in part from his misperceiving that he was expected not 
to feel anxiety during the tasks (and that doing so would indicate failure/his causing 
trouble). Despite our regularly outlining the purpose of the exposures (i.e. to gradually 
reduce his high anxiety), as well as encouraging him to report his anxiety, Adesola 
continued to find this difficult. Though we tried to discern his anxiety-level via his 
demeanour, it was often nevertheless difficult to tell what his anxiety was at any given 
moment, posing obvious challenges during the tasks. 
Adesola’s ongoing concerns about being taken to West Africa again periodically 
increased at times when his mother returned to London (from West Africa). Although 
we did not discuss this (as well as his relationship with his parents more broadly) in 
detail during my sessions with him, it seems likely that the associated stress served to 
increase his background/baseline levels of anxiety, possibly making the exposure tasks 
(even) more challenging for him. 
At times, Adesola seemed ambiguous about fully engaging due to concerns that he 
would be made to find employment. We sought to reassure him by saying we felt it 
would be difficult for him to work at present and that he would be supported by the 
team should he be called for a workplace assessment. 
X. RESULTS 
Quantitative outcomes: 
Adesola’s self-reported scores on each item of the CORE-10 at baseline, mid-sessions 
and the end of sessions are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Adesola’s responses (and scores) to each item of the CORE-10 at baseline, 
mid-sessions and at the end of sessions 
Item Baseline Mid-sessions End of sessions 
1. I have felt tense, 
anxious or nervous 
Most or all of 




2. I have felt I have 
someone to turn to for 
support when needed* 
Often (1) Often (1) Often (1) 
3. I have felt able to 
cope when things go 
wrong* 
Most or all of 
the time (0) 
Sometimes (2) Sometimes (2) 
4. Talking to people has 
felt too much for me 
Only 
occasionally (1) 
Not at all (0) Not at all (0) 
5. I have felt panic or 
terror 
Often (3) Sometimes (2) Sometimes (2) 
6. I have made plans to 
end my life 
Not at all (0) Not at all (0) Not at all (0) 
7. I have had difficulty 
getting to or staying 
asleep 
Often (3) Sometimes (2) Only 
occasionally (1) 
8. I have felt despairing 
or hopeless 
Often (3) Sometimes (2) Sometimes (2) 
9. I have felt unhappy Sometimes (2) Only 
occasionally (1) 
Sometimes (2) 
10. Unwanted images or 






Not at all (0) 
 Total score = 18 Total score = 12 Total score = 12 
Note: Items rated on the following 5-point Likert scale: 0 = ‘not at all’, 1 = ‘only occasionally’, 2 
= ‘sometimes’, 3 = ‘often’ and 4 = ‘most or all of the time’. 
* Item reverse-scored. 
It can be seen from the table that, across the intervention, there was a clear reduction 
in Adesola’s overall CORE-10 scores, such that his baseline score of 18 – that is, above 
threshold for depression – had, by the mid-point in sessions, reduced to 12 – that is, 
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below threshold for depression – though this score remained above the cut-off for 
general psychological distress. This reduction was maintained to the end of sessions. 
Notably, 50 percent of the reduction in his overall score (i.e. 3) was attributable to those 
items relating more specifically to anxiety (i.e. 1 and 5) – that is, those aspects that were 
being specifically targeted as part of the intervention. 
In terms of his SMART goal, although Adesola was not able to travel independently 
around South-East London by the end of the intervention, he was able to tolerate 
travelling to an area with two day/community centres (that he was strongly invested 
in attending) in the company of someone else (e.g., his Support Worker). Although he 
continued to find being close to tall buildings understandably anxiety-provoking (given 
the long period of previous avoidance), he was better able to approach these feared 
stimuli and tolerate the anxiety without escaping the situation. These clinical 
observations are consistent with his reduced anxiety ratings on CORE-10 items. In a 
session towards the end, Adesola himself stated that he had ‘greater mental strength 
to get close to tall towers’. 
XI. DISCUSSION 
The modified CBTp via graded exposure course was moderately successful in 
facilitating Adesola’s goal of being able to travel to and from day centres around South-
East London. He had previously felt himself unable to travel to certain areas (regardless 
of being accompanied or not), due to a large number of tall towers (i.e. flats and office-
blocks) in the vicinity and so this represented a significant achievement. It seems likely 
that Adesola’s progress may have been hindered somewhat by the crisis he experienced 
involving the slimming-pills. At the same time, that he was nevertheless able to make 
some progress in the context of this crisis, as well as other ongoing stressors (e.g., the 
relationship with his family), should be borne in mind. Adesola continues to work on 
his fears around tall towers with my supervisor from this placement, and also now 
spends one day a week travelling to and spending time at his day centres with his 
Support Worker as additionally work towards his goal. Thus, our sessions might be 
viewed as the initial steps towards (hopefully) further progress in future. 
Overall, after working with Adesola, the logic behind Fowler et al.’s [16] 
recommendation of working towards a specific and valued goal for the patient in CBTp 
was reinforced for me. The complex difficulties related to psychosis, not only due to 
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personal symptoms and other comorbidities, but also related to (lack of) employment, 
financial difficulties and general social marginalisation [45, 46], mean that those with 
the diagnosis can often struggle to engage and maintain engagement in therapy (e.g., 
due to associated distress). For Adesola, due to such issues as his ongoing concern 
around being removed to West Africa, it may not have been practical, at that point in 
his recovery, for us to have worked on other, perhaps larger issues (e.g., the way he 
perceived/relationship that he had with his auditory hallucinations, relations with 
family members). 
At the same time, that the intervention focused so specifically on his (intra-individual) 
fear of tall towers might be considered a limitation. After all, his difficult relationships 
with family members was formulated as having possibly had a significantly detrimental 
impact on his self-esteem, as well as being related to the content of and way he 
interacted with his auditory hallucinations. Thus, in order to address these issues, since 
my work with Adesola ended, he has been referred, and is currently on the waiting-list 
for, family therapy for psychosis. His mother has agreed to attend these sessions with 
him. He said that he wanted their relationship to be ‘less fighty’. 
XII. REFLECTIONS 
Working with Adesola led me to reflect on a range of factors relating to diversity and 
cultural differences, which I believe have broadened my awareness of these issues. 
Throughout our work together, I experienced particularly high levels of sympathy; at 
times, it seemed that I almost felt guilty. Reflecting on these feelings as part of 
supervision, I believe that they were related to Adesola and I’s both being male and 
having been born in the same year, yet our lives having taken different paths. I reflected 
on Adesola and his family’s being Black and his having grown-up in a relatively 
deprived part of the country (i.e. South-East London). I wondered whether and to what 
extent these factors may have been important in his parents’ pressuring him (as 
Adesola reported) into studying for a degree high in prestige and a first step in a 
potentially lucrative career (i.e. Software Engineering), but which he had not wanted 
to do and had seemingly stretched his mental resources, putting him under significant 
stress (which seemed to act as a trigger for his first psychotic experience and his 
seemingly traumatic temporary removal to West Africa). Overall, working with 
Adesola led me to reflect on the many life experiences, particularly when we are 
younger, that operate on us and over which we often have little control – but which 
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have the potential to significantly influence how we view and experience the world – 
and how we see ourselves within it. 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.I)  BLOOD-INJECTION-INJURY PHOBIA: DEFINITION, CHARACTERISTICS, 
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND TREATMENT 
Blood-Injection-Injury (BII) phobia refers to a condition in which individuals display 
intense, irrationally-high levels of fear and anxiety in response to real or imagined 
exposures to blood, physical injury, injections or other medically-related procedures 
[1]. BII phobia is relatively common, with an estimated prevalence-rate of between 3 to 
4 per cent in the general population [2]. A commonly-observed and unfortunate 
consequence of BII phobia is an avoidance not only of blood and injections in 
particular, but also of medically-related stimuli and scenarios more broadly. As a result, 
individuals tend not to report to / refuse offers of appointments at clinics and hospitals. 
As well as serving to maintain and possibly deepen their anxieties, such avoidance 
behaviour increases the risks to individuals’ physical health, as they miss a range of 
medical procedures, from routine check-ups through to surgical operations [3]. 
Furthermore, BII phobia can also restrict potential occupational choices, by excluding 
employment in medical and related contexts, as well as limiting life-decisions more 
broadly, such as travel to countries for which vaccinations are recommended or 
required. Regarding society more broadly, BII phobia also reduces the numbers of 
people donating blood [4]. 
In virtually all forms of specific phobia, exposure to feared stimuli precipitates a 
common physiological response, involving increased blood-pressure and an elevated 
heart-rate (i.e. tachycardia). BII phobia, however, is unique, in that, upon real or 
imagined exposure to blood-, injection- and/or related stimuli, individuals typically 
experience a diphasic cardiovascular response, whereby an initial increase in blood-
pressure and tachycardia is followed by bradycardia (i.e. abnormally slow heartbeat), 
diaphoresis (i.e. sweating), hypotension, shock, vertigo, nausea and, rarely, asystole 
(i.e. ceasing of heartbeat) and death [5, 6]. The latter part of this physiological response, 
termed ‘vasovagal syncope’, often leads to fainting reactions in the presence of feared 
stimuli [7]. It is estimated that, in around 80 per cent of those with BII phobia, the 
phobic response is characterised by syncope or pre-syncope [that is, light-headedness, 
muscular weakness, blurred vision and feeling faint - as opposed to syncope, in which 
the individual does in fact faint; 8] [9, 10]. Recently, disgust-sensitivity – that is, ‘the 
degree to which a person feels disgusted in response to a variety of stimuli’ [11, p.54] – 
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has been posited as an important element in BII [12]. It appears that high disgust-
sensitivity appears to elicit parasympathetic activity and reductions in blood-pressure 
in BII phobics [13], thereby making an individual more susceptible to fainting [14, 15]. 
Given the potentially serious health consequences of BII phobia, it is important that 
individuals are provided with effective treatment. The existing evidence-base indicates 
the most efficacious treatment to be Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) based on 
graded exposure [e.g., 16, 17-19]. Although there do not appear to be any NICE 
guidelines for BII phobia, CBT would appear to be an effective first-line approach. 
Given the characteristic vasovagal response in BII phobia, Mednick and Claar [20] 
recommend that applied muscle-tension (AMT) is incorporated into CBT interventions 
(prior to beginning graded exposure) – the aim of AMT being to counteract the 
syncopal response on exposure to feared stimuli, such that the patient is able to 
experience habituation [18]. Chapman and DeLapp [3] have recently described the 
successful application of manualised CBT, incorporating applied muscle-tension, in a 
single case design involving an adult male with longstanding BII phobia. 
I.II) OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER: CHARACTERISTICS, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND 
TREATMENT 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) is characterised by the presence of obsessions 
and/or compulsions [1]. Obsessions can be defined as recurrent and persistent thoughts 
(e.g., of contamination), urges (e.g., of violent or horrific scenes) or images (e.g., to stab 
someone) that are experienced by the individual as intrusive and unwanted, causing 
marked distress. Compulsions, on the other hand, are repetitive behaviours (e.g., 
washing, checking) or mental rituals (e.g., counting, repeating words silently) that the 
individual feels must be performed in response to an obsessive thought or according 
to rules that the individual believes must be rigidly adhered to. Most OCD patients 
have both obsessions and compulsions. By performing compulsions, the patient hopes 
to reduce the distress engendered by obsessions or to prevent a feared event (e.g., 
becoming unwell). However, the compulsions are either not tangibly related to the 
feared event (e.g., fixing one’s gaze on a certain part of the room in order maintain 
one’s sanity) or are obviously excessive (e.g., washing one’s hands 50 times a day). The 
obsessions and/or compulsions are time-consuming and cause clinically-significant 
distress and/or functional impairment in social, occupational or other life areas. OCD 
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can follow a chronic course if left untreated [21]. The 12-month prevalence of OCD 
across cultures is estimated at between 1.1-1.8% [1]. 
CBT is known to be the most effective intervention for OCD, in combination with a 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) medication [22, 23]. A fundamental aspect 
of CBT for OCD is Exposure and Response-Prevention (E/RP), which involves the 
patient repeatedly and systematically exposing themselves to the feared event(s) 
associated with their obsession(s), whilst simultaneously resisting the urge to engage 
in their compulsion(s). 
II. THE CLIENT 
The client – ‘Sarah’ (not her real name) – was a 13-year-old White British female. She 
was an only-child of above-average academic ability (she was in the top sets for all 
subjects at an independent girls’ school). 
III. PRESENTING PROBLEM 
Sarah was referred into the service by her Consultant Paediatric Nephrologist 1  in 
October 2014. It was reported that Sarah felt faint and unwell when blood was discussed 
or if she was exposed to a cue related to blood or blood-tests (e.g., a blood-pressure 
cuff or being asked to hold-out her arm prior to a needle being inserted). This had led 
her to avoid certain important immunisations (e.g., the MMR and HPV vaccines) and 
blood-tests. The latter was particularly significant because, in 2005, when she was 4 
years old, Sarah had had an episode of haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS). HUS is 
predominantly observed in children and is characterised by anaemia (caused by the 
destruction of red blood cells), low platelet count and acute kidney failure [24]. Sarah’s 
HUS had been treated during a month-long hospitalisation, wherein she underwent a 
2-week period of inpatient dialysis. She was considered to have made a good recovery 
and to be in good physical health. It was nevertheless necessary for her to undergo 
regular blood-tests thereafter, in order to monitor her red blood cell- and platelet-
counts and thereby check for signs of potential relapse. Sarah’s avoidance of these 
blood-tests therefore represented an ongoing risk to her physical health. 
                                                                
1 A medical doctor specialising in disorders of the kidneys. 
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Her anxiety meant that she was also avoiding watching television programmes or films 
that may contain images of injections, injuries, operations or any other blood-related 
contexts; this placed restrictions on Sarah’s ability to socialise (e.g., spending time with 
family via watching television in the living-room, going to the cinema with friends, 
etc.). In addition, at school, she would often feel compelled to leave the classroom 
during Biology lessons concerning the circulatory system, the workings of internal 
organs, etc., due to feelings of nausea and her fear of fainting. Overall, therefore, the 
client’s BII phobia was significantly compromising her ability to function and to fulfil 
role-expectations across various life-contexts. 
IV. BACKGROUND 
Sarah had had a previous diagnosis of OCD and had been treated previously (in 2011, 
when she was 10), via CBT using Exposure with Response-Prevention (E/RP), in the 
same team in which the treatment detailed in the present case study took place. At 
assessment, her OCD was of moderate severity (she scored ‘20’ on the Children’s Yale-
Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale, or CY-BOCS). Sarah’s ego-dystonic obsessive 
thoughts centred around her mother being ‘fat’, ‘old’ and ‘wrinkly’. Sarah felt compelled 
to share these obsessive thoughts with her mother. Sarah also had intrusive thoughts 
about her mother having a disease or being stabbed and dying and, consequently, 
repeatedly sought assurance, from her mother, that she was safe and well. In addition, 
the client felt anxious that she might have sworn or made an accidental, offensive 
gesture and compulsively asked her mother for assurance and reassurance that this had 
not happened. Sarah also worried that she might unintentionally lie and therefore 
avoided speaking and answering others’ questions. Her OCD was thought to have 
originated when Sarah was around 4 years of age. Positively, her treatment led to 
significant reductions in Sarah’s OCD: her CY-BOCS score dropped to ‘9’ (mild) at the 
end of treatment and 5 (below clinical cut-off) at 6-month follow-up. 
In terms of her developmental history, Sarah had good health in the neonatal period. 
She achieved her speech and language milestones at an appropriate age and was 
described as being competent in social interactions and enjoying imaginative play. 
Thus, an Autistic Spectrum Disorder was excluded. Sarah’s parents reported that she 
initially found it difficult to separate from her mother at nursery school and that she 
continues to find school transitions difficult. 
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Regarding Sarah’s family history, her father had a history of low mood and, 
additionally, describes himself as ‘being particular about tidiness and cleanliness’ and 
feeling compelled to ‘check and recheck’ his work. Sarah’s mother describes herself as 
a ‘worrier’. Neither of Sarah’s parents, nor members of her wider family, had been 
diagnosed with a mental health problem. 
V. FORMULATION 
Based on a model proposed by Barlow [18], a longitudinal cognitive-behavioural 
formulation for BII phobia best described Sarah’s experiences (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: A model of the aetiology of specific phobia [18] 
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That is, a number of interacting vulnerabilities seemed to have facilitated Sarah’s fear 
that she would ‘feel floppy’ (in her words) upon being presented with blood- and 
injection-related stimuli. Thus, a relatively non-specific generalised biological 
predisposition to experience anxiety and/or alarm responses, as well as familial 
transmission of anxiety, may have interacted with various distinct learning 
experiences, to cause her to associate fear and anxiety with blood, needles and 
associated stimuli. 
Although it is clearly impossible to disentangle temperamental and environmental 
influences, Sarah’s parents described her as having been a particularly anxious child, 
demonstrating fear and distress in relation to a range of stimuli (e.g., separation anxiety 
in relation to her mother, school transitions, OCD). Regarding familial transmission of 
anxiety, Sarah’s having been exposed to an anxious mother, who herself described and 
modelled strong anxiety in the presence of blood- and injection-related stimuli, seems 
likely to have contributed to Sarah’s interpretation of injections and blood-tests as 
things to be feared. 
In terms of learning experiences, importantly, Sarah’s one-month stay as an inpatient 
due to HUS in 2005 had, for obvious reasons, been an incredibly stressful episode in 
her and her family’s life. During the course of this admission, Sarah underwent a 
number of successful blood-tests (i.e. that had not led to significant anxiety, fainting 
and avoidance), as well as peritoneal dialysis (during which a catheter is inserted into 
the abdomen). However, Sarah reported that she became increasingly fearful of having 
her blood taken over the course of this admission. It appears likely that Sarah’s 
apparent generalised temperamental predisposition towards anxiety, together with the 
high level of anxiety she experienced during this episode, interacted such that Sarah 
came to associate a disproportionately high level of anxiety with blood and needles; 
indeed, this hypothesis was spontaneously endorsed by Sarah at assessment. 
Although Sarah had successfully managed to undergo some vaccinations in the period 
between 2005 and 2012, these had been tolerated with progressively increasing anxiety 
and distress. It was during this period that she also began to faint (and demonstrate 
the signs and symptoms of possible imminent fainting) in response to blood-tests and 
injections. Sarah’s possibly-inherited tendency to experience vasovagal syncope, in 
combination with these psychological vulnerabilities, likely led to her experiencing 
multiple ‘false alarms’ (substantial increases in anxiety) in the context of blood-tests 
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and injections and related stimuli/scenarios (e.g., the sight of needles and related 
medical equipment, GP surgeries and hospitals, having her blood-pressure taken, etc.). 
Sarah’s progressive false-alarm experiences culminated in a particularly anxiety-
evoking incident, in Spring 2012, in which she had ‘had a fit’ (in her words) and fainted 
after an injection; Sarah reported feeling disorientated upon coming round. This 
incident proved to be so stressful that she refused/avoided any further blood-tests and 
injections from this point. Sarah’s anxiety concerning blood- and needle-related stimuli 
had been exacerbated and maintained via negative reinforcement processes: thus, over 
a period of over 3 years (i.e. from Spring 2012 to Summer 2015), she experienced 
increasingly intense anxiety in the run-up to scheduled medical appointments (in 
which she was to have injections or her blood taken), in combination with increasingly 
powerful (short-term) feelings of relief associated with her subsequent avoidance of 
these appointments. Over time, Sarah’s avoidance behaviours led to a generalised 
psychological vulnerability, that is, strong feelings of anxiety related not only to future 
exposures to blood- and injection stimuli in particular, but also to stimuli related to 
needles and injections (e.g., holding her arm out straight, in the manner preceding one 
having a needle inserted) and biological and medical stimuli more generally (e.g., a fear 
of fainting during Biology classes related to the circulatory system and of entering 
Hospitals and medically-related contexts, etc.). 
VI. AIMS OF INTERVENTION 
As stated above, Sarah had felt unable to undergo blood-tests, meaning that her 
Nephrology team could not assess her renal function. An appointment for an important 
and overdue blood-test had been scheduled for October 2015. It was therefore 
important that, by this time, Sarah’s anxiety around blood and injections was reduced 
such that she was able to have her blood taken. It was also important for Sarah to 
undergo immunisations that she had missed. Additional aims were that Sarah would 
be able to tolerate watching television programmes/films containing blood, injections, 
injuries, etc., and that she would no longer feel the need to escape the classroom when 
certain topics (e.g., the circulatory system) were discussed.
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VII. ASSESSMENT MEASURES 
Sarah’s intake assessment took place in December 2014. At this time, a number of 
measures of general wellbeing were administered to both her and her mother. The 
following measures were administered to Sarah: (i) the Affective Reactivity Index – Self-
Report [ARI-S; 25]; (ii) the Mood and Feelings Questionnaire [MFQ; 26], and; (iii) the 
Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire [SDQ; 27]. 
Sarah’s mother completed: (i) the Affective Reactivity Index – Parent Version [ARI-P; 
25]; (ii) the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales [DASS; 28], and; (iii) the SDQ – Parent-
Report [29]. 
In addition, the team also rated her general level of functioning via the Children’s 
Global Assessment Scale [CGAS; 30]. 
(For descriptions and scoring/interpretation of all the measures outlined above, see 
Appendix.) 
The above measures are administered to all children and adolescents and their parent/s 
during intake assessment in the service. Her self- and mother-reported scores for each 
of these measures are presented in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 1: Sarah’s self-reported outcome measures of general wellbeing at baseline 
Measure Score (classification, where 
relevant) 
ARI-S:  
Total score 0 
Impairment score 0 
MFQ 2/66 (non-clinical range) 
SDQ – Self-Report:  
Emotional Problems Scale 3/10 (non-clinical range) 
Conduct Problems Scale 0/10 (non-clinical range) 
Hyperactivity/Inattention Scale 3/10 (non-clinical range) 
Peer Relationship Problems Scale 0/10 (non-clinical range) 
Prosocial Behaviour Scale 8/10 (non-clinical range) 
Total Difficulties Scale 6/40 (non-clinical range) 
Note: ARI-S = Affective Reactivity Index – Self-Report; MFQ = Mood and Feelings 
Questionnaire; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire.
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Table 2: Sarah’s parent-reported outcome measures of general wellbeing at baseline 
Measure Score (classification, where 
relevant) 
ARI-P:  
Total score 0.17 
Impairment score 0 
DASS:  
Depression 0 (non-clinical range) 
Anxiety 0 (non-clinical range) 
Stress 3 (non-clinical range) 
SDQ – Parent-Report:  
Emotional Problems Scale 3/10 (non-clinical range) 
Conduct Problems Scale 0/10 (non-clinical range) 
Hyperactivity/Inattention Scale 4/10 (non-clinical range) 
Peer Relationship Problems Scale 2/10 (non-clinical range) 
Prosocial Behaviour Scale 9/10 (non-clinical range) 
Total Difficulties Scale 9/40 (non-clinical range) 
Note: ARI-P = Affective Reactivity Index – Parent-Report; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
In addition to the more general measures administered, two measures specifically 
indexed difficulties related to Sarah’s BII phobia. 
Firstly, Sarah completed the self-report Fear Questionnaire [FQ; 31; see Appendix for a 
description of this instrument], which was used to index the severity of her BII. On this 
measure, Sarah scored as follows: (i) 11/40 for phobic avoidance, indicating that, overall, 
she was ‘slightly avoidant’ of BII-related situations; (ii) 7/40 for anxiety and depression, 
indicating that these feelings were somewhere between being ‘hardly at all troubling’ 
and ‘slightly troublesome’, and; (iii) 3/8 for global phobia, which lay mid-way between 
being ‘slightly disturbing’ and ‘definitely disturbing’. Given that Sarah’s BII phobia had 
led to her not only avoid important medical appointments, but was also impacting on 
her daily life in a variety of ways (e.g., leaving the classroom during Biology lessons, 
leaving the living room during television programmes and films), it is likely that her 
self-report somewhat underestimated the extent to which BII phobia was impacting on 
her life. 
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Secondly, Sarah self-rated her anxiety in relation to a number of BII-related scenarios, 
at several time-points across the intervention (see ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Feared 
Stimuli/Situations’ in the ‘Intervention’ section, below). 
Overall, therefore, Sarah’s BII phobia was a relatively specific concern for her, in the 
absence of more general and widespread emotional and psychological difficulties; thus, 
Sarah scored in the normal range, according to both herself and her mother, across the 
ARI-S, ARI-P, MFQ and SDQ. This was also reflected in her CGAS score of 63. 
Furthermore, her mother/family seemed not to have been adversely affected 
emotionally, as indicated by a DASS score in the normal range – although the family 
were somewhat involved in Sarah’s compulsions.  
VIII. INTERVENTION 
Sarah was offered 14 weekly hour-long sessions of CBT as an outpatient, in addition to 
three follow-up meetings post-treatment (at 1 month, 6 months and 12 months). The 
intervention was delivered jointly by both myself and a fellow Clinical Psychologist in 
Training. Sarah attended all 14 sessions on time, with her mother. She was pleasant, 
engaged and highly motivated in treatment throughout. Broadly, Sessions 1-2 were 
concerned with psychoeducation around anxiety and BII phobia; Session 3 involved 
introducing, discussing and practicing applied muscle tension (AMT) techniques; 
Session 4 was concerned with collaboratively constructing a hierarchy of feared BII-
related stimuli/situations, and; Sessions 5-14 focused on Sarah being progressively 
exposed to each of these feared stimuli/situations in turn. 
VIII.I) SESSIONS 1-2: PSYCHOEDUCATION 
The psychoeducation in Sessions 1 and 2 included introducing and discussing the 
following: (i) the ‘fight or flight’ response and its evolutionary origins; (ii) the 
normative curve relating to elevations in anxiety (i.e. its rapid, initial increase from 
baseline to peak, followed by its more gradual reduction back to baseline); (iii) the 
(relatively high) prevalence-rates of phobias in general and of BII phobia specifically; 
(iv) the diathesis-stress model of BII phobia; (v) the cognitive/subjective, emotional, 
physiological and behavioural correlates of anxiety and avoidance in BII phobia and 
the relationship between these factors (i.e. a CBT-based cross-sectional formulation), 
and; (vi) the pre-syncopal and syncopal responses often observed upon exposure to 
feared stimuli in BII phobia, and its possible adaptive function (i.e. to prevent potential 
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toxins from travelling extensively around the body). The purpose of these discussions 
was to increase Sarah’s understanding of and normalise her anxiety towards blood- and 
injection-related stimuli. 
VIII.II) SESSION 3: AMT TECHNIQUES 
Session 3 was given over to introducing and explaining the purpose of AMT techniques 
(i.e. to pre-emptively increase blood-pressure in anticipation of its dropping as part of 
a potential syncopal or presyncopal response on Sarah’s exposure to BII-related 
stimuli), as well as demonstrating and practicing these with Sarah. In accordance with 
Mednick and Claar’s [20] recommendations, and as per the method used by Chapman 
and DeLapp [3], Sarah was instructed to tense the muscles throughout her body for 
around 10-15 seconds, before then relaxing the muscles for around 20-30 seconds. This 
tensing and relaxing is alternated, so as to prevent either excessive arousal or excessive 
relaxation. Sarah was instructed to use AMT during the exposure tasks in Sessions 5-
14. 
VIII.III) SESSION 4: CONSTRUCTING A HIERARCHY OF FEARED 
STIMULI/SITUATIONS 
In Session 4, in collaboration with Sarah, we developed a list of BII-related ‘trigger’ 
stimuli/situations that she found anxiety-provoking. For each one, we asked her to 
estimate the level of anxiety she experienced whilst in the presence of the 
stimulus/situation, on a scale from 0 (no anxiety whatsoever) to 10 (the greatest anxiety 
imaginable). On the basis of these discussions, Sarah described a number of stimuli as 
eliciting anxiety. These are shown, along with their associated anxiety ratings, in order 
from least (towards the top of the table) to most anxiety-eliciting (towards the bottom), 
in Table 3.
 142 
Table 3: List of blood-related trigger stimuli/situations and their associated anxiety 
ratings at baseline (ordered from lowest to highest, in terms of the degree to which 
they elicited anxiety) 
Stimulus/situation Anxiety rating (/10) 
1. Sarah touching the inside of her own elbow* whilst 
talking about blood 
4/5 
2. Biology lessons (specifically, images and 
discussions of blood cells) 
6 
3. ‘Knee’† myself 6 
4. Personal, Sexual and Health Education (PSHE) 
involving blood and reproduction 
7 
5. Having a bad cut 7 
6. Other people touching the inside of her elbow 7/8 
7. ‘Knee’† someone else 7/8 
8. Having a blood-pressure cuff secured around her 
arm 
7/8 
9. Sarah’s Mum cutting her own finger 8 
10. Using a finger-pricker 8 
11. Watching a television programme involving blood, 
wounds, injections, etc. 
8 
12. Watching a person having an injection 8/9 
13. A video of someone having their blood taken 9 
14. Visiting people in hospital 9 
15. Having injections 10 
* The cubital fossa. 
† Sarah used the term ‘knee’ (herself or others) to refer to the act of touching the back of the 
knee. This had become a phobic stimulus due to her associating the back of the knee with the 
cubital fossa, due to their obvious similarities.
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VIII.IV) SESSIONS 5-14: GRADED EXPOSURE TASKS 
Sarah’s hierarchy informed exposure tasks as part of a graded exposure hierarchy. The 
actual stimuli Sarah was exposed to in each session differed somewhat from those 
included as part of her hierarchy, on the basis of information that emerged as treatment 
progressed. In each week, we encouraged and facilitated Sarah’s progressively exposing 
herself to increasingly anxiety-provoking BII-related stimuli in turn. The other Trainee 
and I modelled approach behaviours towards her phobic stimuli, prior to Sarah’s 
engaging in these exposure tasks. As part of each task, Sarah rated her anxiety before, 
during and after; tasks were ended at the point at which her anxiety had reduced by at 
least half (in order to facilitate Sarah’s learning that anxiety naturally reduces ‘itself’, 
that is, without her needing to engage in escape/avoidance behaviours). The other 
Trainee and I provided positive reinforcement whenever Sarah managed to complete a 
task. Sarah was given between-session homework tasks each week, which broadly 
involved her repeating the exposure tasks that we had completed in the session (as well 
as continuing to repeat exposure tasks from earlier weeks). 
Given Sarah’s 10-year history of BII phobia, there were, unsurprisingly, some 
challenging moments. For example, in Session 9 (which involved going into, exploring 
and discussing the instruments in a phlebotomy room), Sarah reported a significant 
increase in anxiety and pre-syncopal symptoms. This led her to suspend the expose and 
lean over, with her head on a stool to recover. However, after around five minutes, she 
reported feeling better, including her anxiety having reduced to ‘0’. Positively, Sarah 
was able to return to the room and complete the task. This seemed to be a crucial 
milestone in therapy, in that (and according to her subsequent self-report) Sarah 
seemed to learn that she was able to tolerate and ‘ride-out’ high anxiety levels even in 
high anxiety-eliciting scenarios. 
At the end of the course of treatment, the extent to which Sarah felt anxious at the 
prospect of exposure to (what had previously been) each of her trigger stimuli had 
significantly reduced (as can be seen in Table 6). She reported feeling ‘100% certain’ 




The outcome measures that Sarah and her mother were administered at baseline were 
administered again (that is, sent-out via post) at the end of her sessions, as well as at 
3-, 6- and 12-month follow-up. Unfortunately, Sarah and her mother only completed 
these measures at the time of the 12-month follow-up. These data, together with their 
corresponding baseline scores, can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4:  Sarah’s self-reported outcome measures at baseline and 12-month follow-up 
Note: ARI-S = Affective Reactivity Index – Self-Report; EWSAS = Education, Work and Social 
Adjustment Scale [32; see Appendix for a description of this measure]; MFQ = Mood and 
Feelings Questionnaire; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
* Not completed at baseline. 
† Not completed at follow-up.  
Measure Score (classification, where relevant) 
Baseline 12-month follow-up 
ARI-S:   
Total score 0 0 
Impairment score 0 -† 




Daily skills - 0/8 
Social activities - 0/8 
Hobbies - 0/8 
Family and relationships - 0/8 
MFQ 2/66 (non-
clinical range) 
0/66 (non-clinical range) 
SDQ:   
Emotional Problems Scale 3/10 (non-
clinical range) 
1/10 (non-clinical range) 
Conduct Problems Scale 0/10 (non-
clinical range) 










0/10 (non-clinical range 
Prosocial Behaviour Scale 8/10 (non-
clinical range) 
10/10 (non-clinical range) 
Total Difficulties Scale 6/40 (non-
clinical range) 
2/40 (non-clinical range) 
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Table 5: Sarah’s mother-reported outcome measures at baseline and 12- month 
follow-up 
Note: ARI-P = Affective Reactivity Index – Parent-Report; DASS = Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales; SDQ = Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire. 
As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, although Sarah’s general wellbeing measures were 
relatively low at baseline, at 12-month follow-up, there had nevertheless broadly been 
improvements in even these low scores. Furthermore, although Sarah had not 
Measure Score (classification) 
Baseline 12-month follow-up 
ARI-P:   
Total score 0.17 0 
Impairment score 0 0 
   
DASS:   












SDQ:   





























completed the EWSAS at baseline, her score at 12 months post-treatment indicated no 
impact of her difficulties upon her education and social adjustment. 
In terms of clinician-rated measures, Sarah’s CGAS score was rated as 63 at baseline 
and was 91 at 12-month follow-up – indicating that she was ‘doing very well’. There was 
therefore a significant increase in her general functioning over the two time-points. 
Table 6 shows Sarah’s self-rated levels of anxiety in response to her feared situations at 
baseline, at the end of the sessions and at 12-months post-treatment.
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Table 6: Anxiety ratings at baseline and post-treatment 
Stimulus/situation Anxiety rating (/10) 




1. Sarah touching the inside of her 
own elbow* whilst talking about 
blood 
4-5 0 0 
2. Biology lessons (specifically, 
images and discussions of blood 
cells) 
6 0 0 
3. ‘Knee’† myself 6 0 0 
4. Personal, Sexual and Health 
Education (PSHE) involving blood 
and reproduction 
7 2-3 2 
5. Having a bad cut 7 0 0 
6. Other people touching her arm 7-8 2 0 
7. Knee† someone else 7-8 0 0 
8. Having a blood-pressure cuff 
secured around her arm 
7-8 0 0 
9. Sarah’s Mum cutting her own 
finger 
8 0 0 
10. Using a finger-pricker 8 5 4 
11. Watching a television 
programme involving blood, 
wounds, injections, etc. 
8 0 0 
12. Watching a person having an 
injection 
8-9 0 0 
13. A video of someone having their 
blood taken 
9 5 4 
14. Visiting people in hospital 9 0 0 
15. Having injections 10 5 4 
* The cubital fossa. † Sarah used the term ‘knee’ (herself or others) to refer to the act of touching 
the back of the knee. This had become a phobic stimulus due to her associating the back of the 
knee with the cubital fossa, due to their obvious similarities. 
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The table shows that Sarah’s self-rated anxiety for each of her feared scenarios 
significantly reduced from baseline through to the end of the sessions. With a few 
exceptions, almost every scenario from numbers 1 through to 12 had reduced to zero by 
the end of sessions, regardless of its rating at baseline. Furthermore, these gains (or 
rather, reductions) had been maintained at 12-month follow-up. Those scenarios 
involving injections or needles more directly (e.g., numbers 10, 13 and 15) were, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, somewhat more resistant to change, showing smaller reductions. 
However, even the anxiety associated with these most-feared scenarios nevertheless 
had reduced by at least half by the end of the sessions, with these reductions being 
either maintained or reducing further at 12-month follow-up. 
Sarah’s self-reported phobic avoidance at baseline, and follow-ups, rated via the Fear 
Questionnaire, can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7: Sarah’s self-reported phobic avoidance at baseline and the various follow-
ups 
Index Baseline Follow-Up 1  Follow-Up 2 Follow-Up 3 
Phobic 
avoidance 
11/40 3/40 1/40 0/40 
Anxiety and 
depression 




3/8 2/8 1.5/8 1/8 
 
Consistent with the reductions in self-reported anxiety described above, these data 
show that Sarah’s phobic avoidance of BII-related situations reduced, from being 
‘slightly avoidant’ (a mean score of 2.2) at baseline to being ‘not avoiding’ (a mean score 
of 0) at 12-month follow-up. As stated earlier, it seemed that Sarah was underestimating 
her levels of avoidance and the global impact of her BII at baseline; the reduction from 
baseline to follow-up, and therefore her therapeutic progress, may ‘in reality’ have been 
somewhat larger. Similarly, Sarah also showed notable improvements in mood related 
to her BII phobia. Finally, she showed a substantial reduction in her global phobia 
rating, from being mid-way between ‘slightly disturbing’ and ‘definitely disturbing’ at 
 150 
baseline, to being mid-way between ‘phobia absent’ and ‘slightly disturbing’ at 12-
month follow-up. 
Overall, therefore, Sarah’s general wellbeing showed some improvement – though this 
had been relatively good at baseline. More importantly, there appeared to have been 
substantial improvements in her anxiety and phobic avoidance in relation to BII-
related stimuli. Indeed, such was the reduction in her anxiety that, at 3-month follow-
up, Sarah reported that she had managed to undergo her required blood-tests (i.e. to 
assess renal function). This had been her primary goal for her CBT treatment, and 
something that she had been building-up to for the previous five years. Crucially, 
although she had indeed been highly anxious (around 8/10), she had nevertheless 
managed to tolerate the experience. Sarah reported having used the AMT techniques 
and that, as a result, she had not felt faint. Sarah had also managed to have her blood-
pressure taken, which had been an additional challenge in the past. Furthermore, and 
positively, the blood-tests indicated a full recovery and meant that she had 
consequently been discharged from the Renal Service. 
These gains had been maintained at 6- and 12-month follow-ups. Specifically, Sarah 
had continued to regularly watch ‘Casualty’ (which she feels regularly exposes her to 
blood and injuries) and had ceased to avoid conversations or images involving blood-, 
injections- or related stimuli. Indeed, Sarah was able to describe some recent episodes 
in detail, a task that would have been incredibly difficult for her at the start of 
treatment. She had also been able to fully participate in Biology lessons – one of which 
had involved dissecting an eyeball. Although she reported still experiencing anxiety at 
the idea of having a blood-test of injection (5/10), she also stated that she would not 
avoid these. Finally, Sarah has even begun to consider Medicine as possible career (yes, 
honestly). As standard, Sarah’s recent 12-month follow-up was her final appointment 
with the service, from which she has now been discharged.
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X. DISCUSSION 
The graded exposure programme delivered with Sarah was clearly successful. Together 
with the growing evidence-base suggesting the effectiveness of CBT via graded 
exposure (and using AMT) [e.g., 16, 17-19], it may be time for NICE to evaluate such 
evidence and to consider instituting guidelines recommending the use of such methods 
to address BII phobia. 
Given the potential importance of high disgust-sensitivity in BII phobia [e.g., 12, 13-15], 
it may have been useful to include some measure of this [such as the Disgust Propensity 
and Sensitivity Scale-Revised; 33], in order to measure the impact of the intervention 
(or not) upon this construct (and vice-versa). The failure to include such a measure 
may be considered a limitation, and something that would be addressed were this 
single case design to be repeated. 
A sometimes-challenging aspect of the intervention was the anxiety of Sarah’s mother 
in relation to BII-related stimuli. Indeed, she often demonstrated clear signs of anxiety 
and refused to watch and take part in some of the exposures (e.g., observing mine and 
the fellow Trainee’s blood being taken in the later sessions) as a result. This was 
interesting, as it provided obvious evidence in favour of Barlow’s [18] diathesis-stress 
model of BII phobia. However, it was also challenging, as it of course set-up something 
of a conflict for Sarah, between the ‘approach’ demands of the graded exposure and the 
anxiety and ‘avoidance’ implicitly suggested by her mother. As it turned-out, Sarah’s 
determination was such that she was not swayed by her mother’s anxiety. Had this not 
been the case, it may have been helpful to explore Sarah’s attending the sessions 
independently. 
Nevertheless, that the intervention did not directly address Sarah’s parents’ anxieties 
may be considered a limitation. It is likely that this was an important factor, throughout 
the course of Sarah’s childhood, in the development and maintenance of her BII phobia 
(as well as previous OCD diagnosis) [e.g., 18]. Sarah was 13 years old and will 
presumably be living at home with – and exposed to the anxieties of – her parents for 
at least a few years to come. That the present intervention did not address her parents’ 
anxieties directly, therefore, may have a bearing on whether Sarah is able to maintain 
the gains made in treatment. That said, the present intervention’s focusing rather 
specifically on Sarah’s individual anxiety (to the exclusion of her familial context) is no 
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different to the (generally successful) approach(es) taken by Öst et al. [16], Craske et al. 
[19], Ayala et al. [17], amongst others. Indeed, this is a broader criticism that can be 
levelled at CBT approaches in general. However, it would be difficult for such a 
schedule of 14 weekly hour-long sessions to incorporate additional work on the 
difficulties of the index patient’s significant other(s). Then again, it is hoped that 
Sarah’s mother’s apparent BII-related anxieties were addressed in some way, albeit 
indirectly, via her co-attending all of Sarah’s sessions (e.g., by listening to the 
psychoeducation and observing the numerous exposure tasks). 
XI. REFLECTIONS 
Working with Sarah was sometimes challenging because fear of blood-tests/injections 
was something that I myself had struggled with previously – which made it relatively 
easy to empathise with her difficulties. Though I did not undergo any formal 
psychological therapy, I had managed to tolerate a number of regular blood-tests and 
immunisations as part of Occupational Health for a job. These had therefore served as 
a natural, in vivo exposure course and resulted in my becoming significantly less 
anxious about and more able to tolerate blood-tests and injections. 
I believe that both my prior experience of BII phobia, as well as my having overcome 
this difficulty via a form of repeated exposures, influenced my practice throughout the 
intervention. In the initial exposure sessions, Sarah was struggling to fully engage with 
homework tasks (spec., putting-on and wearing plasters on her cubital fossae), and my 
empathy with her may have impacted on the extent to which I fully addressed and 
problem-solved these difficulties. I explored this in supervision and reflected on the 
crucial role of repeated exposures for alleviating BII phobia. From this, I was able to 
hold in mind the potentially limited impact of the intervention if Sarah was not more 
strongly encouraged to engage and persist with exposure tasks – especially at such 
times when her anxiety was clearly high. Overall, I feel that this contributed to my 
professional development, in terms of my ability to hold in mind treatment goals at 
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APPENDIX: DESCRIPTIONS OF MEASURES COMPLETED AT BASELINE AND 
FOLLOW-UP 
The Affective Reactivity Index [ARI; 25] – Self-Report and Parent Versions: 
The concise, 7-item ARI scales index irritable mood. The individual items are scored 0 
(‘not true’), 1 (‘somewhat true’) or 2 (‘certainly true’), with the first six items being 
summed to form the total score. The seventh item measures the extent of impairment 
owing to irritable mood, and is scored separately. The first six items are scored by 
dividing their sum by 6, by which one obtains a three-point scale corresponding to a 
three-level gradation of irritability severity (i.e. ‘not true’, ‘somewhat true’ or ‘certainly 
true’). 
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scales [DASS; 28]: 
The 42-item DASS simultaneously measures the negative psychoemotional states of 
depression, anxiety and stress in parents – each construct being assessed by 14 items. 
Respondents are asked to indicate the frequency with which they have experienced 
symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress during the previous week. Individuals 
respond to each item using a 4-point Likert scale, from 0 (‘did not apply to me at all’) 
to 3 (‘applied to me very much, or most of the time’). Thus, potential scores for each 
subscale range from 0 to 42, with higher scores suggesting greater symptom-severity. 
Details of the scoring and interpretation of the DASS are given in Table A1. 
Table A1: Scoring and interpreting the DASS 
Range Depression (D) Anxiety (A) Stress (S) 
Normal 0-9 0-7 0-14 
Mild 10-13 8-9 15-18 
Moderate 14-20 10-14 19-25 
Severe 21-27 15-19 26-33 
Extremely Severe <28 <20 >34 
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The Mood and Feelings Questionnaire [MFQ; 26] – Child Self-Report Long Version: 
The 33-item Child Self-Report MFQ assesses current symptoms of depression. It 
consists of a series of descriptive phrases concerning how the respondent has been 
feeling and behaving within the past two weeks. The individual responds to each item 
by indicating ‘not true’ (scored ‘0’), ‘sometimes’ (1) or ‘true’ (2). A total score is 
determined by summing all items, with potential scores ranging from 0 to 66. A score 
of 25 or above is thought to optimally predict the presence of depressive symptoms. 
The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire [SDQ; 27, 29] – Self- and Parent-Report 
Versions: 
The SDQ is a 25-item questionnaire concerning the psychological attributes and 
behaviour of individuals aged between 4- and 17-years-old. The scale yields five 
subscales: 1) Emotional Problems (5 items); 2) Conduct Problems (5 items); 3) 
Hyperactivity/Inattention (5 items); 4) Peer Relationship Problems (5 items); and 5) 
Prosocial Behaviour (5 items). The scores from scales 1-4 can be added together to 
create a ‘Total Difficulties’ score. Details of the scoring and interpretation of the SDQ 
in 14-17-year-olds is given in Table A2.
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Table A2: Scoring and interpreting the SDQ in 14-17-year-olds 
 Normal Borderline Abnormal 
Parent-completed:    
Emotional problems 
Scale 
0-3 4 5-10 
Conduct problems Scale 0-2 3 4-10 
Hyperactivity/Inattention 
Scale 
0-5 6 7-10 
Peer Problems Scale 0-2 3 4-10 
Prosocial Scale 6-10 5 0-4 
Total Difficulties 0-13 14-16 17-40 
    
Self-completed:    
Emotional Problems 
Scale 
0-5 6 7-10 
Conduct Problems Scale 0-3 4 5-10 
Hyperactivity/Inattention 
Scale 
0-5 6 7-10 
Peer Problems Scale 0-3 4-5 6-10 
Prosocial Scale 6-10 5 0-4 
Total Difficulties 0-15 16-19 20-40 
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Children’s Global Assessment Scale [CGAS; 30]: 
The CGAS is a measure for assessing the severity of psychiatric disturbance and 
impairments in general functioning in children aged 4 to 16 years. It is scored from 1 to 
100, with a score below 61 taken to indicate ‘definite pathology’ [34]. Summary decile 
descriptions are given in Table A3. 
Table A3: Summary Decile Descriptions for the CGAS 
Decile Description 
100-91 Doing very well 
90-81 Doing well 
80-71 Doing all right – minor impairment 
70-61 Some problems – in one area only 
60-51 Some noticeable problems – moderate impairment in several 
areas and unable to function in one area 
50-41 Obvious problems – moderate impairment in most areas or 
severe impairment in one area 
40-31 Serious problems – major impairment in several areas and 
unable to function in one area 
30-21 Severe problems – unable to function in almost all situations 
20-11 Very severely impaired – so impaired that considerable 
supervision is required for safety 
10-1 Extremely impaired – so impaired that constant supervision is 
required for safety 
The Fear Questionnaire [FQ; 31]: 
The FQ yields scores for the extent to which the respondent is currently (i) avoiding 
phobic stimuli/scenarios; (ii) troubled by their phobia(s), and; (iii) globally disturbed 
by their phobia(s). 
In the avoidance subscale, the respondent completes questions related to three forms 
of clinical phobia: agoraphobia, social phobia and blood and injury phobia. The 
respondent completes the questions relating to the phobia category/ies most relevant 
to them. Each category contains five factor-analytically-derived items, each rated on a 
scale of severity ranging from 0 to 8, where 0 denotes ‘would not avoid it’, 2 means 
 161 
‘slightly avoid it’, 4 denotes ‘definitely avoid it’, 6 denotes ‘markedly avoid it’ and 8 
means ‘always avoid it’. Scores are summed to give a total severity score ranging from 
0 to 40, with higher scores indicating greater severity of avoidance. 
Regarding (ii), the respondent completes questions relating to the extent to which they 
feel depressed, angry, tense, panicked and are having upsetting thoughts as a result of 
their phobia(s). Each item is rated on a 0 to 8 scale, where 0 indicates ‘hardly at all’, 2 
means ‘slightly troublesome’, 4 denotes ‘definitely troublesome’, 6 means ‘markedly 
troublesome’ and 8 means ‘very severely troublesome’. Each item is scored individually. 
In terms of (iii), the respondent rates the extent to which their phobia(s) is/are globally 
disturbing, on a single item, ranging from 0 to 8 (0 = ‘phobias absent’, 2 = ‘slightly 
disturbing/not really’, 4 = ‘definitely disturbing/disabling’, 6 = ‘markedly 
disturbing/disabling’ and 8 = ‘very severely disturbing/disabling’). 
The Education, Work and Social Adjustment Scale – Child Version [EWSAS; 32]: 
The EWSAS is an adaptation of the Work and Social Adjustment Scale [WSAS; 35] for 
children and adolescents, and measures the degree of impairment in five different areas 
of functioning (school, everyday situations, social activities, leisure time and family and 
relationships). The respondent rates the extent to which their difficulties affect their 
functioning in each domain, using a scale from 0 to 8 (0 = ‘my problem doesn’t affect 
this at all’, 2 = ‘my problem affects this slightly’, 4 = ‘my problem definitely affects this’, 
6 = ‘my problem affects this a lot’ and 8 = ‘my problem affects this severely’). 
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CLINICAL CASE STUDY 4 
‘THAT’S WHEN THE SHARKS START CIRCLING’ 
 COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL FORMULATION AND THERAPY 
FOR A COMPLEX ANGER PRESENTATION IN A 20-YEAR-
OLD MALE 
SUPERVISED BY DR. NEIL HAMMOND
163 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Literature review………………………………………………………………………………………. ………….164 
I.I) Autism spectrum disorders .............................................................................. 164 
I.II) Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder ........................................................ 164 
I.III) Anger management issues in ASD and ADHD ............................................. 165 
I.IV) Addressing anger management issues in ASD and ADHD........................... 166 
II. The patient ................................................................................................................ 167 
III. The presenting problem .......................................................................................... 167 
IV. Background .............................................................................................................. 168 
V. Formulation ............................................................................................................... 169 
VI. Aims of intervention ................................................................................................ 174 
VII. Intervention ............................................................................................................ 174 
VIII. Measures ................................................................................................................ 175 
VIII.I) Neuropsychological assessment .................................................................. 176 
IX. DIFFICULTIES .......................................................................................................... 177 
X. Results ........................................................................................................................ 178 
X.I) Neuropsychological assessment results .......................................................... 180 
XI. DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................. 181 
XI.I) Recommendations .......................................................................................... 183 
XII. Reflections ............................................................................................................... 183 
References ...................................................................................................................... 184 
Appendix 1: Full (anonymised) WAIS-IVUK assessment report .................................... 189 
Appendix 2: Raw data from tests of executive functioning .......................................... 195
164 
 
I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
I.I) AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are a range of neurodevelopmental conditions 
characterised by pervasive difficulties in social communication and interaction, 
together with restricted and repetitive patterns of behaviour, interests and activities 
[1]. Executive functioning deficits are also common [2], a recent study reporting those 
with ASD to be impaired across a number of indices measured [3]. The prevalence 
amongst adults has been estimated at 9.8 per 10,000, with males four times more likely 
to receive a diagnosis than females [4]. The aetiology of ASD is currently unknown. 
However, since genetic factors account for no more than 20-30 per cent of all cases, it 
is clear that complex genetic and environmental interactions are implicated in the 
remaining 70-80 per cent [5]. 
I.II) ATTENTION-DEFICIT/HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder 
characterised by pervasive and impairing symptoms of inattention and/or impulsivity 
and hyperactivity [1] 1 . ADHD has a significantly detrimental impact across many 
aspects of behaviour, including on behaviour in the home and school/work 
performance [7]. ADHD has a relatively high prevalence-rate and is estimated to affect 
around 4 per cent of all children [8, 9]. It seems to persist, from childhood to adulthood, 
in around 50-60 percent of individuals [10-12]. Males are diagnosed more often than 
females, with the estimated male-to-female prevalence-ratio varying cross-culturally, 
from around 3:1 in Norway to 16:1 in Austria [13]. Although the aetiology of ADHD is 
under almost-continuous investigation, the evidence suggests an inter-play between 
multiple genetic and environmental risk factors [14]. 
An ADHD diagnosis confers vulnerability for a number of other comorbid DSM-V 
diagnoses [15]. Rates of comorbid depression have been estimated at around 28 percent, 
whilst between 10-37 per cent of individuals will go on to develop an alcohol and/or 
other substance use disorder [16, 17]. Approximately 20-50 per cent of children with 
                                                                
1 Although the World Health Organisation (WHO) uses the term ‘Hyperkinetic Disorder’ (HD) 
in their ICD-10 (2015) to describe this set of behaviours, there is much overlap in terms of the 
operational criteria between ADHD and HD ([6] 
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ADHD go on to receive a diagnosis of conduct disorder during adolescence [15]. 
Percentages of comorbid personality disorder diagnoses in adults with ADHD range 
from 10-75 per cent, depending on sample characteristics [18], with anti-social 
personality disorder (ASPD) and borderline personality disorder (BPD) being observed 
most frequently [19, 20]. The mechanism(s) for the association between ADHD and 
personality disorders is/are at present unclear, although common genetic pathways 
[21], the impulsivity and hyperactivity seen in ADHD [22], as well as parenting styles 
[23] are all thought to be important predisposing factors [18]. 
ASD and ADHD commonly co-occur in individuals, with between 30 and 50 per cent 
of those diagnosed with the former exhibiting elevated symptoms of the latter [24, 25]. 
It is similarly estimated that features of ASD are observed in around two-thirds of 
individuals with ADHD [26]. 
I.III) ANGER MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN ASD AND ADHD 
Anger management issues are relatively common in ASD [27], with rates of around 45 
per cent having been reported [28]. In terms of potential mechanisms, those with ASD 
are known to be impaired with respect to inferring the mental states and emotions of 
those around them [29]. Combined with related and commonly-observed impairments 
in understanding non-verbal and reciprocal interactions, as well as ‘unwritten’ social 
rules, such difficulties can ‘set the stage’ for confusion and miscommunication. 
Furthermore, those with ASD are also impaired in terms of recognising and regulating 
their own emotions [i.e. alexithymia; 30] which, combined with executive functioning 
deficits, can lead to instantaneous physical responses, episodes of ‘blind rage’2 and an 
‘inability to recognise signals indicating that it would be appropriate to stop’ [6, p. 
1204]. 
Individuals with ADHD experience greater levels of trait and state anger, relative to 
controls [32], and display this anger in more socially-inappropriate ways [33], such as 
‘temper outbursts’ and emotional reactivity [34]. It stands to reason that elevated levels 
of anger and aggression in ADHD may be related to a central deficit in inhibitory 
control [35]. 
                                                                
2 ‘The rapidity and intensity of anger, often in response to a[n] [apparently] relatively trivial 
event, can be extreme’ ([31] 
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I.IV) ADDRESSING ANGER MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN ASD AND ADHD 
The most recent National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines 
for addressing challenging behaviour in people with learning disabilities [NG11; 36] 
recommend a psychosocial intervention (provided that no coexisting mental or 
physical disorders, or problems relating to the physical or social environment, have 
been identified as triggering or maintaining the challenging behaviour). Most of the 
literature on anger interventions for those with ASD suggests using Cognitive-
Behavioural Therapy (CBT). Sofronoff et al. [6] have outlined a modified CBT-based 
framework for addressing anger in children with ASD, involving the following 
components: (i) exploration of happiness and relaxation (i.e. ‘positive’ emotions); (ii) 
exploration of anger – specifically, its physiological, cognitive and behavioural 
correlates (and their inter-relation); (iii) common and personal ‘triggers’ for anger; (iv) 
introduction and development of an ‘anger thermometer’; (v) introduction and 
discussion of reality-/ probability-testing (e.g., alternative non-aggressive possible 
explanations for why people may behave in particular ways, etc.); (vi) discussion of 
strategies to alleviate feelings of anger (e.g., going for a run, listening to music, etc.), 
and; (vii) discussion of alternative, non-aggressive behaviours for expressing anger. 
Sofronoff et al.’s [6] programme also included ASD-appropriate modifications [cf. 31] 
(e.g., using visual materials and role-play to facilitate learning). In a Randomised 
Controlled Trial (RCT) using this protocol, Sofronoff et al. [6] reported significant 
reductions in parent-reported episodes of anger, as well as evidence indicating that 
strategies learned during treatment had become generalised to both home and school 
settings [see also 37]. Though such studies were conducted with children, their core 
components can be adapted for use with adults. 
There are currently no specific NICE guidelines for addressing anger/aggression in 
ADHD. Given the strong links between ADHD and certain neurochemical 
abnormalities [38], drug treatment (methylphenidate) is recommended as the first-line 




II. THE PATIENT 
The patient, ‘Roshan’ (not his real name), was a 20-year-old Asian-British male, of 
relatively large build, with a complex psychiatric presentation. He had diagnoses of 
ASD and ADHD. He was an only-child living with his mother. Although, at initial 
assessment, Roshan was undertaking a Business and Technology Education Council 
(BTEC) level 3 in IT, by the time he entered the ward, he had effectively discontinued 
his attendance. He and his mother owned a Staffordshire bull terrier, to which Roshan 
was highly attached. 
III. THE PRESENTING PROBLEM 
Roshan was referred to a tertiary inpatient service for ASD, due to high levels of anger 
and aggression. His anger was primarily directed towards – although not restricted to 
– family members. 
At home, Roshan’s anger manifested via destruction of property (e.g., destroying items 
of furniture/electrical equipment and causing structural damage) and verbal and 
physical aggression, the latter primarily towards his mother. Roshan described that he 
would ‘throw [his mother] around, kick her and punch her’. In particularly violent 
episodes, he had even stamped and jumped on her after having knocked her to the 
ground. Such incidents had resulted in his mother having been hospitalised several 
times and needing ongoing physiotherapy. He had previously threatened his father 
with a knife. 
His mother reported that Roshan had difficulties with daily functioning. The most 
common ‘trigger’ to his anger at home was being asked to complete necessary activities. 
Outside of the home, Roshan was also aggressive/violent towards peers when he 
perceived them as slighting him in some way (e.g., staring at him from across the 
street). At such times, he described his anger as overwhelming him, increasing ‘from a 
0 to a 10 immediately’ and, ‘turning [him] into an animal… I just want to inflict pain, 
hear people scream in agony and destroy everything.’ 
Roshan had no criminal convictions resulting from his violence. However, he had 
received a caution for ‘assault occasioning actual bodily harm’ (on his mother) in 
December 2014. Furthermore, he had been issued with ‘Final Warnings’ from two local 
Police forces for his domestic violence, meaning that any further offences may lead to 
168 
 
criminal prosecution without his mother having to press charges. At assessment, 
Roshan agreed that his aggressive outbursts were ‘unacceptable’, and consented to his 
inpatient referral in order for these issues to be addressed. Although numerous 
interventions had been previously undertaken, these had been of limited success, 
according to both Roshan and his parents. 
IV. BACKGROUND 
Roshan first came to the attention of Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services 
(CAMHS) in 2009, aged 12 years. He had had a number of exclusions from secondary 
school, due to ‘fighting, disrupting classes and persistently refusing to follow 
instructions.’ Roshan reported having previously been bullied at the school. He was 
also ‘struggling to adhere to boundaries’ at home (e.g., his aggression towards his 
parents). As a result, he was diagnosed with and underwent various treatments for 
ADHD, between 2009 and 2011. 
In 2012, after treatments for Roshan’s ADHD had not resolved his anger/aggression, he 
was assessed for and diagnosed with an ASD. His parents first became concerned about 
his behaviour when he was 3 years old, describing him as having ‘a rigid need to be in 
control, inflexibility and extreme reactions to situations’. Roshan tended to play alone 
at Montessori school and, on one occasion, bit another child. 
At around age 14/15, Roshan founded and developed a gang, along with a group of 
friends. Gang members behaved provocatively towards other gangs by, for example, 
entering their respective ‘territories’. Roshan stated that his gang affiliation made him 
feel ‘powerful’ and ‘unstoppable’. Subsequently – as his friends/other gang members 
came to be stabbed and even killed (when he was 16) – he came to realise the gang had 
become ‘really serious’. His school were instrumental in ending his gang affiliation at 
16/17 years, encouraging Roshan and his friends to write and record music and thereby 
provide an alternative focus for their interests. 
At assessment, Roshan was assessed for the potential presence of a range of mood and 
anxiety disorders and schizophrenia, but these were excluded. He was not taking any 
psychotropic medication, was a non-smoker and was neither abusing alcohol nor 




On the basis of Roshan’s presenting difficulties and background information, collected 
at assessment, and initial discussions with him from our early sessions, his case was 




Figure 1: Longitudinal formulation of Roshan’s anger and aggression presentation
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Roshan seemed to demonstrate a number of neurological difficulties typical of ASD – 
that is, in the processing of information relating to both others and oneself, as well as 
executive functioning deficits. 
In terms of Theory of Mind ability (or ToM), Roshan often becomes angry when in the 
car and another driver toots their horn. He tends to assume that the driver is tooting 
at them, and ‘is unable to see that they may be tooting someone else or making a 
general protest.’ Also, Roshan stated that, if his mother shouts/screams (to stop) whilst 
he is attacking her, this ‘pisses [him] off even more and makes [him] hit her even 
harder.’ Thus, he seemed not to recognise that she may be shouting due to fear and/or 
pain, and might have been trying to bring the violence to a close, rather than – as he 
believed – deliberately trying to provoke him further. 
Roshan also seemed to have enduring difficulties understanding social information, 
including appropriate behaviour in a given situation. He had bitten another child at 
primary school. Roshan often talked at length about tangential/irrelevant topics 
despite a number of verbal and non-verbal prompts, and had similar difficulties 
recognising cues indicating the end of the session. His mother reported that Roshan 
often misunderstands what others say to him (e.g., failing to understand jokes and 
interpreting things in a literal manner). 
Roshan had clear difficulties in emotion self-perception and regulation – seemingly an 
enduring risk-factor for his aggression. Thus, he described not being aware of when his 
anger was building-up, experiencing these episodes as having a rapid onset (making 
his anger ‘go from a 0 to a 10 immediately’). He also seemed to have significant difficulty 
in perceiving his emotions more generally, frequently describing himself as being ‘only 
angry or neutral’, and denying experiencing other emotions. 
There was also evidence of executive functioning deficits. His attention was reported 
as being poor by both himself and his mother. He also seemed to struggle with 
impulsivity. Roshan reported having had difficulty with exams at school, due to 
responding too quickly to them, not thinking through what the questions were asking. 
During our sessions, I noticed that he would start to respond to a question immediately 
after my having asked it (speaking rapidly, with little ‘space’ between sentences and 
ideas), appearing not to have fully processed what I had asked. He also found planning 
and organisation very difficult, to the extent that his father took on much/all of the 
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responsibility for Roshan’s schedule. Similarly, he would frequently misplace/forget 
items (e.g., his keys, phone/laptop chargers). 
It seems likely that, due to a number of relatively difficult early experiences, Roshan’s 
self-concept was relatively poor. Firstly, he had struggled with educational attainment 
from primary school onwards. Combined with his difficulties in ToM and social 
interactions (his mother described him as having been a very quiet child and not very 
sociable), it is perhaps unsurprising that he became isolated from his peers and 
experienced significant episodes of bullying during primary and secondary school. 
In addition, Roshan’s parents’ relationship was reportedly disharmonious, Roshan 
being witness to physical violence between his parents from a young age. In 2007, 
Roshan’s parents separated ‘acrimoniously’ and subsequently went on to live in 
separate parts of the country. Roshan’s living arrangements had since been unstable, 
being successively transferred between his parents at various stages. From around 2013 
(i.e. including the time of the assessment and intervention), Roshan had been living 
with his mother. 
A number of negative core beliefs were hypothesised. His difficulties in school 
attainment and in managing everyday tasks could have fostered a belief of his not being 
capable/good enough. He told me, on a number of occasions, ‘I haven’t got the 
concentration or the motivation to sit down and study for exams, so what’s the point?’ 
Roshan’s experience of being bullied may have led to his developing beliefs such as his 
being vulnerable, unacceptable to others and/or that other people cannot be trusted. 
It seems likely that being successively transferred between his parents may have served 
to reinforce such possible beliefs. His (regular) exposure to domestic violence, together 
with his time as part of a gang, may have led to a perception of the world as 
dangerous/threatening, and anger and aggression as adaptive responses within this. 
In terms of Roshan’s assumptions/rules for living, he seemed to think it important not 
to appear weak or vulnerable as, in his words, ‘that’s when the sharks start circling’. 
Such thoughts may have precipitated his gang membership. It seems likely that the 
rather concrete nature of this ‘solution’ to possible feelings of vulnerability may have 
been related to his ASD. It is also reasonable to conclude that his witnessing domestic 
violence may have led to his viewing aggression as a valid means of expressing oneself 
and resolving perceived ‘threats’ (the term ‘threats’ is used here in the broadest sense, 
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including both perceived overt challenges/ridicule from others, through to perceived 
implicit criticisms associated with requests from others (e.g., to clean his room, 
complete schoolwork, etc.)).
Roshan’s parents reported that their prompting him to engage in typical daily-living 
tasks often served as triggers for his anger. Such prompts would generally remind 
Roshan that he has not carried out a given task, possibly activating hypothesised core 
beliefs around being unable to manage. His self-management problems could have 
served as further ‘evidence’ for such beliefs. More systemically, his mother described 
her parenting style as having been/being protective (‘I never let Roshan out alone’). 
Although an understandable response to Roshan’s vulnerabilities, such behaviour may 
have contributed to and reinforced his hypothesised perceived low self-efficacy. 
Perceived slights from peers may have triggered his anger due to sensitivity towards 
potential signs of threat, related to a perception of the world as dangerous. 
Roshan was able to describe a number of symptoms of anger in response to triggering 
stimuli. At such times, Roshan reported feeling suddenly overwhelmed by his anger 
(‘going from a “0” to a “10” instantly’) and that he would ‘become out of control… like a 
wild animal’. The episodes typically lasted around 30-40 minutes, after which Roshan 
would feel exhausted and fall asleep. Functionally, behaving thus may have served to 
make Roshan feel temporarily powerful, as well, perhaps, as serving as an avoidance 
from difficult thoughts and feelings around vulnerability. 
In summary, Roshan’s neurological difficulties and challenging early experiences may 
have interacted such that his pervading view of the world was of a threatening and 
dangerous place within which one is at an ongoing risk of ‘attack’ (including perceived 
criticism) from others. It appears that his rigid/concrete thinking style, together with 
his having witnessed significant episodes of domestic violence, may have led him to 




VI. AIMS OF INTERVENTION 
The overall aim of the intervention was to reduce Roshan’s aggressive outbursts (and 
the attendant risks posed to others). More specifically, the aims were to allow Roshan 
to: (i) become more aware of ‘triggers’ for his anger; (ii) become more aware of signs 
and symptoms that his anger is increasing (before the point at which it went to a ‘10’ 
and he ‘turn[ed] into an animal’); (iii) learn strategies for diffusing/reducing his anger, 
and; (iv) learn alternative behaviours for managing anger-inducing situations (e.g., to 
communicate dissatisfaction without aggression or violence). 
VII. INTERVENTION 
A modified form of CBT, incorporating the core elements described by Sofronoff et al. 
[6] but tailored to Roshan’s presentation and formulation and using ASD-appropriate 
adaptations (e.g., the use of metaphors to aid understanding, using a whiteboard to 
summarise ideas/draw-out diagrams and reduce the ‘talkiness’ of sessions), was 
delivered. The intervention took place over 8 weekly, hour-long sessions, with 
‘homework’ tasks between sessions. 
In the first half of the sessions, we explored the following. Given Roshan’s difficulties 
in noticing the ‘warning signs’ of increasing anger, our sessions included a specific 
focus on common and personal triggers to anger and its cognitive and physiological 
correlates, as well as the relationships between these factors (i.e. a cross-sectional 
formulation). In order to develop Roshan’s understanding of how anger can increase, 
we used the metaphor of a ‘pressure-cooker’ to describe how anger can (continue to) 
build-up and, if the ‘pressure’ is not released (e.g., via various tension-reduction 
strategies), cause the lid to ‘blow-off’ (e.g., smashing and destroying property, verbal 
and physical violence aimed at his mother). As part of this, we explored the ‘fight or 
flight’ system and used the ‘broken car alarm’ metaphor to explain how one’s threshold 
for the triggering of anger may become lowered (in Roshan’s case, due to e.g., his 
experiences of gang violence). We also thought about how anger is a natural part of 
the human experience, its evolutionary origins, as well as its advantages (e.g., to signal 
discontent with others and thereby facilitate goal-directed behavior to address the 
source of discontent) and disadvantages (e.g., injuring others, police involvement). 
Throughout sessions, I looked for potential ‘openings’ to discuss Roshan’s potential 
underlying thoughts and feelings associated with anger. 
175 
 
We spent time thinking about factors that can commonly and personally influence 
anger. We explored how symptoms of ASD can sometimes make anger more likely 
(e.g., how ToM difficulties can sometimes lead people to interpret situations as 
threatening). Also, we thought about the impact that low mood can have on anger, and 
the importance of engaging in tasks and activities known to improve mood (e.g., sleep 
hygiene, engaging in regular exercise and eating a healthy, balanced diet). 
In the latter half of the sessions, we thought about strategies to reduce anger and 
aggressive behavior. First, we explored common and potential personal strategies for 
reducing angry feelings. Roshan found being on his own in his room, listening to 
(reggae) music and going for a walk with his dog particularly helpful strategies for 
calming himself down. Following this, we thought what we can do at those times when 
it might not be possible/practical to reduce internal angry feelings via the above 
strategies. We talked about how we can respond to internal anger in three broad ways: 
passively (i.e. ‘putting-up’ with something that we are unhappy with), aggressively or 
assertively (i.e. making it clear that we are unhappy with something in a clear, non-
aggressive way). In order to illustrate these forms of responding, [an Assistant 
Psychologist] and I performed role-plays to demonstrate each form of behavior and 
asked Roshan to identify each, followed by a discussion of their respective merits and 
drawbacks. 
VIII. MEASURES 
The following measures were administered to each party at baseline (before the 
intervention had begun) and again at the end of the intervention. 
Roshan completed the Novaco Anger Inventory – Short Form [NAI-25; 40] which 
measures the degree of anger felt in a range of anger-inducing situations. Each 
question is rated on a 5-point Likert scale, from ‘very little’ (0) to ‘very much’ (4). A 
total score is calculated by summing all items. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.96 has been 
reported for the scale [40]. Items describing scenarios that Roshan rated as eliciting 
high levels of anger were explored as part of the intervention (e.g., ‘you are in a 
discussion with someone who persists in arguing about a topic they know very little 
about’). Roshan scored 29/100 at baseline. 
Roshan also completed the Anger-Out (MAO) subscale and Anger-In (MAI) subscales 
from the Multidimensional Anger Inventory [MAI; 41, 42]. These subscales respectively 
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measure the tendency to express and suppress anger. Each item is rated on a 5-point 
scale, ranging from ‘completely undescriptive of me’ (1) to ‘completely descriptive of 
me’ (5). Adequate internal consistency for these subscales has been reported [41, 43]. 
Roshan completed the MAO and MAI at baseline and the end of the intervention. At 
baseline, he scored 8/10 for the MAO subscale [that is, 0.91 standard deviations, or SDs, 
above the mean, M, based on norms published by 44] and 12/25 on the MAI (0.05 SDs 
above the mean). 
Roshan’s mother also rated his anger and aggression via other-reported versions of the 
NAI-25 and MAO and MAI. At baseline, Roshan’s mother scored him as 64/100 on the 
NAI-25, 9/10 (1.42 SDs above the M) for the MAO and 18/25 (1.52 SDs above the M). 
Thus, although there was some consistency between Roshan’s and his mother’s ratings 
for the MAO, his mother’s ratings were somewhat higher for the NAI-25 and the MAI. 
In addition, Roshan’s primary nurse on the ward was asked to rate him on the other-
reported version of the MAO subscale after having had him on her caseload for around 
a month (she was not asked to complete the NAI-25 or MAI at baseline as these scales 
depend on a good knowledge of the person being rated, which it was felt she could not 
have at that point). His primary nurse scored Roshan 2/10 (that is, 2.10 SDs below the 
M). Interestingly, this was substantially lower than both Roshan’s and his mother’s 
score. 
VIII.I) NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
In addition, and as part of an extended assessment (conducted across a number of 
meetings running parallel to the intervention sessions), a battery of 
neuropsychological tests were administered to explore various aspects of Roshan’s 
cognition. 
Roshan was firstly administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – UK Fourth 
Edition [WAIS-IVUK; 45] in order to measure his general intellectual functioning. 
After that, he completed the following tests to index the range of executive functioning 
abilities: (i) the Trail-Making Test [46], which measures attention and processing-
speed; (ii) the Delis-Kaplan Executive Functioning System [D-KEFS; 47] Letter Fluency, 
Category Fluency and Category Switching subtests, to assess verbal fluency and set-
switching; (iii) the Hayling Sentence-Completion Test [48], to index initiation speed 
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and inhibitory control, and; (iv) the Brixton Spatial Anticipation Test [48], a measure 
of cognitive flexibility and the ability to discern patterns. 
IX. DIFFICULTIES 
Although Roshan engaged well throughout the first half of the sessions, some 
difficulties began to emerge after around the half-way point. Specifically, he would 
often rapidly digress on to other, somewhat tangential subjects (e.g., Chelsea Football 
Club [and football in general], the pragmatics and difficulties of looking after his 
Staffordshire Bull Terrier and, most frequently, his strong dislike of his mother and 
difficult relationship with her). Once Roshan had ‘got started’ on a digression, it was 
incredibly difficult to ‘pull him back’ from it. His ASD notwithstanding, Roshan often 
seemed to understand that I was trying to refocus the conversation and seemed to 
actively resist my doing so. Thus, he would often speak even more quickly and adhere 
to his digression more forcefully, resulting in the sessions often feeling to me like 
something of a tug-of-war. I discussed this in supervision and problem-solved various 
strategies to mitigate these interruptions (e.g., Roshan and I agreed that, if I felt that 
we were going ‘off-topic’, I could interrupt him and redirect him to the agenda). 
However, such attempts had little impact, reducing the amount of therapeutic time 
per session. 
Although Roshan had come into therapy saying that his anger/aggression was 
‘unacceptable’, he subsequently seemed ambivalent about whether/how much he 
agreed that he had difficulties with anger and also whether/how much he wanted to 
change. He often remarked that, if one chooses not to respond to provocation with 
(high levels of) aggression, ‘that’s when the sharks start circling’, leaving one open to 
further ‘attacks’ (both from the original provocateur, as well as third-party ‘onlookers’). 
Whilst we were exploring the disadvantages of aggression and violence, and the 
conversation had turned to potentially being arrested, going to jail, etc., Roshan talked 
at length about strategies for dealing with police questioning and specifically, how not 
to implicate oneself (e.g., ‘You just have to make sure you don’t say anything – you just 
say “No comment”, “No comment” to everything they ask…’). Such comments were 
manifestations of a general and consistent ‘gangster’ persona that Roshan had adhered 
to and did not seem to wish to part with. Roshan’s history of witnessing domestic 
violence and his having been involved in a gang (and its associated violence) may have 
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made it difficult for him to contemplate/accept potential alternative behaviours to 
aggression. 
Related to the above, but perhaps most importantly, as the sessions progressed, it 
became increasingly clear that Roshan seemed to have an intense dislike, possibly even 
hatred, towards his mother. Both Roshan and his mother described his feeling no guilt 
or remorse about his quite brutal levels of violence towards her (e.g., dragging her by 
the hair across the floor, throwing her into wine-racks, jumping on her neck whilst she 
lay on the floor). Indeed, such were his apparent levels of contempt and antipathy 
towards his mother that, when discussing these incidents, rather than remorse, he 
would often seem to become re-irritated and re-angry at his recollection of the thing(s) 
she had said or done to provoke him on a given occasion. Throughout the sessions, he 
repeatedly stated that he has ‘no bond with her’ and that, ‘she is just like any other 
person on the street to me.’ When asked to reflect on good things about her, Roshan 
said that ‘there isn’t anything.’ Indeed, by far the majority of his digressions concerned 
his mother. Roshan described her as obstinate, stupid, confrontational and 
provocative, and felt that she did things deliberately to irritate and anger him. 
Furthermore, from discussions with Roshan and his mother, it became increasingly 
clear that Roshan’s anger and aggression appeared to occur almost exclusively in the 
context of the relationship with his mother. He often said that ‘she [his mother] should 
be in here [the ward] having this [the sessions], instead of me.’ 
Roshan also strongly disagreed with and rejected his diagnosis of ASD and, as an 
informal patient, decided to spend increasingly less time on the ward. After a relatively 
short time, he was only coming to the ward for his anger sessions (e.g., he refused to 
remain on the ward on days when he did not have an anger session [which was most 
days, as he had one session per week] and did not attend any other ward groups, such 
as Social Skills Training and Understanding Your Emotions groups). 
X. RESULTS 
Roshan’s self- and other-reported outcome measure scores at baseline and at the end 
of the intervention are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: Roshan’s self- and other-reported outcome measure scores at baseline and at 
the end of the intervention 
Measure Baseline End of intervention 
Self-reported:   
NAI-25 29/100 13/100 
MAO 8/10 5/10 
MAI 12/25 9/25 
Mother-reported:   
NAI-25 64/100 Not collected 
MAO 9/10 7/10 
MAI 18/25 15/25 
Primary nurse-reported:   
MAO 2/10 Not collected 
Note: NAI-25 = the Novaco Anger Inventory – Short Form; MAO = Multidimensional Anger 
Inventory Anger-Out subscale; MAI = Multidimensional Anger Inventory Anger-In subscale. 
As can be seen from the table, at the end of the sessions, Roshan rated himself around 
55% lower (relative to baseline) for the degree of anger that he believed various anger-
inducing scenarios (would) elicit in him (the NAI-25). He rated himself around 38% 
lower for the extent of his aggressive behaviour, and 25% lower for the amount of anger 
he generally felt. Throughout the intervention, Roshan showed clear evidence of 
learning from the sessions (e.g, by regularly making reference to subjects that we had 
explored together), both in our sessions and in his discussions with another ward 
Psychologist. At the end of the sessions, Roshan said that his anger and aggression had 
‘clearly got less… I mean, it’s obvious, you can even ask my Mum.’ 
Roshan’s mother rated him around 22% lower for aggression (MAO) and reported a 
perceived 17% reduction in his levels of anger (MAI). His mother verbally completed 
the MAO and MAI during a phone-call at the end of the intervention. Due to time-
constraints, it was not possible to collect his mother-reported NAI-25 during this same 
phone-call. Unfortunately, despite a number of subsequent attempts, she could not be 
contacted thereafter to provide this. Thus, though Roshan’s mother reported a 
reduction in his anger and aggression, this was not as pronounced as Roshan’s self-
ratings. Nevertheless, she also spontaneously verbally reported that Roshan’s 
aggression had reduced. 
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Roshan’s primary nurse felt that, due to his spending so little time on the ward, she did 
not have enough information to complete the MAO again at the end of the 
intervention. That said, although, in any given week, Roshan spent little time on the 
ward, he did, in total (i.e. total number of hours from intake through to discharge) 
spend a considerable amount of time there (and occasionally participated in ward 
sports groups and group lunches). Throughout this time, he was not involved in any 
angry or aggressive incidents. 
Overall, therefore, despite the difficulties described above, the intervention seemed to 
have had an effect on Roshan’s anger and aggression. Nevertheless, there were two 
occasions during the intervention on which Roshan had physically attacked his mother 
(once following his mother’s locking his dog outside the front door and its having 
wandered-off, and once following a sudden change of plans). Though it may sound 
facile, both Roshan and his mother (independently) stated that his aggression on these 
occasions had ‘not been as bad as before’ (i.e. it had consisted of grabbing and shoving 
her, rather than throwing her around and jumping onto her). 
X.I) NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT RESULTS 
On the WAIS-IVUK, Roshan’s verbal comprehension, working memory and processing 
speed performances all fell into the Average range, whilst his perceptual reasoning 
performance fell into the Low Average range.  He achieved an overall IQ score of 96 
(Average range). Although Roshan’s Verbal Comprehension was somewhat greater 
than his Perceptual Reasoning, his performance revealed no notable areas of particular 
strength or weakness. (For a detailed assessment report, see Appendix 1.) 
Performance across the range of executive functioning tasks was satisfactory. On both 
Parts A and B of the Trail-Making Test, Roshan performed within the Average range. 
On the D-KEFS Letter Fluency subtest (fluency for words beginning with ‘F’, ‘A’ and 
‘S’), he performed within the High Average range. On the Category Fluency and 
Category Switching subtests, he performed within the Average range. On the Hayling 
Sentence-Completion Test, Roshan scored within the Average range. On the Brixton 
Spatial Anticipation Test, he also scored within the Average range. (For all raw scores, 
see Appendix 2.) These results therefore did not indicate the presence of any deficits 
in any area of executive functioning (i.e. in attention and/or processing speed, verbal 
fluency, set-shifting, inhibitory control or cognitive flexibility). 
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Overall, surprisingly and despite his ADHD diagnosis, there were no indications of any 
focal neuropsychological impairment. Importantly, his performance on executive tests 
suggested that he may no longer meet criteria for a diagnosis of ADHD. This is 
consistent with research indicating that around 40-50 percent of those diagnosed with 
ADHD in childhood do not meet criteria in adulthood [10-12]. 
XI. DISCUSSION 
The apparent relative success of the CBT intervention aside, by the end of the sessions, 
it seemed that relational/systemic factors were playing a greater part in his 
presentation than had seemed the case at the beginning. Although at assessment 
Roshan’s anger had seemed relatively pervasive, it gradually became clear that his 
anger occurred primarily within the context of the relationship with his mother. Not 
only did Roshan report an intense dislike of her, he also viewed other members of the 
team with whom she had communicated as having been manipulated and ‘poisoned’ 
by her (that is, poisoned against him). Thus, due to his mother having attended ward-
round a number of times, he refused to attend any weekly ward-rounds. On the 
contrary, Roshan did not seem to view me as having been so poisoned, due to my 
having worked primarily with him – indeed, he regularly stated that I was one of the 
few people ‘who understood’. This seemed to indicate both that Roshan did not feel 
that, in general, his perspective had been taken into account (by mental health 
professionals), and that his mother’s viewpoint had been given prominence. This 
impression may been reinforced by the CBT intervention, with its key assumption that 
factors intrinsic to the individual are ‘problematic’ and thus targets for change. Given 
that the results of the neuropsychological assessment indicated normal functioning in 
attention and other executive functions (and an absence of adult ADHD), it seemed 
that his persistent excessive talking and disruptions of sessions may have been 
functional. The function of this behaviour was interpreted as a means via which Roshan 
was partially rejecting the intervention, due to disagreeing that his anger problems 
were simply ‘located within’ him. Also, Roshan may have viewed the sessions as an 
opportunity to not only make it clear to me that his mother was a significant part of 
his anger issues, but also that I may then communicate this to other team members 
and thus act as a representative for him in the ward rounds that he refused to attend. 
Roshan’s behaviour in sessions, and the impact that this had upon me, also seemed to 
provide important information for the possible dynamics of the apparently conflict-
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dominated interactions with his mother. His excessive talking often left me feeling 
frustrated, and this may be the effect that he has upon his mother. Notably, however, 
several team members (including myself) who had interacted with Roshan’s mother 
observed that it seemed relatively difficult to have a reciprocal exchange with her, and 
that she, too, seemed not to pick-up on non-verbal cues and to be somewhat dominant 
in conversation. A number of interpretations for this are possible, which are not 
elaborated upon here. Regardless, overall, the evidence seemed to indicate that, in 
addition to various factors intrinsic to Roshan (e.g., his ASD), the dynamics between 
Roshan and his mother were a significant trigger and maintenance factor in Roshan’s 
anger – and therefore needed to be specifically addressed. 
In addition, and complicating the picture further, it seemed that Roshan may have 
been traumatised from having witnessed significant episodes of domestic violence 
throughout his childhood and having witnessed and been involved in gang violence. 
Towards the end of my sessions with Roshan, his mother informed me that, when he 
was around 9 years of age, Roshan witnessed his father attack his mother, hitting her 
over the head with a ‘heavy lampstand’ in their bedroom and causing her to bleed 
profusely, over the bedsheets and carpet. According to her, Roshan had stood on the 
threshold watching this, and had remained ‘rooted to the spot, staring’ for around 15 
minutes following the incident. During his time in a gang, one of Roshan’s friends had 
been stabbed and killed. Viewed against the wider, threat-saturated context of his life 
history, Roshan’s (somewhat rigid) adherence to a gangster persona, his difficulties in 
contemplating alternatives to aggressive behaviour and his preoccupation 
with/vigilance for signs that ‘the sharks’ are circling him, seem understandable. 
Although I allowed time during the sessions to explore these events and the impact 
that they may have had on Roshan, he did not seem ready to discuss this. 
As stated above, Roshan and his mother both reported that he experienced little or no 
remorse for the aggression and violence that he directed towards his mother. As 
described in the literature review, individuals diagnosed with ADHD in childhood 
often go on to develop anti-social personality disorder (ASPD) or borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) in adulthood – although the precise nature of the 
relationship between ADHD and personality disorders seems unclear at present [18]. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that Roshan’s apparent lack of guilt may have reflected the 
presence of possible ASPD, given that this is a key criterion in diagnosis of the disorder 
[49]. That the presence of ASPD or another personality disorder was not formally 
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assessed may be considered a limitation, and would be addressed were this single case 
design to be repeated. 
Overall, the effectiveness of the CBT intervention reported here may have been 
somewhat limited, due to the influence of the factors outlined above. However, it 
nevertheless allowed Roshan to explore some important aspects of his anger, such as 
his triggers, signs and symptoms of rising anger and methods to reduce angry feelings 
– which remained an important aspect of his formulation – and which did reduce 
somewhat after therapy. Furthermore, the good therapeutic relationship that I think 
we developed allowed him to feel validated and listened-to, which could prove useful 
for potential psychological interventions in future. Overall, it was difficult to fully 
address the apparently complex nature of his difficulties within the bounds of the 
current intervention. 
XI.I) RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the reformulation of Roshan’s case, it was recommended that he and his 
mother undergo a course of Family Therapy, for which they were placed onto the 
ward’s waiting list. However, shortly after the end of the anger intervention, and due 
to the little time that Roshan spent on the ward in a typical week (i.e. only presenting 
for anger sessions), his funding was discontinued and he was discharged from the 
ward. He and his mother were therefore placed instead on the waiting list of local 
services. This was considered particularly important, given that Roshan intends to 
remain at home with his mother for the foreseeable future. 
XII. REFLECTIONS 
As described above, Roshan often digressed in sessions to talk about his mother – and 
specifically, occasions on which he had become aggressive and violent with her – 
discussing his often rather extreme violence in a casual, matter-of-fact sort of way. He 
frequently stated – and it indeed appeared – that he felt no guilt or remorse for such 
things as dragging his mother across the floor by her hair, throwing her into racks of 
wine bottles and jumping on her neck as she lay on the floor. The apparently clear 
(family) systemic factors involved in his anger notwithstanding, it was nevertheless 
challenging to hear him talk like this, and sometimes a challenge to keep the mitigating 
influences of his ASD in mind. I spoke to other team members about challenging 
thoughts and feelings I had, as and when they arose, so as to ventilate and process 
184 
 
them, as I was aware that keeping them to myself could have proved unhelpful. In this 
way, I was able to develop and maintain a good therapeutic relationship with Roshan. 
In fact, such was our rapport that, on a few occasions, Roshan told me that I was ‘one 
of the only ones who understand [what she is like]’. In communicating this, he seemed 
to be implying that I thought such violent behaviour acceptable, given his mother’s 
personality/behaviour. This made me feel uncomfortable and, at such times, I tried to 
be clear in reiterating to him my unambiguous condemnation of any violent behaviour, 
on the one hand, whilst acknowledging that, sometimes, other people can make us feel 
angry/aggressive, and thereby seeking to avoid invalidating his experience of anger. 
Overall, in terms of my professional development, I feel that this case has 
demonstrated to me the potential importance of systemic factors in any given 
presentation, regardless of the presence or not of apparently fundamental 
neuropsychological deficits. This will be important, as I intend to pursue a career in 
Neuropsychology. 
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APPENDIX 1: FULL (ANONYMISED) WAIS-IVUK ASSESSMENT REPORT 
Detailed background information regarding Roshan and his presentation can be found 
in the final assessment report of the [ward], by [Clinical Psychologist] and [Assessment 
and Referrals Clinician], dated [date]. In summary, and more specifically related to the 
present assessment report, Roshan was referred to the [ward] in order to address his 
anger management issues. The present cognitive assessment was therefore undertaken 
as part of a longitudinal formulation that the Psychology team are constructing 
regarding Roshan’s anger issues – specifically, in order to try to gain a greater 
understanding of the psychological factors involved in his angry/aggressive responses 
to potential triggers/provocations (in order to inform further treatment approaches). 
Behavioural Observations 
Roshan was tested across two sessions at the [ward], with each of these sessions lasting 
approximately one hour. When I knocked on his door to begin the testing, Roshan was 
anticipating our appointment and was ready to begin the assessment right away. Prior 
to the delivery of the testing procedures, Roshan was given a general overview of what 
the testing would involve and was offered the opportunity to ask questions. He was 
well-engaged throughout the testing sessions and seemed to be applying his full effort 
on the tasks. He did not show any obvious signs of fatigue or irritation during testing. 
Description of Assessment 
Roshan’s general intellectual ability was assessed using the UK version of the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale (fourth edition; the WAIS-IVUK). The WAIS-IVUK is a 
standardised, reliable measure of an adult’s (i.e. those aged 16-90 years) intellectual 
functioning comprising of 10 core sub-tests. The WAIS-IVUK groups an individual’s 
score into 4 domains: the Verbal Comprehension Index, which measures verbal 
abilities; the Perceptual Reasoning Index, an indication of non-verbal ability including 
manipulation of concrete material; the Working Memory Index, which measures 
ability to hold and manipulate information in short-term memory; and the Processing 
Speed Index, which measures cognitive processing efficiency. Scores achieved on each 
of the sub-scales can be used to calculate a Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ). 
Each of the sub-scales and the FSIQ have a mean score of 100 and a Standard Deviation 
of 15. Roshan’s scores on the WAIS-IVUK were compared to the average scores obtained 
by a sample of the general population within his age range. 
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Summary of Performance 
Overall Current Level of Intellectual Functioning: the WAIS-IVUK 
Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) 
Roshan scored 100, indicating that his ability to process and express verbal 
material falls into the Average range. He scored at the 50th percentile. 
In the Similarities subtest, Roshan was required to identify the way in which two 
common words, objects or concepts are alike (e.g. ‘Horse’ and ‘Tiger’). Scores are 
based on the identification of a classification system which is relevant to both 
words (e.g., ‘mammal’) or the identification of a specific property common to both 
words (e.g., both have tails). His score was in the Above Average range1, which 
indicates a somewhat elevated level of cognitive flexibility and abstraction. 
Roshan’s Similarities performance was both a statistically- and clinically-
significant strength for him, the magnitude of this relatively greater performance 
being observed in only 2-5% of the general population. 
The Vocabulary subtest requires the individual to provide definitions for a 
selection of words. Points are awarded for good synonyms, a major use and a 
classification or through describing several features that together encapsulate an 
understanding of the word. Here, too, Roshan’s score fell within the Average 
range. His Vocabulary performance was in line with the average of his 
performances in the other VCI subtests. 
The Information subtest requires the examinee to answer questions that address 
a broad range of general knowledge topics, assessing verbal reasoning and 
conceptualisation. Roshan performed in the Average range on this subtest. 
Relative to his performances on the other subtests comprising the VCI, Roshan’s 
Information performance was a statistically-significant weakness for him. 
However, the magnitude of this relatively inferior performance is also observed in 
                                                                
1 A scaled score from ≤ 3 is described as ‘Extremely Low’; a scaled score from 4-5 is described as 
‘Borderline’; a scaled score from 6-7 is described as ‘Low Average’; a scaled score from 8-11 is 
described as ‘Average’; a scaled score from 12-13 is described as ‘Above Average’; a scaled score 
from 14-15 is described as ‘Superior’; and a scaled score ≥ 16 is described as ‘Very Superior’. 
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15% of the population, meaning that, though statistically-significant, this 
difference cannot be considered to be clinically-significant. 
Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI) 
ROSHAN scored 88, indicating that his ability to process visual material 
falls into the Low Average range. He scored at the 21st percentile. There were no 
statistically- or clinically-significant differences between any of Roshan’s 
performances on the three subtests which comprise the PRI. 
In the Block Design subtest, the individual is given blocks which have white sides, 
red sides and sides that are half-red and half-white. Using these blocks, the 
examinee has to create designs that match those presented in a booklet as quickly 
as possible. During this task, Roshan scored in the Low Average range, indicating 
a broadly normal ability-level, with respect to the perception and recreation of a 
series of complex designs. 
In the Matrix Reasoning subtest, the examinee looks at an incomplete ‘matrix’ or 
pattern and is asked to select the missing part of the pattern. It is a measure of 
visual intelligence, classification and spatial ability, knowledge of part-whole 
relationships, simultaneous processing and perceptual organisation. On this 
subtest, Roshan scored in the Average range, indicating that his skills here are in 
line with those of the general population. 
In the Visual Puzzles subtest, working within a specified time-limit, the examinee 
views a completed puzzle and selects three response options that, when combined, 
reconstruct the puzzle. Roshan scored in the Average range on this task, as well. 
Roshan’s VCI score was, statistically, significantly greater than his score for 
the PRI. However, given that the magnitude of this difference is shared with 
19.3% of the general population, it cannot be deemed to be clinically-
significant. Nevertheless, it should be noted that his abilities as regards the 
processing and expression of verbal material, represent a relative strength, 
compared to his ability to process and analyse visual and spatial 
information. 
It should be noted that, due to an unusually large difference between 
Roshan’s Verbal Comprehension Index score and his Perceptual Reasoning 
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Index, it was only possible to examine relative strengths and weaknesses 
for specific subtests within the VCI and PRI and not the following two 
indices. 
Processing Speed Index (PSI) 
Roshan scored 102, indicating that his speed of information processing falls 
within the Average range. He scored at the 55th percentile. There was no 
difference in Roshan’s ability-level on the two subtests that comprise this Index. 
Regarding the individual subtests that comprise the PSI, the Symbol Search task 
requires the examinee to search a group and decide whether the target symbol(s) 
matches any of the symbols in the search group within a specified time limit. 
Roshan scored within the Average range on this subtest. 
The Coding task requires the individual to copy symbols that are paired with 
numbers within a specified time limit. Roshan again performed within the Average 
range on this subtest. 
Working Memory Index (WMI) 
Roshan scored 97, indicating that his ability to temporarily hold and 
manipulate information within his short-term memory falls into the 
Average range. He scored at the 42nd percentile. There was no difference in 
Roshan’s ability-level on the two subtests that comprise this Index. 
In the Digit Span subtest, Roshan had to repeat single digit numbers back to me, 
firstly in order and then reserve them. He could successfully recall 6 digits in order 
and 5 in reverse order which, overall, placed him in the Average range. 
In the Arithmetic subtest, working within a specified time-limit, the individual 
must mentally solve a series of arithmetic problems. Roshan scored in the Average 
range on this task, indicating that his ability to briefly hold information in mind 






Full Scale Intelligence Quotient (FSIQ) 
It should be noted that, due to the large difference between Roshan’s 
Verbal Comprehension Index score and his Perceptual Reasoning Index 
score, his FSIQ could not be validly computed. 
SUMMARY: Overall, Roshan’s performance and score on the WAIS-IVUK suggests 
that, although his processing speed is within the average range, relative to others 
of his age, his verbal comprehension and working memory abilities are slightly 
lower than the general population, whilst he exhibits a more marked difficulty in 
his ability to process visual and spatial material. This may mean that Roshan has 
(and has had) difficulty with everyday skills such as orienting himself in space (e.g., 
map-reading) and organising things (e.g., clothes, stationery, etc.) in physical 
space. It may be that his relatively (compared to his poor PRI) better language 
abilities act to somewhat mask his difficulties with visuo-spatial reasoning. 
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Table A1: Scores from the WAIS-IVUK 








100 94-106 50 Average 
Similarities 13    
Vocabulary 9    
Information 8    
Perceptual Reasoning 
Index 
88 82-95 21 Low 
Average 
Block Design 7    
Matrix Reasoning 8    
Visual Puzzles 9    
Working Memory 
Index 
97  90-104 42 Average 
Digit Span 10    
Arithmetic 9    
Processing Speed 
Index 
102 93-110 39 Average 
Symbol Search 11    
Coding 10    
Note: Scores related to indices, given in bold, are index scores; scores related to subtests, 
unbolded, are unscaled total scores. 
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APPENDIX 2: RAW DATA FROM TESTS OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
Roshan’s performance on selected tests of executive functioning is displayed in Table 
A2. 
Table A2: Roshan’s performance on tests of executive functioning 
Trail-Making Test  
 Time (seconds) Percentile 
Part A 23 40th 
Errors 0  
Part B 48 40th-50th 
Errors 0  
   
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS)  
 Raw score Scaled score 
Verbal Fluency   
Letter Fluency 47 13 







   
The Hayling and Brixton Tests  
 Raw score (s) Scaled score 
Sensible completion 11 5 (Moderate Average) 
Unconnected completion 9 6 (Average) 
Errors 0 8 (Good) 
   
Total scaled scores 19 6 (Average) 
   
Brixton   
Errors 15 6 (Average) 
 
